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FOREWORD
One of the objectives of the Air Force Center for Systems Engineering (AFCSE) is to
develop case studies focusing on the application of systems engineering principles within various
aerospace programs. The intent of these case studies is to examine a broad spectrum of program
types and a variety of learning principles using the Friedman-Sage Framework to guide overall
analysis. In addition to this case, the following studies are available at the AFCSE website.
■
■
■
■
■
■
■
■

Global Positioning System (space system)
Hubble Telescope (space system)
Theater Battle Management Core System (complex software development)
F-111 Fighter (joint program with significant involvement by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense)
C-5 Cargo Airlifter (very large, complex aircraft)
A-10 Warthog (ground attack)
Global Hawk
KC-135 Simulator

These cases support practitioners of systems engineering and are also used in the
academic instruction in systems engineering within military service academies and at both
civilian and military graduate schools. Each of the case studies comprises elements of success as
well as examples of systems engineering decisions that, in hindsight, were not optimal. Both
types of examples are useful for learning. Plans exist for future case studies focusing on various
space systems, additional aircraft programs, munitions programs, joint service programs,
logistics-led programs, science and technology/laboratory efforts, and a variety of commercial
systems.
The Department of Defense (DOD) continues to develop and acquire joint complex
systems that deliver needed capabilities to our war fighters. Systems engineering is the technical
and technical management process that focuses explicitly on delivering and sustaining robust,
high-quality, affordable products. The Air Force leadership has collectively stated the need to
mature a sound systems engineering process throughout the Air Force.
As we uncovered historical facts and conducted key interviews with program managers
and chief engineers, both within the government and those working for the various prime and
subcontractors, we concluded that today’s systems programs face similar challenges. Applicable
systems engineering principles and the effects of communication and the environment continue
to challenge our ability to provide a balanced technical solution. We look forward to your
comments on this case study and the others that follow.
John Paschall, Col, USAF
Deputy Director, Air Force Center for Systems Engineering
Air Force Institute of Technology
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) defines Systems
Engineering (SE) as an “interdisciplinary approach and means to enable the realization of
successful systems. It focuses on defining customer needs and required functionality early in the
development cycle, documenting requirements, and then proceeding with design synthesis and
system validation while considering the complete problem: operations, performance, test,
manufacturing, cost and schedule, training and support, and disposal.” 1 This case study on the
International Space Station considers what many believe to have been the ultimate international
engineering project in history. 2 The initial plans involved the direct participation of 16 nations,
88 launches and over 160 spacewalks—more space activities than NASA had accomplished prior
to the 1993 International Space Station decision.
Probably more important was the
significant leap in System Engineering
(SE) execution that would be required to
build and operate a multi-national space
station. In a short period of time, NASA
and its partners had to work out how to
integrate
culturally
different
SE
approaches, designs, languages and
operational perspectives on risk and
safety.
The International Space Station
(ISS) traces its heritage back to early plans
for the United States Manned Orbiting
Laboratory (MOL) program to the US
Skylab, the Shuttle’s Space Lab and then through the multiple Soviet space stations culminating
in the Mir. With the successful development and launch of the Space Shuttle, the United States
was ready to take on a much larger space station concept. In the fall of 1985, NASA put
together a plan for a dual-keel design with multiple US, European and Japanese research
modules along with Canada’s planned Mobile Servicing System. By 1986, this had changed
due to the Challenger accident and other safety considerations. A major new addition was a
new “lifeboat” vehicle that would accommodate emergency returns to Earth. All of these
changes caused the estimated price to double. By the end of the 1980s, the station design (now
called Space Station Freedom) had shrunk along with total crew (down to four), electrical power
generation (from 75 to 56 kw) and for budgetary reasons, there was no defined end-state for the
station. By 1990, the modified station cost was several times higher than the original plan. 3
By 1993, the station design had continued to evolve and cost estimates continued to
grow. The new Clinton administration set up a blue ribbon panel to look at the space station and
1

INCOSE website: http://www.incose.org/practice/whatissystemseng.aspx

2

“Systems Engineering Challenges of the International Space Station,” Mark. D. Jenks, 2000 NAE Symposium on
Frontiers in Engineering.

3

“Nasa’s Space Station Program: Evolution of its Rationale and Expected Uses,” Marcia S. Smith, Congressional
Research Service, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Science and Space, United States Senate, April 20, 2005.
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determine a new design that would fit within available budget. The new design, eventually
called the International Space Station (ISS), would still be an international effort but would now
include the addition of Russia as a major contributor of ISS modules and support.
As the
program progressed and assembly began, costs grew along with schedule delays.
By 2002,
NASA was looking for a way to significantly reduce costs and to complete the station. This
involved the cancellation of a few modules along with the emergency crew return vehicle. The
original plan called for 6-7 astronauts full time doing research and this was considered for a
reduction to 3. 4 Estimated cost for completion increased and the schedule slipped with a new
completion date of 2004.
By 2004, in the aftermath of the Columbia accident, the schedule and budget had grown
and ISS completion was now scheduled for 2010. President Bush announced a new NASA
Vision for Space Exploration which placed less emphasis on the ISS and started development of
a new fleet of vehicles that someday would go to the Moon, Mars and beyond. To make the
budget available for this new effort, the Shuttle would be retired in 2010 with the completion of
the ISS assembly. The ISS retirement date was unclear, possibly as early as 2016. These
decisions do provide an end state for ISS construction, but raise risk issues about US access to
the station after Shuttle retirement and before the next generation of US manned orbital vehicles
will be ready.
Not to downplay the major cost and schedule issues, the systems engineering challenge
on the ISS was equally monumental.
NASA had to quickly learn how to adapt its SE
approaches to include an awareness of those of the international partnership. NASA has its own
challenges of multiple centers with their own SE differences and approaches. NASA had to
learn how to operate as a “managing partner” to accommodate its International Partners (IPs).
A major effort was involved in developing the partnership agreements, allocating costs and usage
rights, and determining operational control. Under the new ISS partnership, 5 NASA was the
first IP among equals, with each board chaired by the NASA representative. In cases where
consensus could not be reached, the NASA representative technically had the right to make a
decision for the board; however, this right was rarely used in practice.
NASA was concerned about maintaining schedule and cost on the ISS program, because
failures would not be tolerated by Congress. Initial program strategy was for no IP to be on the
critical path, which would allow NASA more control to reduce risk. As it turned out, however,
the Russians ended up providing the first two major modules that were at the front of the critical
path.

NASA had to solve many major SE challenges. It had to figure out how to coordinate
and integrate all of the IPs and their highly integrated modules:

4

“Nasa’s Space Station Program: Evolution of its Rationale and Expected Uses,” Marcia S. Smith, Congressional
Research Service, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Science and Space, United States Senate, April 20, 2005.

5

“Lessons Learned and Recommendations on International Participation from the International Space Station
Program,” Daniel V. Jacobs and Michael J. See, Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, Sept. 2004.
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The integration challenge was further hindered by a lack of computer and information
technology capability both at NASA and its partners (especially the Russians). The ISS
helped accelerate NASA’s upgrade of its information technology systems and adoption of
a full email and web focused data exchange system. Within the constraints of federal law,
NASA had to supply computers and software to the Russians.



The Russians had a very different approach to SE, risk, and safety. The Russians had
significant on-orbit experience with the MIR and its predecessors, which drove their SE
approaches. For instance, they tended to be more conservative and evolutionary in
design. A prime example is their Soyuz/Progress vehicle designs, which are directly
traceable to their 1960s designs. They also utilized an approach that could best be
described as “dissimilar redundancy”. In this mode different systems can be utilized to
provide a basic capability.



The ISS design, development and construction began with Space Station Freedom design
work in the 1980s and are not scheduled to conclude until 2010, with operations
continuing until 2016 and possibly beyond, requiring NASA to solve major obsolescence,
logistics, and technology issues. The length of the program has created major personnel
challenges as NASA attempts to capture, manage, and create program knowledge while
dealing with significant career progression issues of its personnel.



The on-orbit assembly of the ISS created a major operational configuration challenge.
Each on-orbit configuration had to operate as a stand-alone space station, requiring
multiple design baselines for the structure, hardware, and operational systems. NASA
basically developed a new version of spiral construction theory.



NASA and its IPs had to develop innovative methods to test and verify interfaces. One of
the most significant of these involved Multi-Element Integrated Testing solutions for the
station components and then creating a complex test plan and hardware/software solution
for each configuration.



NASA had to develop expertise in supporting its systems engineering approach while
adjusting to the realities of a complex external environment including international
politics across many partner nations. At times, optimal technical solutions conflicted
with political constraints, and prohibitions created by the Iran, North Korea and Syria
Non-Proliferation Act, and International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).

Part of this problem was solved by adopting an integrated product team (IPT) approach. This
approach was utilized in a broad manner after the 1993 redesign activity. Its use diminished as
the design and development phase came to completion.
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1.0 SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES
1.1
1.1.1

General Systems Engineering Process
Introduction

The United States government continues to develop and acquire new systems and to meet
the scientific needs of our growing nation. With a constant objective to improve and mature the
acquisition process, the United States continues to pursue new and creative methodologies to
purchase these technically complex systems. A sound systems engineering process (hereafter
referred to as the SE process), focused explicitly on delivering and sustaining robust, highquality, affordable products that meet the needs of customers and stake holders, must continue to
evolve and mature. Systems engineering encompasses the technical management process that
results in delivered products and systems that exhibit the best balance of cost and performance
with the highest resultant technical integrity. The SE process must operate effectively with
desired mission-level capabilities, establish system-level requirements, allocate these down to the
lowest level of the design, and ensure validation and verification of performance, meeting cost
and schedule constraints. The systems engineering process evolves as the program progresses
from one phase to the next, as do the tools and procedures. The process also changes over the
decades, maturing, expanding, growing, and evolving from the base established during the
conduct of past programs. Examples can be found demonstrating a systemic application of
effective engineering and engineering management, as well as poorly applied, but well-defined
processes. Throughout the many decades during which systems engineering has emerged as a
discipline, many practices, processes, heuristics, and tools have been developed, documented,
and applied.
Several core lifecycle stages have surfaced as consistently and continually challenging
during any system program development. First, system development must proceed from a welldeveloped set of requirements. Secondly, regardless of the evolutionary acquisition approach,
the system requirements must flow down to all subsystems and lower level components. And
third, the system requirements need to be stable, balanced and must properly reflect all activities
in all intended environments. However, system requirements are not unchangeable. As the
system design proceeds, if a requirement or set of requirements is proving excessively expensive
to satisfy or becomes otherwise unsupportable, the process must rebalance schedule, cost, and
performance by changing or modifying the requirements or set of requirements with customer
concurrence.
Systems engineering includes making key system and design trades early in the process to
establish the system architecture. These architectural artifacts can depict any new system, legacy
system, modifications thereto, introduction of new technologies, and overall system-level
behavior and performance. Modeling and simulation are generally employed to organize and
assess architectural alternatives at this introductory stage. System and subsystem design follows
the functional architecture. System architectures are modified if the elements are too risky,
expensive, or time-consuming. Both newer object-oriented analysis and design and classic
structured analysis using functional decomposition and information flows/data modeling occur.
Design proceeds logically using key design reviews, tradeoff analysis, and prototyping to reduce
any high-risk technology areas.

1

Important to the efficient decomposition and creation of the functional and physical
architectural designs are the management of interfaces and integration of subsystems. This is
applied to subsystems within a system, or across large, complex systems of systems, and requires
acknowledgement of the human as an integral element of the system. Once a solution is planned,
analyzed, designed, and constructed, validation and verification take place to ensure satisfaction
of requirements. Definitions of test criteria, measures of effectiveness (MOEs), and measures of
performance (MOPs), established as part of the requirements process, take place well before any
component/subsystem assembly design and construction occurs.
Several excellent representations of the systems engineering process are presented in the
literature. These depictions present the current state of the art in the maturity and evolution of
the systems engineering process. One can find systems engineering process definitions, guides,
and handbooks from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, International Council
on Systems Engineering (INCOSE), Electronics Industrial Association (EIA), Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), International Standards Organization (ISO), and
various Department of Defense (DoD) agencies and organizations. They show the process as it
should be applied by today’s experienced practitioner. One of these processes, long used by the
Defense Acquisition University (DAU), is depicted in Figure 1. It should be noted that this
model is not accomplished in a single pass. This iterative and nested process gets repeated to the
lowest level of definition of the design and its interfaces.

Figure 1. The Systems Engineering Process as presented by the
Defense Acquisition University

2

The DAU model, like all others, has been documented in the last two decades and has
expanded and developed to reflect a changing environment. Systems are becoming increasingly
complex internally and more interconnected externally. The process used to develop aircraft and
other weapons of the past was a process effective at that time. It served the needs of the
practitioners and resulted in many successful systems in our inventory. However, the cost and
schedule performance records of the past programs are fraught with examples of some wellmanaged programs and programs with less than perfect execution. As the nation entered the
1980s and 1990s, large DoD and commercial acquisitions were overrunning costs and running
behind schedule. The aerospace industry and its organizations were becoming larger and more
geographically and culturally distributed. As applied within the confines of a single system or a
single company the early systems engineering process, was no longer the norm.
Today, many factors overshadow new acquisitions, including System-of-Systems (SoS)
context, network centric warfare and operations, and the rapid growth in information technology.
These factors have driven a new form of emergent systems engineering, which focuses on certain
aspects of the traditional process. One of these increased areas of focus resides in the
architectural definitions used during system analysis. This process is differentiated by greater
reliance on reusable architectural views describing the system context and concept of operations,
interoperability, information and data flows and network service-oriented characteristics.
1.1.2

Case Studies

The systems engineering process to be used in today’s complex SoS projects is a process
matured and founded on the principles of systems developed in the past. The examples of
systems engineering used in other programs, both past and present, provide many lessons to be
used in applying and understanding today’s process.
The purpose of developing detailed case studies is to support the teaching of systems
engineering principles. The systems engineering case studies assist in discussion of both
successful and unsuccessful methodologies, processes, principles, tools, and decision material to
assess the outcome of alternatives at the program/system level. In addition, the importance of
using skills from multiple professions and engineering disciplines and collecting, assessing, and
integrating varied functional data is emphasized. Analysis of these aspects will provide the
student with real-world, detailed examples of how the process plays a significant role in
balancing cost, schedule, and performance.
The utilization and mis-utilization of systems engineering principles are highlighted, with
special emphasis on the conditions that foster or impede good systems engineering practices.
Case studies should be used to illustrate both good and bad examples of acquisition management
and learning principles, to include determining whether:
■

Every system provides a balanced and optimized product to a customer.

■

Effective requirements analysis was applied.

■

Consistent and rigorous application of systems engineering management standards
was applied.

■

Effective test planning was accomplished.

■

Effective major technical program reviews were conducted.
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■

Continuous risk assessments and management adjustments were implemented.

■

Reliable cost estimates and policies were developed.

■

Disciplined application of configuration management was demonstrated.

■

A well-defined system boundary was defined.

■

Disciplined methodologies were developed for complex systems.

■

Problem solving methods incorporated understanding of the system within the larger
environment (customer’s customer).

The systems engineering process transforms an operational need into a set of system
elements. These system elements are allocated and translated by the systems engineering
process into detailed requirements. The systems engineering process, from the identification of
the need to the development and utilization of the product, must continuously integrate and
optimize system and subsystem performance within cost and schedule to provide an
operationally effective system throughout its life cycle. Case studies highlight the various
interfaces and communications to achieve this optimization, which include:
■

The program manager/systems engineering interface, which is essential between the
operational user and developer (acquirer) to translate the needs into the performance
requirements for the system and subsystems.

■

The government/contractor interface, essential for the practice of systems engineering
to translate and allocate the performance requirements into detailed requirements.

■

The developer (acquirer)/user interface within the project, essential for the systems
engineering practice of integration and balance.

The systems engineering process must manage risk, known and unknown, as well as
internal and external. This objective specifically focuses on external factors and the impact of
uncontrollable influences, such as actions of Congress, changes in funding, new
instructions/policies, changing stakeholders or user requirements or contractor and government
staffing levels.
Lastly, the systems engineering process must respond to “Mega-Trends” in the systems
engineering discipline itself, as the nature of systems engineering and related practices vary with
time.
1.1.3

Framework for Analysis

This case study is presented in a format that follows the learning principles specifically
derived for the International Space Station, utilizing the Friedman-Sage 6 framework to organize
the assessment of the application of the systems engineering process. The framework and the
derived matrix can play an important role in developing case studies in systems engineering and
systems management, especially case studies that involve systems acquisition. The framework
presents a nine row by three column matrix shown in Table 1.
6

Case Studies of Systems Engineering and Management in Systems Acquisition, George Friedman and Andrew Sage, Systems
Engineering, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2004, © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
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Table 1. Framework of Key Systems Engineering Concepts and Responsibilities
Concept Domain

Responsibility Domain
1. Contractor
Responsibility

2. Shared
Responsibility

3. Government
Responsibility

A. Requirements Definition and Management
B. Systems Architecting and Conceptual Design
C. System and Subsystem Detailed Design and
Implementation
D. Systems and Interface Integration
E. Validation and Verification
F. Deployment and Post Deployment
G. Life Cycle Support
H. Risk Assessment and Management
I. System and Program Management

Six of the nine concept domain areas in Table 1 represent phases in the systems
engineering life cycle:
A. Requirements Definition and Management
B. Systems Architecting and Conceptual Design
C. System and Subsystem Design and Implementation
D. Systems and Interface Integration
E. Validation and Verification
F. Deployment and Post Deployment
Three of the concept areas represent necessary process and systems management support:
G. Life Cycle Support
H. Risk Assessment and Management
I. System and Program Management
While other concepts could have been identified, the Friedman-Sage framework suggests
these nine are the most relevant to systems engineering in that they cover the essential life cycle
processes in systems acquisition and the systems management support in the conduct of the
process. Most other concept areas identified during the development of the matrix appear to be
subsets of one of these areas. The three columns of this two-dimensional framework represent
the responsibilities and perspectives of government, the contractor, and the shared
responsibilities between the government and the contractor.
The Friedman-Sage matrix is not a unique systems engineering applications tool, but
rather a disciplined approach to evaluate the systems engineering process, tools, and procedures
as applied to a program. The Friedman-Sage matrix is based on two major premises as the
founding objectives:

5

1. In teaching systems engineering, case studies can be instructive in that they relate
aspects of the real world to the student to provide valuable program experience
and professional practice to academic theory.
2. In teaching systems engineering, there has previously been little distinction
between duties and responsibilities of the government and industry activities.
More often than not, the government role in systems engineering is the role of the
requirements developer.
1.2

ISS Major Learning Principles and Friedman-Sage Matrix

The authors’ selection of learning principles from the Friedman-Sage matrix is reflected in
the Executive Summary of this case study (separate attachment).
The systems engineering of the ISS was necessarily biased towards government-led
integration, owing to the numerous intergovernmental agreements executed between the US and
its International Space Station partners.
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2.0
2.1

INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION PROGRAM
J OURNEY
Historical Background

Humans have always looked up at the sky and imagined
what it might be like to view the earth from outer space or the
heavens. The first recorded reference to a space station as we know
it today was in a short story 7 by Edward Everett Hale entitled “The
Brick Moon” in 1869. The space station or brick moon was to serve
as a navigation aid to sailors much as the stars or moon did for
centuries. Hale’s space station was not practical, because it was
constructed of bricks, had no propulsion and its inhabitants could
actually wave at the ships and jump up and down to make the
station vibrate as a warning signal. While not a physicist, he
identified an early concept to use orbiting satellites to aid in
navigation—a very crude Global Positioning Satellite (GPS).
Later, in 1923 8, Hermann Oberth wrote of space travel to the moon
and beyond starting from an orbiting “space station”—which was
the first coining of the term. He even published the first concept of
a wheel-like space station. 9 In 1952, Dr. Werner von Braun (a
former student of Oberth) published an important
article in Colliers magazine about his idea for a Figure 2. US Manned Orbiting Laboratory
(USAF Image)
rotating space station in a 1000-mile high orbit. In
1959, the U.S. Army began a study called Project
Horizon 10 to consider building a permanent outpost on the Moon along with a possible space
station. The Department of Defense (DoD) began a program called Manned Orbiting
Laboratory 11 (MOL) in December 1963 (Figure 2). Its purpose was to provide a reconnaissance
capability to the Air Force and establish the first manned military space program. The program
was eventually cancelled in June 1969.

7

“The Brick Moon,”, Edward Everett Hale, The Atlantic Monthly, 1869

8

By Rocket to Space, Hermann Oberth, 1923

9

Frontiers of Space Exploration, Roger D. Lanius, Greenwood Press, 1998

10

“Project Horizon Report: A US Army Study for the Establishment of a Permanent Lunar Outpost,” 9 June 1959.

11

“Best Laid Plans: A History of the Manned Orbiting Laboratory,” Steven Strom, Aerospace Corporation.
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2.1.1

Soviet Space Stations

The Soviet Union launched the
first space station in its early Almaz and
Soyuz programs. An early Almaz design
is shown in Figure 3. These early space
stations were developed and built in the
1964-1977 timeframe. They were
relatively small and could not be refueled
or resupplied (other than what the
arriving crews brought in their small
Soyuz capsules). These stations were
placed in orbit by Proton rockets with the
crew to follow in Soyuz capsules. They
were marginally successful with at least
five built; one failed to achieve orbit, but
at least four were occupied by one or
more crews. The first successful mission
occurred in 1971. However, the
successful docking was overshadowed by
the deaths of the Soyuz-11 crew due to a
failed pressure equalization system that
asphyxiated
Georgi
Dobrovolski,
Vladislav Volkov, and Viktor Patsayev

Figure 3. Soviet ALMAZ Space Station

The second generation of Soviet
space stations flew from 1977-1985.
These were slightly larger but had the
capability to be refueled and resupplied
by automated Progress capsules—a major
Figure 4. Soviet Salyut 6 Space Station
technological achievement. As shown in
Figure 4, the Salyut 6 space station was considerably larger than previous stations and allowed
for multiple crews and longer missions. These provided the Soviets with valuable experience in
extended stays in space providing logistics support and crew transportation to the space stations.
The third generation Soviet space station was the Mir which was first occupied in 1986 and
remained in orbit 15 years. It was 107 feet long by 90 feet wide and weighed an estimated 135
tons when completed. The Mir provided valuable research and information on long-term
habitation in space. It also became the stepping stone for the ISS and its future crews at the end
of its operational life.
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2.1.2

Skylab

The United States launched its first space
station, Skylab, in 1973 with plans to keep it in
operation well into the 1980s with support flights
from the new space shuttle (Figure 5). It was
launched on 14 May 1973 and was occupied by
three separate crews that year. The original plan
was to park it in a higher orbit, shut it down and
then wait for the new Shuttle to resume support
flights to the station.
Due to unexpected
dynamics during the first reboost a second
planned firing was not completed. Due to delays
in the Shuttle development, the lower orbit and
a degrading altitude resulting from higher
than anticipated solar activity; it reentered
the atmosphere on 11 July 1979.

Figure 5. US Skylab Space Station

As the Shuttle program began launch
operations in 1981, 12 it began to take experimental laboratories in its cargo bay into orbit for
research and experiments—as part of what was called Spacelab. While not a true space station,
it allowed the US to conduct research in orbit and develop test equipment for the future space
stations.
2.1.3

Space Station Freedom

In 1984, with the Shuttle on track, NASA announced plans for the next stage of space
exploration to be a space station that would support up to eight full time astronaut scientists. The
design and funding changed multiple times during the 1980s and eventually ended up as the
Space Station Freedom in 1988 with Canada, Europe and Japan onboard as partners.
2.1.4

Shuttle-Mir Program

At the end of the first Bush Administration in 1992, the United States and Russia agreed
to jointly engage in space exploration. 13 At this time the Space Station Freedom was
transitioning into the International Space Station (ISS), and United States and Russia were
looking for ways to renew cooperation and benefit from existing space programs. Often referred
to as Phase One of the eventual ISS program, the Shuttle-MIR program provided the United
States access to the MIR and opportunities to engage in long duration space missions and
experimentation (Figure 6). Of equal importance to the Russians, it provided an influx of badly
needed revenue (in excess of $400M) to continue and expand the MIR program.

12

“NASA’s Space Station Program: Evolution of Its Rational and Expected Uses,” Marcia Smith, Congressional
Research Services, 20 April 2005.
13

Russian Federation Agreement Between The United States Of America And The Russian Federation Concerning Cooperation In The
Exploration And Use Of Outer Space For Peaceful Purposes (Signed at Washington D.C. on June 17, 1992, Proclaimed on June 17 , 1992)
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Figure 6. US Shuttle Docked with the Russian MIR Space Station
The initial cooperative program negotiated in 1992 had a single American astronaut
visiting the MIR and two cosmonauts joining a Shuttle mission. By 1993, the United States had
announced revised plans for ISS, and the program was expanded. The new program allowed the
United States to invest in the MIR construction which allowed for the launch and integration of
new modules, the Spektr and the Priroda. 14 Both were modules previously begun prior to the
collapse of the Soviet Union and both had initially been designed to accommodate some military
missions (surveillance). While NASA had little to do with the design of the MIR, it did allow
NASA to research the long term effects of micro-gravity on astronauts, gain experience on
spacewalks, allow testing and research of new equipment, gain valuable experience in docking
(Shuttle and Soyuz capsules with MIR) and learn critical lessons about day to day operation of
long term space assets in orbit.
The program began in February 1994 with the inclusion of Cosmonaut Sergei Krikalev
on board STS-60 for a nine-day Shuttle mission. The first Shuttle mission to MIR came in 1995,
and Shuttle support ended in 1998. During this time, seven astronauts performed long duration
flights on the MIR (up to six months) which provided valuable information for systems
engineering (SE) requirements generation of the ISS. They also spent significant time in Russia
training and working with the Russian system engineering staff.
While the program is hailed as a major success and valuable source of data for the ISS,
much of the valuable information was learned the hard way. Although it would be incorrect to
14

In the mid-1990s with the return of US-Russian cooperation in space, NASA agreed to provide funds to complete
the Spektr and Priroda modules in exchange for having 600 to 700 kg of US experiments installed.
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say that the missions were totally successful and the US experience was flawless, it painted a
clear picture of the risks involved in international space stations and their development. 15


The marriage of NASA with the Russian space program felt to many to be a
forced marriage at best in the beginning. It was a major cultural shock for the
NASA astronauts, engineers and managers to integrate with the former Soviet
bureaucracy and its systems engineering establishment. Information was power
in the Russian system, so documentation and sharing of information was
constrained. The Russians had similar difficulties learning and understand the
engineering techniques and emphasis of their American counterparts.



Although NASA had significant experience in multi-national projects the level of
support and integration required to form the partnership with Russia was
overwhelming. This was exacerbated by the condition of emergence from the
Soviet era and the mammoth political and economic change occurring in Russia.



In most NASA international projects English was the primary language of the
project. With the initiation of the Russian partnership that was the accepted
principle however it was not practical to have English as the primary language.
Most of the NASA professionals couldn’t speak Russian and few Russians spoke
English, which caused communication problems across the board—even with
interpreters. In addition to basic language, the teams needed to agree on a
fundamental engineering and project management lexicon.



In the difficult economic environment of the mid-1990’s in Russia, the Russian
space industry was encouraged to seek “off-budget” resources. This also evolved
into unique payment scenarios where cosmonauts were compensated for specific
mission tasks. This raised significant differences in approach to crew operations
and at times caused confusion in plans and motivations for activities.



In 1997, an oxygen-producing canister (the same as being proposed for the ISS)
caught fire aboard the Mir Space Station due to a quality problem during
production (apparently a piece of latex glove was accidently left in the canister 16).
The resulting fire and smoke seriously compromised the station’s environment
and scalded one of the cosmonauts, who attempted to put it out with a waterbased fire extinguisher.

15

DragonFly: NASA and the Crisis Aboard MIR, Bryan Burrough, Harper Collins Publishers.

16

“Latex Glove Sparked Fire Aboard MIR Space Station”, Michael Brooks, The Guardian, 1997.
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Also in 1997, the Russians
experimented with a manual docking
system for the Progress in hopes that
it would allow them to avoid using
an expensive automated system that
had proven successful on past
missions. On one attempt, they lost
control of the Progress and it barely
missed the station. A few months
later, they attempted a similar
experiment and this time the
Progress hit the station and
punctured the Spektr module. This
caused significant damage, a total
loss of power and control and initial
decompression (Figure 7). Note that
partial power, control, and cabin
pressure were later recovered and
did not affect crew survivability.

Figure 7. Damage to the Soviet MIR
from Docking Accident
2.2

Space Station Freedom Redesign

On June 17, 1993, President Clinton announced 17 that he was accepting the advice of a
special blue ribbon panel and directing NASA to downsize the planned Space Station Freedom
(SSF) to save budget. He directed NASA to work with the US’s International Partners (IP) to
develop this reduced cost, scaled down version of the original Space Station Freedom. By the
end of 1993, the space station had a new preliminary design and the partners had invited Russia
as a major contributor and partner. The name Space Station Freedom had been dropped and it
became the International Space Station.
2.2.1

Budget

The primary reason driving the redesign of the Space Station Freedom was escalating
cost and a desire by the Administration and Congress to reduce NASA’s budget. At the time in
1993, the cost to design build and launch SSF was $31B with estimated operational costs of
$100B over its 30-year lifespan. 18 The new station, chosen by President Clinton, had an
17

“Space Station Redesign Decision Reduces Costs, Preserves Research, Ensures International Cooperation,”
Executive Office of the President news release, 17 June 1993

18

“NASA Unsure If Redesigned Space Station Is Viable,” by Warren E. Leary, The New York Times, April 23,
1993.
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estimated cost of $12.8B over the first five years (develop/launch) and $16.5B for operational
costs during deployment and a reduced lifespan of just ten years after its assembly in space. 19 At
this point in time, SSF had already cost $9B and it was hoped much of its technology and
systems could be reused on the new design. An additional but enormously significant constraint
was the direction from the Administration that the ISS program spending profile would be
essentially flat, capped at $2.1 B per year, during its development. 20 [Note that for large
government funded efforts, not only are technical issues the causal factor of cost growth, but
when the funding profile or “phasing” does not meet the planned profile, the cost tends to grow
and the schedule likely slips. Thus it is not just the amount of funding, but when the project
receives it.] As a program management challenge, incorporating a traditional development
funding curve in a flat profile would drive the ISS program in many ways.
Despite the redesign and its presidential support, the station’s future was still in jeopardy.
Just weeks after the report of the redesign team the ISS barely survived a cancellation vote in the
Congress by a single vote. Over the next several years, the program would continually face
cancellation votes. Although the margin of victory continued to climb, the level of
Congressional interaction was a large drain on program resources.
2.2.2

Studies/Review Panels

Underestimates by NASA of the station program's cost and unwillingness by Congress to
appropriate funding for the space station resulted in delays of Space Station Freedom’s design
and construction; it was repeatedly redesigned and rescoped. Between 1984 and 1993 it went
through seven major re-designs, losing capacity and capabilities each time. In January 1993,
Vice President Dan Quayle provided the outgoing President Bush with the annual report on the
US Space Program. 21 It generally supported the Space Station Freedom and gave it the go-ahead
to continue development. However, with a new administration a few weeks later, things changed
dramatically. Space exploration had been a major emphasis area of President Bush and his
predecessor, President Reagan. The new democratic administration had a different set of
priorities and saw a need to reallocate the federal budget.
On March 9, 1993, President Clinton directed the formation of the Advisory Committee
on the Redesign of the Space Station. Their task was to spend 90 days to redesign the space
station with the goal of reducing costs while still retaining research capability. At the same time,
NASA formed a team of 45 top NASA engineers and administrators along with 10
representatives from the International Partners to do the actual designs. The NASA team was
directed to develop three options that met budget goals, provided technical and scientific
capability, and reduced NASA management and operation costs. The three options, A, B, and C
were targeted to different development budget targets. Option A kept much of the Freedom
design but added an existing large spacecraft bus as an initial building block. Option B was an
optimized version of the Space Station Freedom design, Option C was a major deviation that
19

“Space Station Will Not Be Cancelled,” Audrey Leath, American Institute of Physics, June 18, 1993.
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utilized a very large core module similar to the Skylab. This option would require a new ShuttleC launch vehicle to lift the Station core. The team recommended Option A as the best solution
and that became the basis of negotiations with Russia. Over time and with the addition of Russia
many of the aspects of the Option A were dropped. The ISS today is much more the Freedom
configuration.
2.2.3

Changes from SSF to ISS

2.2.3.1 International Partners and Management
The Reagan plan for the Space Station Freedom intended that it would be a permanently
crewed space station built by the US, operated by the US, but with added capabilities from its
IPs. 22 The US goal would be that the IPs would not be on the critical path and their contributions
would be enhancements. As the definition of the ISS assembly task grew it became obvious that
the Canadian Canadarm2 would play a critical role in the station operations and assembly. The
initial invitation to participate from President Reagan was to the US Allies. This invitation was
answered by Europe (the European Space Agency, ESA), Japan (NASDA, later renamed JAXA)
and Canada The Canadian Space Agency (CSA).
With the new program and its IPs, the US did retain its role as the integrator (with Boeing
as the prime US Contractor), but the IPs were responsible for the development and long term
support of their modules and were now major investors and equal partners in the ISS. In fact the
management of the ISS has been devised in the Memorandums of Understanding (MOU’s) to
utilize bilateral relationships to facilitate the development of the elements and a multilateral
framework to integrate the overall operations of the ISS. In the multilateral framework the stated
goal was consensus decision making although the US was empowered to make decisions if no
consensus could be reached. As the configuration evolved, the IP contributions (particularly
those from the Russians) became increasingly more important to the critical path of ISS
assembly. This situation required a much more integrated plan of testing, assembly and
operations. It also led to schedule impacts as partners had budget and development challenges.
Under the new ISS, 23 NASA was essentially the managing partner, with each board
chaired by the NASA representative. In cases where consensus could not be reached, the NASA
representative had the right to make a decision for the board; however, this right was rarely used
in practice. Nothing in the ISS arrangements conferred upon NASA the right or ability to
compel another IP to take specific actions against its interests; therefore, occasions were rare in
which it was efficacious for NASA to make unilateral decisions. This was a significant
challenge to the systems engineering process, as NASA had to negotiate processes with
individual partners and across the entire partnership. In a systems engineering aspect several
architectural decisions were successfully implemented across most of the elements. Since the
partnership agreement with Russia allowed the use of existing or heritage equipment some of
those architectural agreements were not extended to the Russian elements.
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“Structuring Future International Cooperation: Learning from the ISS,” L. Cline, P. Finarelli, G. Gibbs, I. Pryke,
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“Lessons Learned and Recommendations on International Participation from the International Space Station
Program,” Daniel V. Jacobs and Michael J. See, Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, Sept. 2004.
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The inclusion of the Russians brought major changes. Several changes were cultural,
since the Russian approach to space systems, engineering and operations was different than that
of the US and its contractors. The source of the differences came with respect to approaches to
systems design. Basically, the Russians tended to employ a very evolutionary approach that
drew heavily on heritage designs, whereas NASA and ESA engineers were much more inclined
toward clean sheet designs which incorporate latest technologies. So, there were differences in
the details of the respective systems engineering approaches driven by these distinctive
approaches to systems design. Furthermore, the other IPs, foreign countries with different
languages, operated more like the US. Many of their engineers and managers were US-trained
and educated, and their aerospace firms had worked on US projects or with US contractors. That
was not the case with the majority of the Russian government and private contractors. Most of
the Russian contractors were cold war remnants of the Soviet Union and were struggling to
remain in business. Furthermore, most of their engineers had little contact with western firms or
practices—despite some contact through professional organizations and journals. Finally, the
Russians as a new team member did not integrate as easily as European, Canadian, or Japanese
partners, who had worked with NASA for years.
2.2.3.2 Orbit
A major change for the ISS was the decision to place the station in a 51.6 degree orbit,
the inclination the Russians achieve by launching due east from Baikonour. Prior launches from
the Kennedy Space Center were frequently at an inclination of 28.5 degrees to the equator
(which allows for the maximum delta-v imparted to the launch vehicle by the rotation of the
Earth due to a due east launch), though the Shuttle had flown several different inclinations prior
to the ISS flights. This orbit provided safe launches over water into an orbit that the Soviets
could not reach without incurring a substantial payload penalty. Changing the orbital inclination
to 51.6 degrees allowed the Russian launch facilities to provide support to the ISS.
At the time, NASA was sensitive that future groundings of the Shuttle fleet due to
accidents (Challenger had just occurred in 1986) would severely impact the ISS, and the possible
use of a Russian capsule for rescue or backup crew transport was a valuable asset to bring to the
team. The downside to this option was the reduction of Shuttle lift capability (almost 11,500
pounds out of its maximum capability of 55,000 pounds). Later the Shuttle program regained
much of this lift through the development of a “super lightweight” version of the Shuttle
External Tank and other weight savings options. This dissimilar redundancy of launch vehicle
was validated with the future repeated use of the Progress and Soyuz vehicles after the Columbia
accident and the grounding of the Shuttle fleet in 2003. Fourteen successive Russian crew and
supply missions reached the ISS before the shuttle returned to flight.
Changing the orbital inclination was a huge SE challenge. It impacted key ISS design
elements such as power and thermal subsystems, orbital debris protection, and STS operations.
Moreover, none of the subsystems were redesigned to maximize operation in the new orbit. The
decision was taken that in order to save design costs, much of the hardware designed for a 28
degree orbit would be flown ‘as is’ in the higher-inclination orbit. The change increased the
number of assembly flights, restricted launch windows throughout the year and per launch
opportunity. Changing the orbital inclination was a major decision that ended up being
negotiated at the Vice Presidential Level (Al Gore and Viktor Chernomyrdin). This decision
salvaged much of the design up to that point, but created major operational complexities that are
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still being experienced today, and that indeed drive the size and cost of the workforce needed to
operate and maintain the ISS.
2.3
2.3.1

NASA Systems Engineering Environment
NASA Management Approach

NASA had the task of leading a sixteen-country international team through the ISS
system development, module production, visiting vehicle fleet scheduling and integration, onorbit construction, and the long-term station operation. Each agency negotiated and signed
detailed agency-specific Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) that defined partner
contributions, payments for support, and operational responsibilities. Operational control of the
ISS in entirety was to be enabled from Houston and Moscow, while control of payloads and
some partner module systems were planned for partner auxiliary sites such as St. Hubert and
Huntsville. As shown in Figure 8, 24 multiple control centers and launch sites are in use.

Figure 8. NASA and International Partner Operations Scope
In order to appreciate the effectiveness of the post 1993 Space Station redesign
management approach, a brief background of the Space Station Freedom period is useful. The
original structure of the Space Station Freedom systems engineering effort involved several
“levels”. The Freedom engineering hierarchy was organized as much for political/congressional
funding reasons as for any other reason, and this structure led to significant integration issues,
due to its wide geographic spread and the decoupled nature of the financial oversight of the
24

“Final Report of the International Space Station Independent Safety Task Force,” February 2007

16

program. Level 1 was housed at NASA headquarters in Washington, DC. It was not directly
involved in the day-to-day engineering effort, and instead handled most of the political interfaces
and the highest-level program funding decisions. Level 2 was a specially created NASA center,
housed in leased office space in Reston Virginia, separate from both HQ and the NASA field
centers. Level 2 was explicitly designed to be a systems engineering center for the Freedom
program. However, Level 2 was not empowered to control budgets of individual project offices
(the work packages) at the field centers, thus it had virtually no leverage over the engineering
projects it was supposed to integrate.
Level 3 handled the detailed engineering of the subsystems and the modules. Each
subsystem and each module had a system development manager (SDM) and a system integration
manager (SIM). The power generation system was assigned to the Lewis (later renamed Glenn)
Research Center, the environmental control and life support system was assigned to Marshall
Space Flight Center (MSFC), most other systems and subsystems were assigned to the Johnson
Space Center, the integration of the modules and payload accommodations were assigned to the
Marshall Space Flight Center, and the special dexterous human-like robotic system called the
Flight Telerobotic Servicer (FTS) was assigned to the Goddard Space Flight Center. There was
tremendous political pressure to have major responsibilities assigned in the different
congressional districts: thus it was ambiguous in many cases to know who was actually in
charge.
As an example of the confusion that could ensue from such organizational structure,
consider the distribution of electrical power. The secondary power system was managed at JSC
as a subsystem. Its interface with payloads occurred at the interface to racks within the US lab
and inside modules developed by ESA and by NASDA (later named JAXA). The control of the
power distribution was accomplished through the data management system (DMS) architected at
JSC, but programmed in the individual field centers in individual Tier 1 controllers (more on
Tier 1 later). At varying meetings, it was claimed that the command and control of the power
management at the payload rack interface was the responsibility of the power subsystem team,
the payloads team, the lab module team, and the data management team. Contractors working
for the payloads community developed the obligatory Payloads to Electrical Power Subsystem
(EPS) Interface Requirements Document (IRD). At the same time, contractors working on the
power subsystem developed the Electrical Power Subsystem to Payloads Interface Requirements
Document. Neither was developed with the cooperation of the other contractor or center. The
Lab team developed IRDs to both groups that encapsulated the electrical interface control with
the Lab control processor in charge. The Data Management System (DMS) team developed
independent IRDs to the Lab, to payloads, and to EPS, and they in turn developed independent
IRDs to the DMS, with such routine matters as closing electrical circuits as one of the major
functions of the interface.
Worse, in the early days of Freedom, the contract structure required that the contractors
deliver such documents by certain drop dates. The technical maturity of such contractually
mandated books was not specified in the delivery dates: only the structure of the document and
key contractually-mandated legal text was specified. Thus, scores of such IRDs flowed around
the program with boilerplate preamble text and acronym lists, sandwiched around technical
sections that were largely filled with “TBD”. It was easy to get decoupled, and to stay that way
for long periods. Level 2 had no power to order the elimination or merging of any duplicate
documents. From the scant technical content that did emerge from the myriad boilerplate
17

documents, the emerging command and control team found at least seventeen command names
for the act of activating a switch, including command names such as “On”, “Toggle”, “Enable”
“Switch”, “Power”, “Power ON”, and “Set On”.
The concept of Level 2 and work-packages exemplified how not to conduct systems
engineering on a complex system. As exemplified above, the Level 2 management had no
control, specifically budgetary control, over the Level 3 Work Packages. “Influence” proved not
to be a sufficient integrating lever. It was clear at that point that a single lead center with
designated program management authority and control as well as resident engineering
horsepower was an absolute necessity on a program this large, complicated and multi-national.
The Johnson Space Center became the lead program management and SE center following the
1993 redesign (the post-Space Station Freedom era). In that role, they are supported by Boeing,
who served as the integrating contractor and prime support contractor. Boeing has procured and
developed several of the key modules and systems. Boeing also provides overall hardwaresoftware integration and sustaining engineering. Along with Boeing are hundreds of large and
small contractors providing key subsystems, technical supports and logistics services. Within
NASA, these contractors are engaged through normal contracting channels and participation on
Integrated Product Teams (IPTs).
Boeing played a critical role on this team as the lead system engineer for the program.
Boeing provided the experience to co-lead the IPTs with NASA and execute the SE management
that was a major challenge on this program due to the multi-partner integration. It was a
challenging role, since Boeing could not officially negotiate with other countries and often had to
provide the technical lead while NASA provided official signature on detailed international
agreements known as “Protocols”.
The overall Program team is managed through an ISS Control Board Structure, as shown
in Figure 9. The ISS team uses top-level control boards and panels to manage the ISS hardware
and software configuration along with any operational products. At the very top of the process is
the Space Station Control Board (SSCB) that manages the multilateral control of the
configuration. A NASA Space Station Program Control Board exercises control over the several
layers of more detailed ISS subsystem control boards associated with the US elements. This
process is also integrated with the Space Shuttle control boards. Each partner utilizes a similar
control mechanism for their elements.
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Figure 9. Systems Engineering Integration Boards
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2.3.2

NASA Center Approaches

NASA has 10 major centers within its organization and in theory they are of one mind on
systems engineering as it relates to major projects. As an agency, NASA maintains Systems
Engineering process guidance and good practices as documented in its NASA System
Engineering Handbook. 25
Despite this set of agency-level process requirements, the
interviewees commented that each NASA center had a legacy systems engineering (SE) process
that was at times, slow to conform to the agency approach. Additionally, several reported that
the SE processes were driven by the lead SEs, who tended to dominate the resident programs.
The approaches are also different based on the systems being developed and operated, which
allows for a tailoring of the approach. In the case of the ISS, this was exacerbated by the
inclusion of the international partners whose SE approaches differed significantly.
In a 1969 speech prior to the ISS and prior to becoming NASA Administrator, 26 Robert
Frosch commented on strict adherence to mandated SE techniques and bureaucracy:
“I believe that the fundamental difficulty is that we have all become so entranced
with technique that we think entirely in terms of procedures, systems, milestone
charts, PERT 27 diagrams, reliability systems, configuration management,
maintainability groups and other minor paper tools of the ‘system engineer’ and
manager. We have forgotten that someone must be in control and must exercise
personal management, knowledge and understanding to create a system. . . .
Systems, even very large systems, are not developed by the tools of systems
engineering, but only by engineers using tools.”
2.3.3

System Engineers and the Experience Chain

A major issue of any program, especially one like the ISS going on two decades, is how
to recruit, develop, and retain quality system engineers. In fact, NASA’s human spaceflight
programs are usually generational programs. NASA has to manage the workforce over decades
while ramping up for new programs, maintaining ongoing programs and shutting down longterm programs. In the ISS case, the challenge is especially difficult.

25



The initial workforce was a mix of experience, some dating all the way to Apollo,
Skylab and Apollo-Soyuz. Most of the staff, however, came from the Space
Shuttle, Space Station Freedom, and Shuttle-Mir programs. While the ISS
program has been relatively successful to date, it has been under constant attack
due to its schedule and budget issues, along with competition from other
programs (inside and outside of NASA). This does not create a stable long-term
work environment for some engineers.



Many of the engineers desire career progression either in management or to other
technical areas or programs. This tends to encourage engineers to leave the

NASA System Engineering Handbook, NASA/SP-2007-6105

26

“A Classic Look at Systems Engineering,” Bob Frosch, Asst. Secretary of the Navy for RDT&E, speech to the
IEEE Group on Aerospace and Electronic Systems their international conference in New York, 26 March 1969.
27

PERT is Program Evaluation Review Technique
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program and seek other opportunities. This is particularly exacerbated in very
long term programs like the ISS.


While not unique to ISS, over the program’s history, many of the traditional
NASA government positions and areas of responsibility have been absorbed by
contractors in attempts to reduce cost. While this study does not allege any
difference between a practicing government SE as opposed to a contractor SE—
there is a difference driven by job descriptions and responsibilities. As the
government SEs/engineering positions decline, the remaining personnel have less
opportunity to “start at the bottom” and do detailed engineering over a full career.
Rather, they often see their administrative and management responsibilities leave
them little opportunity to learn and to hone their engineering skills. At the same
time, more and more of the engineering and system engineering responsibilities
are assigned to the contractor. This makes it very difficult for the government SE
to gain in-depth SE experience.



During the space station redesign a decision was made to dramatically modify the
systems engineering and integration aspect of the program. Rather than the
Freedom model of the government team (with a support contractor) providing
SE&I, the team recommended selecting a single prime contractor to manage those
functions across the multiple US elements and to provide support to the
integration with the partners. This change was based on the potential cost savings
but also to simplify what the panel felt was a confusing organizational structure
and diffuse accountability. Depending on the level of the division of labor
between NASA and the Prime this can lead to dissatisfaction with engineers who
desire a more “hands on” level of participation in the SE process. Although it may
depend on who you ask, with many NASA ISS engineers believing that the IPT
structure made the system a bit more “badge-less” between the Prime and the
government.

Multiple studies have researched the traits that make a good systems engineer and the
environment that is required to nurture them. A recent study28 from the Aerospace Corporation 29
investigated why certain organizations were able to develop a steady stream of qualified systems
engineers. In this study, Dr. Davidz identified five foundational elements that support a system
engineering development environment:
1. Componential element: this element describes those aspects that are considered in
systems thinking, such as systems objectives, elements, and domain. This considers
components such as political, organizational, economic and technical. 30
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“Developing the Next Generation of Systems Engineers” by Dr. Heidi Davidz, Aerospace Corporation 2006

29

Aerospace Corporation is a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) for the United States Air
Force and the National Reconnaissance Office to support all national-security space and missile programs.
They have provided independent technical and scientific research, development, and advisory services to nationalsecurity space and missile programs since 1960.
30

“Enabling Systems Thinking to Accelerate the Development of Senior Systems Engineers” PhD Dissertation, Dr.
Heidi Davidz, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2006.
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2. Relational element:
this element addresses the connections, interactions and
interdependencies within the system or system of systems.
3. Contextual element: this element addresses the nested and embedded natures of systems
4. Dynamic element: this element links systems in time to the future and past, to include
aspects such as feedback, uncertainty, risk and programmatic “ilities.”
5. Modal element: this element aids with understanding and comprehension of the system
and is the “how of systems thinking.”
A NASA sponsored study 31 focused on 38 successful, highly regarded mid-level
system engineers across the NASA Centers. Despite the wide dispersal at different centers with
different SE environments, the engineers demonstrated the same basic highly effective
behaviors. These behaviors fell into five broad categories: leadership, attitudes and attributes,
communication, problem solving and systems thinking, and technical acumen.
2.3.4

Systems Engineering Challenges of the ISS

The massive scope of budget, schedule, and technical goals of the ISS was daunting
compared to previous space projects. It is one of the largest international programs in modern
times directly involving sixteen nations, well over 100 launches and almost 200 space walks
before the station will be completed. From the beginning, the team members were aware that
they faced three major system engineering challenges 32:
1. Extended Development Cycle: The NASA team started on the initial space
station program back in the 1984 time frame, then went through several changes
before becoming the ISS in 1994. Initial modules weren’t launched until late
1998 with final assembly not scheduled until about 2010. Final shutdown of the
station is no earlier than 2016. This creates an incredible burden of handling
engineering staffs, knowledge retention and training, management, government
transitions, budget fluctuations, technology maturation and obsolescence.
Over a long period of time, public and Congressional support can diminish, which
puts incredible pressure on the team to make sure everything works—since
failures are often rewarded with termination. As mentioned earlier the ISS
program faced many cancellation votes in the Congress. Key analysts and
engineers are also looking for challenges and the opportunity to work on a broad
number of programs, so knowledge management and experience retention are
serious issues.
2. Test and Verification: Due to the long development and build phases (not to
mention the structural and size issues of the ISS), it is infeasible to test the entire
ISS on the ground prior to launch. The first modules were on orbit prior to the
completion of later modules. The modules and subcomponents must have high
31

“NASA Systems Engineering Behavior Study,” Christine Williams (NASA HQ) and Mary-Ellen Derro (JPL),
October 2008.
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“Systems Engineering Challenges of the International Space Station,” Mark. D. Jenks, 2000 NAE Symposium on
Frontiers in Engineering.
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reliability and be able to work immediately, since on-orbit repair options are often
limited. As discussed later, new system test procedures were developed to allow
for multi-element integrated testing. Other parts are designed for space (such as
the solar panels) and thus can’t be deployed on the ground for system checks
without damaging them or required expensive special test fixtures. As will be
explored later, there is the not-so-trivial issue that several modules were made by
the International Partners using different system engineering approaches with the
goal of meeting integration standards. Most of these modules never physically
mated until they were in low Earth orbit. Finally, a major issue is that the ISS
must be flight ready with the first module and then with the addition of each new
module or sub-system, operate on its own as a new independent space vehicle.
3. Infrastructure Scale and Complexity: The infrastructure needed to house the
program offices, engineering staffs, production facilities, and integration and test
facilities is huge and represents a worldwide investment. NASA made a large
investment at the Kennedy Space Center to perform these functions and to stage
major ISS subsystems and parts. The infrastructure just for the launch vehicles
and their support structure is a multi-billion dollar effort. The ISS relied initially
on the Shuttle and the Russian launch capabilities—all major programs
themselves. Eventually European and Japanese launch capabilities are also
utilized.
2.3.5

Systems Engineering Process

The ISS used a system engineering process 33 based on the classical textbook model with
four key elements:
(1)

The ISS is a time-phased development -- the build schedules for the ISS components
are driven by the launch schedule, which was initially spread over a five year period
(ultimately took 12 years including the Shuttle downtime from the Columbia
accident.).

(2)

The ISS is physically integrated “in the field” -- the ISS is assembled on orbit from its
87 major component items.

(3)

The ISS is literally built “around the world” -- major component items were built in
the United States, Europe, Japan, Canada, and Russia, each of whose engineering
methods and cultures differ significantly. Because of this, a “meets or exceeds”
process was established to allow each partner to use its own process standards rather
than trying to force adoption of NASA’s process standards. In this case, a “meets or
exceeds” evaluation was performed on foreign deliveries (from ESA, ASI, NASDA,
and CSA) with respect to manufacturing standards, particularly on materials
processes and EEE parts. With respect to Russia, the evaluation was extended to
include almost all of the aerospace standards, including fracture control, human
factors, and coatings.

33

“System Engineering the International Space Station,” L. D. Thomas, Proceedings of the 33rd Space Congress, pp.
5-35 through 5-44, April 23-26, 1996.
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(4)

The ISS must function as a spacecraft during its assembly – its crew inhabited the ISS
beginning with the third assembly flight, both to aid in assembly and conduct
scientific research. The ISS flew in 44 free-flying configurations during the assembly
phase, an equal number of shuttle-mated unique configurations, and is comprised of
scores of smaller flight elements.

This was a fusion of the NASA systems engineering approach (as codified in the NASA
SE Handbook SP-6105) and the Boeing system engineering process (which was also well
documented and executed). At program start, NASA had over 100 system engineers in the
program office and Boeing provided 300-400 systems engineers. Boeing brought a great deal of
SE experience plus their airplane design and production experience that NASA lacked. This
allowed Boeing to share its aircraft experience in integrating parts and systems using digital
preassembly techniques to form computer aided design (CAD) models.
A key ingredient of the ISS success was the successful integration of the customer’s
needs into requirements and specifications. Dr. Dale Thomas (former ISS Systems Engineering
and Integration Manager) described the approach as: 34
“All too often, system engineering preoccupies itself with requirements definition
for a product. Requirements definition is a means, not an end. For this reason,
this section explicitly includes integration in the title. Indeed, within the scope of
this paper, system engineering includes the development of a valid and cogent set
of requirements and the verification of the as built design against those
requirements. Hence, system engineering must provide assurance that the
product as designed and built meets the customer's stated need; this is the
integration half of the process.”
2.3.6

International Partners

2.3.6.1 Creating International Partnerships
A major challenge of the ISS program was how to solve the political, financial, and
technical aspects of putting together a long-term international partnership. Long before the
systems engineers from each country could sit down and start work, agreements on management,
funding, and issue resolution had to be created. While it was not easy, NASA eventually worked
out a process that accommodated multiple countries with differing cultural and engineering
approaches to major program development and execution. NASA produced a lessons learned
report on the process and issued the following recommendations: 35
(1)

Early in the program, NASA should establish the legal and policy framework for the
partnership that covers intellectual property rights, liability, dispute resolution, public
affairs, amendments, international and criminal jurisdiction, customs and integration,
and terminations. No technical program information should be included.

34

“System Engineering the International Space Station,” L. Dale Thomas, Manager VAIT, NASA Space Station
Program Office.
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“Lessons Learned and Recommendations on International Participation from the International Space Station
Program,” Daniel V. Jacobs and Michael J. See, Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, Sept. 2004.
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(2)

As an evolutionary type program, initial projects should be bilateral and relatively
short in nature. Larger projects requiring multilateral arrangements should come
later.

(3)

A governance model and agreement must be established. The ISS Program was set
up to operate using a board and panel structure, each of which functioned on
consensus. NASA took the role of the managing partner, with each board chaired by
the NASA representative. In cases where consensus could not be reached, the NASA
representative had the right to make a decision for the board; however, this right was
rarely used in practice. The advantages of this arrangement were that each IP had a
voice and that this system allowed IPs to abstain when it was not in their interest for
cost, schedule or other programmatic reasons. The drawback was that the system
could become paralyzed when no consensus was reached on an issue and NASA
could not progress on it absent the support of the dissenting IP(s). The NASA report
noted that the Russians had been reluctant to fully integrate itself into the board
structure, preferring to handle most issues on a bilateral basis with NASA. All the
partners have resisted providing staffing to support the NASA board structure to the
level that NASA does.

(4)

Critical path management had to be maintained by NASA as the managing partner.
The critical path had to be studied and evaluated from an integrated program
perspective to determine the range of risks. This would impact how the specific
program plans were made or altered to minimize risk. When partner elements or
capabilities were on the critical path, NASA may have risk contingency plans in place
(with the full knowledge of the IP). This was a key issue early on with the Russians
delivering the first two major modules that were critical to attaining initial operational
capability. After the first module (purchased by NASA) had been delivered on orbit,
there was a nearly two year gap to the next critical Russian element. In this case
NASA considered using a backup power and support module that had been partially
developed for another program (later cancelled when not required).

2.3.6.2 ITAR and shared technology issues
The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) posed a threat of foreclosing
whole categories of cooperative efforts on the ISS.36 ITAR rules were designed to protect
militarily sensitive U.S. technologies from falling into the hands of U.S. adversaries. But U.S.
allies are also subject to them, even in cases in which the law's application seems to have
escaped the bounds of its intent. ITAR regulations apply to the ISS and all of its partners:
Russia, Europe, Japan and Canada. These nations signed a treaty-level document called the
Intergovernmental Agreement, which sets out each partner's rights and responsibilities, and
governs relations in the station's operation. The agreement was signed before ITAR went into
effect in 1999, and the partners have debated whether the treaty takes precedence over ITAR, or
whether ITAR should govern the station partners' relations.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Authorization Act of 2005
(Public Law 109-155), required the creation of an International Space Station Independent Safety
36
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Task Force (IISTF) to assess the vulnerabilities of the International Space Station (ISS) that
could lead to its destruction, compromise the health of its crew, or necessitate its premature
abandonment and to report back to NASA and the Congress. The February 2007 study37
reported the following:
The International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR) restrictions and IP
objections to signing what the IPs believe are redundant Technical Assistance
Agreements are a threat to the safe and successful integration and operation of
the Station. For example, a contractor workforce comprises a majority of the
operations workforce and must be able to have a direct interface with the IP
operations team to assure safe and successful operations. Their interactions,
ability to exchange and discuss technical data relevant to vehicle operation, etc.
are severely hampered by the current ITAR restrictions.

The systems engineering impact of ITAR was quite simple—it placed a constraint on the
SE processes and engineers. Like any constraint in a process, it usually results in a sub-optimal
outcome. At its simplest, it prevents the use of technologies on key modules or the interaction
of systems engineering personnel to develop and operate systems. On orbit, it could result in
certain equipment, procedures, or full modules being off limits to specific astronauts, or specified
equipment could not be integrated into other systems. Obviously, the ISS could not operate with
an integrated crew with those restrictions and NASA worked within the limitations of ITAR.
2.3.6.3 Differing SE Approaches among International Partners
There is a myth that science and engineering is black and white—that regardless of which
country does a project they all approach it the same. The NASA experience was that this was
not true and that a significant amount of planning, organization, and statesmanship was needed to
run a large international program like ISS. The NASA lessons-learned report 38 pointed out the
following key observations:

37



There are no standard practices—SE approaches may differ widely (along with
management, funding and scheduling approaches). The key to success was technical and
integration processes that were defined for all to follow or else to integrate with key
milestones. Communication protocols were essential, particularly in understanding the
varying lexicons.



The ISS had a single payload safety panel with full partner participation.



A difficult, but key, accomplishment was forcing all Partners to integrate their schedules,
budgets, and development life cycles. While each may have had different detailed levels,
they all had to integrate at the top program levels for discussion and execution,
particularly as the Space Shuttle was the launch vehicle for US, European, Japanese and
Canadian elements.

“Final Report of the International Space Station Independent Safety Task Force,” February 2007.
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Configuration Management and Control must be established early. While this is always
an issue, the ISS had a different twist with its IPs. Here, the IPs as independent agencies
could use the change process to gain political or financial leverage by either not accepting
changes or not following procedures.



There were some benefits of having IP differences. While commonality is often
preferred, dissimilar hardware approaches can add robustness for certain critical and
complex functions. A good example is the two systems for adjusting station
orientation—gyros and thrusters.

2.3.6.4 The Political Environment
Managing the disparate political environments of all partners has also been a challenge.
All partners have differing constituencies, budget cycles and motivations. The economic issues
in Russia in the mid-1990’s created significant financial hardships and gave rise to commercial
activities that were not fully embraced by the other partners. Many of the partners faced political
financial issues at various times. One of the most notable issues was the Russian plan to fly space
tourists to the ISS. While this caused significant strife in the partnership in the beginning, the
teams have learned how to effectively manage with this component as well. Ultimately the other
partners found a joint resolution which would accommodate the space tourist flights.
Despite several very high level differences the partners have worked consistently
effectively at the program level. This is a tribute to all partner teams.
2.3.7

Safety/Risk approaches

2.3.7.1 NASA Safety Process
NASA has developed a rigorous safety review process that is documented in their safety
review process regulation 39 for the overall integrated safety of the ISS. The purpose of this is to
provide in-line and phased reviews for the flight and ground elements and the support
equipment. NASA has signed MOUs with all international partner agencies 40 including RSA41
delegating NASA as responsible for the overall integrated safety of the ISS. In that role, NASA
provides the overall certification that the system (and its elements) is safe.
NASA and its International Partners have put together a rigorous process to manage risk
and to oversee the development and operation of all ISS activities: 42


39

ISS Mission Management Team: This senior level group meets almost daily to discuss
ongoing ISS operations, upcoming missions, and to discuss solutions to ongoing or
developing problems. This not only includes onsite leadership, but also coordination and
participation of partners.

Safety Review Process, International Space Station, SSP 30599 Revision B, February 2000.
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Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) Office: This group reports directly to the ISS
program manager and is responsible for managing the ISS safety program. The group
integrates all inputs from the IPs and manages their safety reviews. It also manages all
S&MA activities, reviews and requirements with the major contractors. Finally, it
supports the headquarters organization as needed.



Safety Review Panel: This group reviews and approves the hazard reports and safety
data packages required for flight approval. It assesses the safety and design of all flight
ISS segments, related ISS flight support equipment, ISS visiting vehicles, and ISS
assembly operations.

To achieve safety and reduce risk, NASA and the team have addressed all elements of the
SE process to minimize problems with the design, test, production and operation of the ISS.
These key elements were reviewed by the ISS Independent Safety Task Force 43:


Basic system design requirements must address three levels of risk:
1. Two-failure tolerant to catastrophic hazard—The on-orbit space station
must be designed so that no two failures, or two operator errors, or one of
each can result in a disabling or fatal injury or the loss of the Shuttle or
ISS;.
2. One-failure-tolerant to critical hazards--The on-orbit space station is to be
designed such that no single failure or single operator error can result in a
non-disabling personal injury, severe occupational illness, loss of a major
ISS element, loss of an on-orbit life sustaining function or emergency
system, or damage to the Shuttle;
3. Design for minimum risk—Hazards are controlled by safety related
properties and characteristics of the design rather than failure tolerance
criteria.



Robust On-Orbit Systems: The design philosophy is that the elements must meet a
two failure-tolerance requirement to avoid catastrophic outcomes. Most of the
major systems have a US system and separate Russian system. Both agencies
have very different approaches to providing these capabilities which reduce the
likelihood of a common failure. Most redundant systems also are built capable of
repair or on-orbit replacement. As an example, there are four sources of oxygen
at all times: the Russian oxygen generator (Elektron), bulk oxygen in tanks, the
US Oxygen Generation Assembly (OGA), and oxygen generation canisters.
While there have been issues with each, there never has been a simultaneous
failure of all four.



Verification Process: This is a five-step process that verifies that all hardware and
software meet requirements:
1. Clearly identify all requirements

43
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2. Define the requirement’s closure strategy—verify the requirements are
met via inspection, analysis, demonstration or test.
3. Execute the necessary verification activities
4. Develop verification reports/analysis
5. Document closure


Physical Verification: This step checks to ensure that the parts fit together and the
major sub-assemblies integrate correctly. This step cannot be accomplished at the
assembly level, since most of the modules and trusses are not assembled together
until the parts are on orbit.
o When possible, actual integration checks should be conducted on the
ground
o The process should develop and maintain accurate and detailed
measurements of all parts for virtual integration checks and modeling
o The process should include 3-D and virtual analysis or mating
o Full simulation and continuity checks of all cables, electrical, and fluid
connections should be conducted to ensure functionality

2.3.7.2 Safety and Off-the-Shelf Systems
A major focus of the ISS program was to use only proven systems (see page 50 for a
discussion of technology readiness levels) but still meet evolving safety requirements. There
were initial concerns about the Russian modules being proposed (Zarya and the Service Module)
since they were already partially built prior to the final station design requirements. NASA
safety officials 44 studied the systems prior to their launch and questioned four areas:
1. Inadequate shielding from orbital debris—this was a basic design tradeoff by the
Russians to keep the weight down and was designed prior to the ISS
requirements. 45 With the exception of the Zarya module, built under direct
contract to the US government, the Russian modules were too heavy to add any
more protective panels before launch. The fix would be to later install panels on
orbit if needed.
2. Inability of Zarya and the Service Module to operate after losing cabin pressure.
Much of the critical equipment in the modules required air for cooling electronics
which would eventually fail in a vacuum. This risk has been lessened with the
addition of other modules with redundant capabilities.
3. Service Module Windows not certified—at issue is whether the Russian windows
meet the requirements of surviving a leak of the outside pane without causing a
catastrophic failure or permanent leak. The window design planned for the
44
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Service Module windows did not meet the requirements for windows used on the
other ISS elements. Several areas of concern included insufficient ultraviolet and
infrared protection, no debris pane or scratch pane to protect windows from
impacts or crew induced damage and no way to safe or replace a window should a
window become damaged on-orbit. The windows on new modules are supposed
to last 15 years, but the Russian design requirement was only five years.
4. Noise levels on the Modules—the ISS requires noise levels no more than 55
decibels over a 24-hour period, but the noise level in the Russian modules are in
the 65-75 decibel range. This was an issue on the MIR, and several astronauts
suffered temporary or permanent hearing loss. Several fixes have been
implemented—more insulation, better crew hearing protection, and replacement
of some of the noisiest equipment.
2.3.7.3 Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) is a senior advisory committee that reports
to NASA and Congress. The Panel was established by Congress after the Apollo Command and
Service Module spacecraft fire in January 1967. 46 This panel has a 40+ year history of providing
support to NASA and all of its programs. It is normally staffed with either senior or retired
experts from the aerospace field to include previous NASA managers and astronauts.
The Panel's statutory duties, as prescribed in Section 6 of the NASA Authorization Act of 1968,
Public Law 90-67, 42 U.S.C. 2477 are as follows:
"The Panel shall review safety studies and operations plans that are referred to it
and shall make reports thereon, shall advise the Administrator with respect to the
hazards of proposed operations and with respect to the adequacy of proposed or
existing safety standards, and shall perform such other duties as the
Administrator may request."
As part of the systems engineering process, safety plays a major role in the requirements,
design, development, production and operation of the systems. In the case of NASA, this panel
provides oversight to all of these areas, but does so in a limited capacity. The Panel does not
work full time nor is it staffed 47 at a sufficient level to allow for detailed oversight or scrutiny.
The panel also has limited authority other than recommendations to change NASA designs or
operations. The panel provides recommendations to the NASA Administrator, develops an
annual report, and reports to Congress.
This lack of authority and integration into the operational aspects has led to some heated
discussions in the past. 48 Following the Columbia accident in 2003, the board issued a report
(and gave Congressional testimony) that challenged NASA to make the ASAP more independent
46
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and to give it an operational safety role in launch decisions and other operation activities. The
panel stated that in the past, NASA program managers allowed safety margins to erode in the
face of schedule and budget pressures. The ASAP recommended that NASA’s safety
organization be placed in a separate chain of command that reported directly to the Administrator
and thus provided a veto on the program managers’ decisions during key operations (such as
launch decisions). In a report issued prior to the Columbia accident, the board wrote:
“It is traditional in NASA for project and program managers to have the authority
to authorize waivers to safety requirements. Safety critical waiver authority
should reside with an independent safety organization using independent technical
evaluation. Moving this authority would increase the management oversight of
safety-related decisions and would strongly support the creation of a wellrespected and highly-skilled safety organization.”
An independent technical, quality or safety oversight board is not a new concept. In most
DoD organizations and contracts, groups like these report outside of the program managers to
guarantee independence. This process is used by the US Navy Sea Systems Command.49 In it,
the technical authority is an independent expert who is isolated from the program managers’
schedule and budget pressures.
The ASAP issues a yearly report that often contains warnings or recommendations
challenging NASA program managers. The 2002 report was a prime example; the report listed a
string of incidents or potential accidents due to miscommunication between Russian and
American engineers that indicated a dangerous pattern to the committee:




Shortly after STS-113 docked with the ISS, there was a loss of ISS attitude control due to
a lack of system configuration.
Lithium thionyl chloride batteries were brought on board over the objection of other ISS
partners.
Russian ground controllers sent commands to fire thrusters before US ground controllers
had disengaged the Control Moment Gyroscope system.

A comment was made by a former ASAP member 50 that there might be communication and
cultural issues between the Russians and Americans that also might contribute to increased risk
of accidents.
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3.0
3.1
3.1.1

FULL SCALE DEVELOPMENT
Major ISS Modules
Zarya Control Module

The Zarya Module (known by the technical term Functional Cargo Block and the Russian
acronym FGB) was the first component launched for the International Space Station. This
module was designed to provide the station's initial propulsion and power. The 19,323-kilogram
(42,600-pound) pressurized module was launched on a Russian Proton rocket in November 1998
(Figure 10).
As part of the business arrangement between NASA and Russia, the United States funded
this component of the station, although it was built and launched by Russia. The module was
built by the Khrunichev State Research and
Production Space Center, which is also known
as KhSC, in Moscow under a subcontract to
The Boeing Company for NASA.
Construction of the Zarya Module
began at KhSC in December 1994. It was
shipped to the Baikonur Cosmodrome,
Kazakhstan, launch site to begin launch
preparations in January 1998. The three-stage
Proton rocket launched the module into a 220.4
by 339.6 kilometer (137 by 211 statute miles)
orbit.
Only two weeks after Zarya reached
orbit, Space Shuttle Endeavour made a
rendezvous and attached a U.S.-built
connecting module called Node 1, or Unity.
The Zarya Module provided orientation
control, communications, and electrical power
to the passive Node 1 while the station awaited
launch of the third component, a Russianprovided crew living quarters and early station
Figure 10. Russian Zarya Module
core known as the Zvezda Service Module. The
Service Module enhanced or replaced many
functions of Zarya. The Zarya module is now used primarily for its storage capacity and external
fuel tanks.
The Zarya Module is 12.6 meters (41.2 feet) long and 4.1 meters (13.5 feet wide) at its
widest point. It has an operational lifetime of at least 15 years. Its solar arrays and six nickelcadmium batteries can provide an average of 3 kilowatts of electrical power. Its nadir docking
port accommodates either a Russian Soyuz piloted spacecraft or an unpiloted Progress resupply
spacecraft. As the station grew, it became necessary to send an extension module (the Mini
Research Module 1, or MRM1) to create a tunnel from this nadir port further towards the nadir,
to provide docking clearance and additional ports for visiting vehicles. Each of the two solar
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arrays is 10.7 meters (35 feet) long and 3.4 meters (11 feet) wide. The module's 16 fuel tanks
combined can hold more than 5.4 metric tons (6 tons) of propellant. The attitude control system
for the module included 24 large steering jets and 12 small steering jets. Its two 300 kgf engines
were used for reboosting the spacecraft and making major orbital changes before Zvezda arrived.
All of these engines were de-activated
several months after the Service Module
arrived, leaving the FGB to serve as a
propellant storage and feed system to the
Service Module and the visiting vehicles.
3.1.2

Unity Node

The Unity module (Node 1) was the
first major U.S.-built component of the
station and was delivered during STS-88
on Space Shuttle Endeavour in December
1998. It includes the Pressurized Mating
Adapter 1 pre-fitted to its aft port.
Assembly required crews to conduct three
space walks to attach the Pressurized
Mating Adapter 1 to the Zarya Control
Module, and to outfit exterior gear such as
handrails, cables, radio equipment, etc.

Figure 11. US Unity Module

In addition to its connection to Zarya, Unity serves as a passageway to the U.S.
Laboratory Module (attached later) an airlock, and other future growth modules. It has six
hatches that serve as docking ports for the other modules. It is 5.5 meters (18 feet) long, 4.6
meters (15 feet) in diameter and fabricated of aluminum. The Unity Node contains more than
50,000 mechanical items, 216 lines to carry fluids and gases, and 121 internal and external
electrical cables using 9.7 kilometers (6 miles) of wire.
Two additional nodes (Node 2 Harmony and Node 3 Tranquility) were built for NASA
by ESA and launched in October, 2007 and February, 2010 respectively. Harmony serves as the
connection to the ESA Columbus and JAXA Kibo modules, discussed later, as well as the
docking port for the Space Shuttle and later U.S. cargo and crew vehicles. Tranquility serves as
the base for the cupola, also discussed later.
3.1.3

Zvezda Service Module

The history of the Zvezda module goes back to the late stages of the Cold War when it
was originally intended as a cornerstone of the Russian Mir-2 space station. The service module
closely resembled the core module of the Mir space station and its design lineage traces back to
the Salyut and Almaz space station programs (see Figure 12). This was the first full Russian
contribution to the ISS and was fully funded by the Russians. The Zvezda module was initially
planned to launch in 1999. Given Russian delays, NASA embarked on development of a back-up
module with the intent of securing the critical path in the assembly sequence.
Zvezda was launched on July 12, 2000 from the Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan..It
served as the early station living quarters and as the main docking port for the Russian Progress
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cargo resupply vehicles. It also provided early propulsive attitude control and re-boost
capabilities for the station. Zvezda's living accommodation 51 provided two personal sleeping
quarters, a toilet and hygiene unit, a galley with a refrigerator-freezer and a table for securing
meals while eating. Its 14 windows 52 offered direct viewing of docking activities, the Earth and
other Station elements. Exercise equipment included a treadmill and a fixed bicycle. Cosmonauts
wearing Orlan-M (and later, the Orlan MK) spacesuits used the Transfer Compartment as an
airlock. 53 Zvezda also provided data, voice and TV links with mission control centers in Moscow
and Houston.

Figure 12. Zvezda Module with
3.1.4

Destiny Laboratory Module

The Boeing-built, Destiny Laboratory Module arrived at Kennedy Space Center, Fla. in
November 1998 to begin final preparations for its launch on Feb. 7, 2001, aboard Space Shuttle
mission STS-98, Station assembly flight 5A. As the first major laboratory, Destiny was the
centerpiece of the US portion of International Space Station, where science experiments were
performed in the near-zero gravity of space. The aluminum module consisted of three cylindrical
sections and two end cones with hatches that were mated to the Unity module at one end, and
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http://www.russianspaceweb.com/iss_sm.html
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The windows in this module represented a difference in Russian design philosophy that placed importance on
windows (for reconnaissance, research and crew considerations) vice the western designs that minimized the number
of windows for safety reasons (a later US module would only contain a single, large window).
53

Note, while the ISS had redundant airlocks early in assembly, the Russian airlock would only accommodate the
Russian spacesuits and not the American suits.
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would have the PMA-2 docking adaptor attached at the other on a later mission (See Figures 13
and 14).
When it arrived at the ISS, Destiny had five racks housing electrical and life-support
systems. Subsequent shuttle missions have delivered more racks and experiment facilities,
including the Microgravity Science Glove box, the Human Research Facility and five racks to
hold various science experiments. Eventually, Destiny would hold 13 payload racks with
experiments in human life science, materials research, Earth observations and commercial
applications, plus eleven systems and storage racks.

Figure 13. US Destiny Laboratory Module
A 50.9 centimeter diameter window was located on
the nadir side of the central module segment and is the largest
window ever to be incorporated in a space station. Destiny's
window (Figure 14), which takes up the space of one rack, is
of optical quality that enables scientific quality photos,
measurements and video. The window is protected by both
internal and external covers to avoid degradation of the glass.
The Window Observational Research Facility rack was later
deployed to house scientific and observational equipment for
use on the window.
The aluminum module is 28 feet long and 14 feet in
diameter. The lab consisted of three cylindrical sections and
two end cones with hatches that were mated to other station
35
Figure 14. US Destiny Module
High Grade Optical Window

components. An exterior waffle pattern strengthens the hull of the lab. The exterior is covered
by a debris shield blanket made of Kevlar similar to that used in bulletproof vests. A thin
aluminum “sandwich” debris shield was placed over the blanket for additional protection. This
module served as the primary living quarters for the non-Russian crewmembers during most of
the assembly of the ISS.

3.1.5

Canadian Space Robotics System

The Canadian space robotics system,
formally called the Mobile Servicing System or
MSS, is an essential component of the ISS. 54 The
MSS provides astronauts the ability to move
equipment and supplies around the exterior of the
ISS (Figure 15). It supported astronauts when
they were working in space and could be used to
release and capture satellites. The system has
three parts:
•

•

•

Canadarm 2, the Space Station Remote
Manipulator System (SSRMS) delivered to the ISS in April 2001
Figure 15. Canadian Space Robotics
the Mobile Remote Servicer Base
System
System (MRSBS) - a work platform
which moves on rails along the length of the space station - delivered to the ISS in
2002
the Special Purpose Dexterous Manipulator (DEXTRE) - the space robotics "Canada
Hand," which has two arms of its own - delivered in 2007.

The contribution of this technology, including Canadarm 2, helps CSA pay for its share of ISS
operating costs. It means CSA has access rights to the space station lab facilities for experiments.
It also means that CSA may send an astronaut to the ISS approximately every three years.
3.1.6

Quest Joint Airlock

The Joint Airlock (also known as "Quest") (Figure 16) was built by the U.S. and provided
the capability for ISS-based Extravehicular Activity (EVA) using either a U.S. Extravehicular
Mobility Unit (EMU) or Russian Orlan EVA suits. Before the launch of this airlock, EVAs were
54

“Canadarm 2,”By Susan Monroe, Canada Online (http://canadaonline.about.com)
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performed from either the U.S. Space Shuttle (while docked) or from the Transfer Chamber on
the Service Module. Due to a variety of system and design differences, only U.S. space suits
could be used from the Shuttle and only Russian suits could be used from the Service Module.
The Joint Airlock alleviates this problem by allowing either (or both) spacesuit systems to be
used. In the past, if the Shuttle was not docked, then the Russian space suits had to be used
through the Russian docking port if an EVA was required. The variation in airlocks and
spacesuits available on the ISS provides an important level of dissimilar redundancy for the EVA
function.
The Joint Airlock was launched on ISS-7A / STS-104 in July 2001 and was attached to
the starboard docking port of Node 1. The Joint Airlock is 20 feet long, 13 feet in diameter, and
weighs 6.5 tons. The Joint Airlock was built by Boeing at Marshall Space Flight Center. The
Joint Airlock was launched with the High Pressure Gas Assembly. The High Pressure Gas
Assembly was mounted on the external surface of the Joint Airlock and supports EVA operations
with breathing gases and augments the Service Module's gas resupply system.
The Joint Airlock has two main components: a crew airlock from which astronauts and
cosmonauts exit the ISS and an equipment airlock designed for storing EVA gear and for socalled overnight "campouts" wherein nitrogen is purged from astronaut's bodies overnight as
pressure is dropped in preparation for spacewalks the following day. This procedure prevents
the bends as the astronauts are re-pressurized after their EVA. Without the ‘campout’ procedure,
the cabin pressure in the entire ISS would have to be lowered prior to each EVA. The crew
airlock was derived from the Space Shuttle's external airlock. It is equipped with lighting,
external handrails, and an Umbilical Interface Assembly (UIA). The UIA is located on one wall
of the crew airlock and provides a water supply line, a wastewater return line, and an oxygen
supply line. The UIA also provides communication gear and spacesuit power interfaces and can
support two crew in spacesuits simultaneously.
These can be either two American
Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) spacesuits, two Russian Orlan spacesuits, or one of each
design.
Before the crew airlock's hatch is opened to space, the crew airlock is depressurized to 3
pounds per square inch (psi) from the ISS pressure of 14.7 (psi) and then down to zero psi. To
conduct this depressurization, a Russian-built compressor temporarily moves most of the air
within the airlock to the main pressurized volume of the ISS. At the end of the EVA, the airlock
is re-pressurized from this cabin air. By conserving the air, even at only 1.2 kilograms per cubic
meter, several tons of logistics are saved over the life of the program. The Quest airlock is the
only airlock in space history to conserve its air.
The atmosphere inside spacesuits is pure oxygen at 4.3 psi. Current spacesuit design
requires these lower pressures in order for the suits to be flexible enough to work within. At
higher pressures the suits stiffen and are hard to work in for prolonged periods of time.
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Figure 16. US Quest Airlock

Figure 17. Russian Pirs Docking
Compartment

The Equipment Airlock has stations that assist
astronauts and cosmonauts as they move into and out of their spacesuits during periodic
maintenance. The Equipment airlock has two racks, one for avionics, and the other for cabin air.
Batteries, power tools and other supplies are also stored in the Equipment Airlock.
3.1.7

Russian Pirs Docking Compartment

The 3,580 kilogram Pirs Docking Compartment is attached to the nadir (bottom, Earthfacing) port of the Zvezda service module (Figure 17). It was docked to the ISS on September
16, 2001, and was configured during three spacewalks by the Expedition 3 crew. 55
55

NASA official site, PIRS mission data,
http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/structure/iss_assembly_4r.html
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Pirs was launched Sept. 14, 2001, as ISS Assembly Mission 4R, on a Russian Soyuz
rocket, using a modified Progress spacecraft as an upper stage. The Docking Compartment has
two primary functions. It serves as a docking port for the docking of Soyuz transport and
Progress cargo vehicles to the ISS, and as an airlock for spacewalks by two ISS crewmembers
using Russian Orlan-M spacesuits.
In addition, the Docking Compartment can transport propellants from the tanks of a
docked Progress resupply vehicle to either the Zvezda Service Module Integrated Propulsion
System or the Zarya Functional Cargo Block. It can also transfer propellant from Zvezda and/or
from Zarya to the propulsion system of Progress. The docking compartment's planned lifetime as
part of the station was five years, but significant delay of its permanent replacement: the
Multipurpose Laboratory Module (MLM: built from the flight spare of the original Russian FGB
module: see section 3.1.11) meant that it had to stay for several additional years. A nearlyidentical Docking Compartment, dubbed the Multipurpose Research Module 2 (MRM2), joined
the ISS at the Service Module Zenith port in late 2009. MRM2 replaced a cancelled prior
concept for a Russian solar array tower called the Science Power Platform (SPP). MRM2
instead created a fourth docking port for Soyuz and Progress vehicles, greatly simplifying the
traffic planning at the ISS.
3.1.8

Columbus Laboratory

The European Columbus Laboratory (Figure 18) was launched on the Space Shuttle on 7
February 2008 and successfully attached to the ISS on 11 February. Columbus represents the
European Space Agency’s largest contribution to the ISS and is a critical piece to bring the ISS
research capability to fruition. 56

56

“ISS: Columbus,” A. Thirkettle, B. Patti, P. Mitschdoerer, R. Kledzik, E. Gargioli, and D. Brondolo. European
Space Agency.
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Figure 18. ESA Columbus Research Module
The research laboratory accommodates ten science racks, five of them for European
Space Agency use, the other five for NASA use. It is used primarily for research and
experimentation in microgravity conditions for:




Microgravity Sciences, to study processes that are obscured by gravity on Earth, and to test
physical theories at levels of accuracy that are impossible on Earth -- again, due to the
planet's gravity.
Fluid Physics, to learn the behavior and properties of fluids in microgravity and develop
techniques to improve oil spill recovery techniques, tracking of ground water contaminants,
optical lens fabrication, and many other processes.
Life Sciences, to learn how flora and fauna growth and disease occur in microgravity and to
convert what is learned into strategies for dealing with disease and disability on Earth.
The Columbus module also provides four external payload attach sites.

3.1.9

Kibo Japanese Experimental Laboratory

The Japanese Experiment Module (JEM), called Kibo, was Japan's first human space
facility and the largest module system on the ISS when completed in mid 2009 (Figure 19).
Experiments in Kibo focus on space medicine, biology, Earth observations, material production,
biotechnology and communications research. Kibo experiments and systems are operated from
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the Mission Control Room at the Space Station Integration and Promotion Center (SSIPC), at
Tsukuba Space Center in Ibaraki Prefecture, Japan, just north of Tokyo.
Kibo consists of six components: two research facilities -- the Pressurized Module and
Exposed Facility; a Logistics Module attached to each of them; a Remote Manipulator System;
and an Inter-Orbit Communication System unit. Kibo also has a scientific airlock through which
experiments are transferred and exposed to the external environment of space. The various
components of Kibo were assembled in space over the course of three Space Shuttle missions.
1. Pressurized Module: The Pressurized Module (PM) provides a shirt-sleeve environment
in which astronauts conduct microgravity experiments. There are a total of 23 racks,
including 10 experiment racks, inside the PM providing a power supply,
communications, air conditioning, hardware cooling, water control and experiment
support functions. As in Columbus, of the ten experiment rack locations in Kibo, 5 are
allocated to JAXA and 5 to NASA. The PM is 11.2 meters (36.7 feet) long and 4.4
meters (14.4 feet) in diameter, about the size of a large tour bus. This module was so
large (at 15 tons) that it was launched empty and most racks and other equipment were
added separately.
2. Exposed Facility: The Exposed Facility (EF) is located outside of the Pressurized
Module and is continuously exposed to the space environment. Astronauts exchange
experiment payloads or hardware from the Pressurized Module through the unique
scientific airlock using the Kibo Remote Manipulator System. Items positioned on the
exterior platform focus on Earth observation as well as communication, scientific,
engineering and materials science experiments. The EF is a platform that can hold up to
10 experiment payloads at a time and measures 5.6 meters (18.4 feet) wide, 5 meters
(16.4 feet) high and 4 meters (13.1 feet) long.

41

Figure 19. Japanese Kibo Experimental Module and Facilities
3. Experiment Logistics Modules (ELM) (Pressurized and Exposed Sections): The
Experiment Logistics Modules, or ELMs, serve as on-orbit storage areas that house
materials for experiments, maintenance tools and supplies. The Pressurized Module and
the Exposed Facility each have an ELM.
a. Pressurized Section: The Experiment Logistics Module - Pressurized Section, or
ELM-PS, is a short cylinder attached to the top of the Pressurized Module that can
hold eight experiment racks. It measures 4.4 meters (14.4 feet) in diameter and
3.9 meters (12.8 feet) long.
b. Exposed Section: The Experiment Logistics Module - Exposed Section, or ELMES, is a pallet that can hold three experiment payloads. It measures 4.9 meters
(16.1 feet) wide, 2.2 meters (7.2 feet) high and 4.2 meters (13.8 feet) long.
4. Remote Manipulator System: The Remote Manipulator System, or RMS, consists of two
robotic arms that support operations on the outside of Kibo. The Main Arm can handle up
to 6.4 metric tons (14,000 pounds) of hardware and the Small Fine Arm, when attached to
the Main Arm, handles more delicate operations. Each arm has six joints that mimic the
movements of a human arm. Astronauts operate the robot arms from a remote computer
console inside the Pressurized Module and watch external images from a camera attached
to the Main Arm on a television monitor at the RMS console. The arms are specifically
used to exchange experiment payloads or hardware located on the Exposed Facility and
Experiment Logistics Module - Exposed Section and from inside the Pressurized Module
through a scientific airlock, support maintenance tasks of Kibo and handle orbital
replacement units. The Main Arm measures 9.9 meters (32.5 feet) long, and the Small
Fine Arm measures 1.9 meters (6.2 feet).
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3.1.10 Cupola
The Cupola (Figure 20) is a European Space Agency (ESA)-built observatory module of
the International Space Station (ISS). 57 Its purpose is to provide ISS crew members with a direct
view of robotic operations and docked spacecraft, as well as an observation point for watching
the Earth. The Cupola project was started by NASA and Boeing, but was cancelled as a result of
cost cuts early in the ISS design period. After a barter agreement between NASA and ESA,
development of the Cupola was later taken over by ESA in 1998. Designed and built by the
Italian contractor Alenia, it is approximately 2 meters in diameter and 1.5 meters tall. It has six
side windows and a top window, all of which are equipped with shutters to protect them from
damage by micrometeoroids and orbital debris. It features a thermal control system, audio, video
and MIL-STD-1553 bus interfaces, as well as the connections needed for installing in it one of
the two identical robotic workstations that control the Canadarm2. The Cupola was launched
aboard STS-130, in Frbruary, 2010 along with node 3..

Figure 20. Cupola Observation Modules
Alenia Spazio Cupola Project Manager, Doriana Buffa, says the Cupola, with its seven
windows, is very unlike any of the other modules on the Station. Its most important contribution
is for making long duration space flights easier on the crew:
“The large viewing windows will provide the astronauts with a view of the Earth
quite unlike any other. For long-stay crews this will provide them with an
important psychological boost–an umbilical cord connecting the crew on the
Station to Mother Earth.”
While not discussed in most systems engineering texts, the ability of the crew to function
long term under often stressful situations must be part of the system’s design and part of the
system engineering process. This specialty is part of human factors engineering, a recognized
area of expertise at NASA’s Johnson Space Center.
3.1.11 Russian Multi-Purpose Laboratory Module
57
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The Russian Multi-purpose Laboratory Module (MLM) (Figure 21) has a long history of
starts and stops. It was originally started as a backup to the Zarya module (as the FGB2) and was
almost 70% complete when construction was halted. Then it was to be modified and used as the
universal docking module, which was later cancelled. The Russians always had plans for a
research module (or two) and in 2005 it was decided to convert the existing FGB2 into the
MLM. During final design discussions, an agreement was made with ESA to have the European
Robotic Arm mated on its surface for a later deployment in space. The production and assembly
suffered several delays and its launch on a Proton boost vehicle slipped to 2009.
The MLM is capable of supporting commercial
projects to a moderate degree, limited by power and
thermal constraints at its shaded nadir position. This
commercial payload concept allowed the Russians to
outsource off-budget funding including investments to
be used to complete and commission the module. For
the Russians, more so than other IP partners, the
ability to generate revenue has been critical to their
continued participation in the ISS. 58
Following are the requirements set for the FGB 2based MLM as derived from the input data:






Provide a port for Soyuz and Progress
vehicles and their modifications as well as
for research modules to be able to dock in
Figure 21. Russian Multi-Purpose
either automatic or manual mode.
Laboratory Module
Support propellant transfer from Progress
vehicles into the SM and FGB tanks.
Support the ISS roll control using its own jets.
Provide room to accommodate European Robotic Arm, provide footprints for external
experiments and for a cargo pallet, install probes for stowage and maintenance of
EVA payloads.
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Gunter’s Space Page,
http://space.skyrocket.de/index_frame.htm?http://www.skyrocket.de/space/doc_sdat/mlm.htm

44

3.1.12 Multi-Purpose Logistics Module
The three Multi-Purpose Logistics Modules (MPLMs) (Figure 22), which were built by
Alenia-Spazio for the Italian Space Agency, are pressurized modules that serve as the
International Space Station's "moving vans," carrying equipment, experiments and supplies to
and from the ISS aboard the Space Shuttle. 59
The unpiloted, reusable MPLM functions as both a cargo carrier and a temporary Space
Station module. Mounted in the Space Shuttle's cargo bay for launch and landing, it is berthed to
the ISS using the Shuttle's robotic arm after the Shuttle has docked. While berthed to the ISS,
racks and equipment are unloaded from the module and then old racks and equipment may be
reloaded to be taken back to Earth.
The Logistics Module is then detached from the Station and positioned back into the
Shuttle's cargo bay for the trip home. When in the cargo bay, the module is independent of the
Shuttle cabin, and there is no passageway for Shuttle crewmembers to travel from the Shuttle
cabin to the module.
In order to function as an attached Station module as well as a cargo transport, the
MPLM also includes components that provide air circulation, fire detection and suppression,
electrical distribution and computer functions. Ultimately, one of the MPLMs is to be re-named
the Permanent Logistics Module (PLM) and will remain on the ISS. Significant upgrades to its
debris protection are required for this long-duration stay, unprotected by the orbiter payload bay.

Figure 22. Interior of Italian Multi-Purpose Logistics Modules
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Official NASA information site: http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/structure/elements/mplm.html
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Although built in Italy, the logistics modules are U.S elements. and were provided in
exchange for Italian access to U.S. research time on the Station.
Construction of the Leonardo module began in April 1996 at the Alenia Aerospazio
factory in Turin, Italy. Leonardo was delivered to the Kennedy Space Center from Italy in
August 1998 by a special Beluga cargo aircraft. Raffaello arrived at Kennedy in August 1999.
The third module, named Donatello, was delivered to Kennedy on February 1, 2001.
Each cylindrical module is approximately 21 feet long and 15 feet in diameter, weighing
almost 4.5 tons. Each module can carry up to 10 tons of cargo packed into 16 standard Space
Station equipment racks. Of the 16 racks the module can carry, five can be furnished with
power, data and fluid to support a refrigerator freezer.
One of the MPLM’s is being modified to remain on station as a storage module when the
Space Shuttle retires.
3.2

Launch Services

A major decision and assumption was
that the required launch services would, at least
initially, all come from existing vehicles. This
meant the ISS was designed with the Shuttle and
Russian launch vehicles as critical components
for the long-term success of the ISS. This total
dependency on these two sources of lift has
become a critical issue (see 3.4.5) with the
announcement by the United States to retire the
Shuttle by 2010 without a direct replacement.
Figure 23. US Shuttle Docked with the ISS
3.2.1

Shuttle

The construction of the ISS was designed to rely upon the Space Shuttle to provide heavy
lift and crew transportation—indeed, this was one of the main design criteria for the Space
Shuttle. In addition, the Space Shuttle provided regular “house calls” of large teams of shortterm, specially-skilled assembly astronauts for each key phase of assembly. While the Russians
used their heavy lift Proton rockets, NASA had no plans to use expendable launch vehicles for
its (or its partners’) large ISS modules. All NASA and IP hardware were designed to interface
with the Space Shuttle payload bay as well as to adhere to the launch requirements (loads etc.)
that are more stringent than other vehicles because of its human rating.
The Space Shuttle allowed NASA and its IPs to send up short-term “construction” crews
to the ISS to assemble modules and trusses with the full support and flexibility of the Space
Shuttle. The Space Shuttle serves as a stand-alone research and assembly support vehicle with
significant up-load capability (Figure 23). With the advent of the Shuttle retirement, a key
function will be retired without replacement: capability to return large (anything larger than can
fit in the Soyuz) payloads to Earth – which also requires changes to the ISS logistics and
maintenance strategy. Instead of rotating failed Orbital Replacement Units (ORUs) with spares
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stored on the ground, equipment will need to be repaired on-orbit or spares will need to be prepositioned on-orbit.
3.2.2

New NASA capability

In 2004, NASA was directed by the Administration 60 to develop not only a replacement
for the Space Shuttle, but a family of vehicles that would extend space exploration to the moon
and beyond. The replacement for the Space Shuttle became the Ares I rocket and Orion Crew
Exploration Vehicle, part of the larger NASA Constellation Program. These were to provide
transportation for the crew, but no significant ability to upload or download ISS payloads. With
the Space Shuttle able to finish supporting the ISS as currently planned (through completion of
assembly), this was not to be an issue. 61 In January 2010 the Obama administration ordered a
restructuring of Constellation activities, and a re-definition of the Orion effort to create a USbuilt lifeboat capability for the ISS, with an option to evolve the spacecraft for later missions.
The ARES 1 booster was canceled, and the larger ARES-5 booster is to be redefined, These
actions leave the final configuration and capabilities of the Orion-derived capsule to be defined
at the time of this case study’s publication. Any transport capability of the future will have
limited ability to bring up spares. Some orbital replacement units are so large that only the Space
Shuttle can deliver them, or replace key components (like solar arrays) if they fail earlier than
planned. Furthermore, the lack of Space Shuttle payload capability may also impact the
operational life and any recertification activities.
3.2.3

Russian Vehicles

The Russians have played a critical role in providing launch services for the astronauts
and for recurring supply missions to the ISS. The early plans were that the Shuttle would supply
all of the heavy lifting of key ISS components, supplies and astronauts. While the Shuttle did
eventually lift the major ISS elements into orbit, the frequency of flights was never achieved and
significant delays occurred after the Columbia accident. In the early years of the ISS program,
NASA envisioned a new United States crewed vehicle that would serve as an ISS life raft and
crew transfer vehicle. The planned US rescue vehicle was the victim of budget cuts, which
placed the Russians in the position of sole provider of rescue services. The Russians launched
the Zarya and Zvezda using their proven three-stage Proton rocket. The MLM module is set to
launch in December 2011.
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It is possible that with time and budget, large replacement modules or equipment transfer modules could be
designed and launched as the Russians did with their two large modules. However, as of this writing, NASA has
no plans to develop this capability or additional ISS components.
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3.2.3.1 Russian Soyuz
The initial NASA plan (1990s) was to use
the Russian Soyuz vehicle (Figure 24) as an
astronaut transfer vehicle and to initially serve as
the life raft until the planned US crew rescue
vehicle arrived. When this didn’t happen the
Russians took responsibility for this role full time.
The Russian plan was always to transport their
crews on the Soyuz and to transport any fulltime
ISS crew as needed and as funded by the US. The
Soyuz normally remains docked to the Russian
module for six months prior to the return of the
crew that launched with it. The Soyuz system Figure 24. Russian Soyuz Manned Vehicle
weighs approximately 14,200 pounds at launch
and consists of three major elements. The top part is the roughly spherical pressurized orbital
module that can be used for cargo storage and for crew accommodation during missions. This
module docks with the ISS. The middle section is the “gumdrop-shaped” re-entry module that
returns the crew to earth. It can carry up to three astronauts. After the de-orbit burn to slow the
Soyuz, the capsule separates and follows a semi-ballistic path with normal parachute landings on
land in Kazakhstan in central Asia. The third, lowest part of the Soyuz is the service module,
which contains instrumentation, power and propulsion systems.
3.2.3.2 Russian Progress
The Russians were always expected to
provide Progress vehicle launches to supply food,
water, oxygen and other needed supplies (Figure
25). This proven space vehicle has had a good
record of on time deliveries with no problems.
The vehicle is normally operated as an expendable
vehicle that is allowed to burn up in the
atmosphere after de-orbiting. As a derivative of
the Soyuz spacecraft, it has the same basic
structure but lacks the equipment to allow
astronauts to ride inside during launch. During
normal operation, it is launched with a full load of
new cargo and docked with the ISS. The cargo Figure 25. Russian Progress Unmanned
capacity is much smaller than that of the Space
Cargo Vehicle
Shuttle, with the size of cargo limited by
relatively small hatches through which cargo is transferred to ISS. The Progress vehicle provides
a maximum pressurized cargo capability in the 1800 kg range. Prior to the arrival of the next
Progress vehicle, it is filled with waste and de-orbited. The Progress is launched with the same
Soyuz A2-class booster (also designated in some arenas as the SL-4) that launches the Soyuz
capsule. This booster is derived from the same original Korolyov design that launched Sputnik,
many Earth-orbiting unmanned research and military craft, and every cargo and crew flight in
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support of their human space effort. After over 1000 launches of its different variants, the
Soyuz-class booster is unparalleled in the world’s space launch systems for reliability.
3.2.4

Japanese Projects

The Japanese have been steadfast investors in the ISS program and have provided
significant engineering support. In the launch service arena, they developed the unmanned H-II
Transfer Vehicle 62 (Figure 26), which was initially launched by the Japanese expendable booster,
the H-IIB in September 2009. The vehicle provides both pressurized and unpressurized cargo
capability in the 5.5 metric ton range.
3.2.5

European Projects

The European ATV (Figure 27) is
an expendable, automated cargo transfer
vehicle that is launched on the Ariane V
expendable rocket. The first ATV (named
Jules Verne) successfully completed its first
mission to the ISS on June 20, 2008. 63 The
ATV successfully transferred over 800 kg
of fuel to the Russian Zvezda module along
with other supplies. The ship also demonstrated
its ability to boost the ISS to a higher orbit. The
European Space Agency has committed to five
vehicles over the 2008-2013 period. 64

3.2.6

Figure 26. Japanese Unmanned H-II
Transfer Vehicle

Commercial Capabilities

NASA
would
prefer
to
provide
transportation for crew and cargo to the ISS by
using US sources to keep the dollars in the US and
to encourage US development of such systems.
NASA has already invested $500M to stimulate
commercial launch sources to support the ISS after
2010. The investments require the commercial
sources to demonstrate various levels of
Figure 27. European Unmanned Automated
capability that will eventually culminate in their
Transfer Vehicle
ability to reach and dock with the ISS.
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Under the NASA Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) program, Space
Exploration Technologies Corporation (SpaceX) and Orbital Sciences Corporation were selected
to develop commercial cargo delivery capabilities for the ISS.
Both plan to eventually also offer crew launch and return
capabilities.
SpaceX is developing a family of launch vehicles
intended to reduce the cost and increase the reliability of access
to space. Their design and manufacturing facilities are in
Southern California by the Los Angeles Airport. Their
propulsion development and structural test facilities are
Figure 28. US SpaceX
located in central Texas. Their launches will take place from
Unmanned
Cargo Vehicle
Cape Canaveral, Florida.
The SpaceX Falcon 9 launch vehicle and Dragon spacecraft will be used for cargo, and
later crew, delivery to the ISS. Falcon 9 is a 2 stage launch vehicle powered by LOX/RP engines.
The first stage is intended to be reusable. The Dragon spacecraft has a flexible cargo and crew
configuration and is also recoverable. Pressurized cargo will be transported inside the capsule
while unpressurized cargo will be located in an aft “trunk”. The crew configuration will be able
to accommodate up to 7 crew members per flight.
The initial test of the full up version of the Falcon successfully placed a qualification unit
of the Dragon capsule into earth orbit in the spring of 2010. The first demonstration flight to ISS
is scheduled for the third quarter of 2010.
Orbital’s COTS operational systems consists of the Taurus II launch vehicle, the Cygnus
advanced maneuvering space vehicle, and all the necessary mission planning and operations
facilities and services. Their launches will take place from NASA’s Wallops Flight Facility in
Virginia.
The Taurus II is a two stage launch vehicle utilizing LOX/kerosene engines for the first
stage and a solid rocket motor for the second stage. The Cygnus visiting vehicle is made up of a
service module and interchangeable pressurized and unpressurized cargo modules. The
pressurized cargo module is similar to the MPLM developed for the ISS by Alenia, which is a
partner with Orbital for the COTS program.
The first demonstration flight to the ISS is scheduled for the second quarter of 2011.

Figure 29. Orbital Sciences
Cygnus Unmanned Cargo
Vehicle

3.3

Development Challenges

The ISS has been an incredible success story, but has nevertheless had many interesting
challenges to overcome. The following are meant to represent a sampling of the engineering
challenges and the approaches to solve them.
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3.3.1

Technology Readiness and Obsolescence

A major issue with any lengthy aerospace development program is the readiness of the
technology chosen. If the designer and systems engineer choose technologies that are already in
use, they may become obsolete by the time the system is deployed or during its early life.
Choosing cutting edge or unproven technologies also risks delays and cost increases as the
technology is matured. During the developmental phase of the ISS, the design underwent a
capabilities-based assessment, where along with the fundamental mission capabilities, tasks,
attributes and performance metrics, the gaps, shortfalls, redundancies and risk areas were
identified and proposed. Many of these solutions required extensive validation of the underlying
technology to be used in space. Even though many of the technologies or prototypes were tested
on the ground, the effects of microgravity, radiation, and human factors could not easily be
reproduced with the desired duration and accuracy. 65 To minimize this risk, most of the systems
that were chosen had already flown on the MIR, Shuttle, and Spacelab or had been developed
and tested as part of Space Station Freedom. This approach created a risk of long term
obsolescence but reduced the upfront schedule and cost risk. A case in point is the early baseline
of the Solar Dynamic (SD) power subsystem that was to supplant the later photovoltaic arrays.
The SD power subsystem was highly efficient in comparison to the photovoltaic arrays, but
because of high up front development and validation costs, and the known reliability of
photovoltaic arrays, the SD system was later abandoned.
NASA has conducted extensive research in this area and helped to create the Technology
Readiness Levels, shown in Table 2 below:
Table 2. Technology Readiness Levels

TRL 1 Basic principles observed and reported
TRL 2 Technology concept and/or application formulated
TRL 3 Analytical and experimental critical function and/or characteristic
proof-of-concept
TRL 4 Component and/or breadboard validation in laboratory environment
TRL 5 Component and/or breadboard validation in relevant environment
TRL 6 System/subsystem model or prototype demonstration in a relevant
environment (ground or space)
TRL 7 System prototype demonstration in a space environment
TRL 8 Actual system completed and “flight qualified” through test and
demonstration (ground or space)
TRL 9 Actual system “flight proven” through successful mission operations
The idea is to select a technology for a new system that will reach maturity (TRL 9) at the
same time as the deployment of the target system. For most major aerospace programs, the
technologies are normally chosen at a TRL 6 or 7 for a new program three or four years in
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advance of deployment. In the case of the ISS, some of the systems are not easily upgradeable or
replaceable, so care must be taken in choosing the best system or technology that will provide
long service but won’t represent a schedule or cost risk due to delayed development.
3.3.2

Use of Probabilistic Risk Assessment

NASA uses a variety of standard risk approaches for the ISS, but in particular specifies
the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) procedure that details a structured risk management
process for system development. The NASA requirement 66 states:
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is a comprehensive, structured, and logical
analysis methodology aimed at identifying and assessing risks in complex
technological systems. PRA is generally used for low-probability, highconsequence events for which limited statistical data exist. Its application is
targeted at risk environments common within NASA that may involve the
compromise of safety, inclusive of the potential loss of life, personal injury, and
loss or degradation of high-value property that may be found in NASA missionrelated programs.
PRA is a decision support tool to help managers and engineers find design and operation
weaknesses in complex space systems. It allows them to systematically uncover and prioritize
safety improvements. PRA characterizes risk in terms of three questions called the triplet
definition of risk:
1. What can go wrong?
2. How likely is it?
3. What are the consequences?

These simple three questions (often called the Triplet Definition of Risk) are then
expanded into a full scope scenario-based PRA process.
1. Objectives Definition
2. System Familiarization
3. Identification of Initiating Events (IEs)
4. Scenario Modeling
5. Failure Modeling
6. Data Collection, Analysis, and Development
7. Quantification and Integration
8. Uncertainty Analysis
9. Sensitivity Analysis
10. Importance Ranking
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If these structured steps are followed, the key to success or failure is how well management is
integrated into the process, along with the subject matter experts, and how that management
believes and acts upon the outputs
3.3.3

Russian Contribution and Risk

The decision to invite the Russians to participate was a complicated decision that
involved numerous political, operational, financial/schedule and technical considerations.


From a political viewpoint, the US and USSR had just ended the Cold War (at great expense
to both) and the USSR had split into a number of independent nations with Russia as the
dominant force. The Soviets (and now Russians) had extensive space experience and
technology that might be of value to the new ISS that was being proposed. However, the US
and the Russians had limited experience working together (Apollo-Soyuz) to begin a major
cooperative effort so soon after the Cold War ended. On top of these major political
problems, there were significant cultural issues that would impact the systems engineering
challenge.



Operationally, the Russians had extensive on-orbit experience. The MIR was the state of the
art in space station technology at the time. The US had been launching Shuttle missions with
many different missions utilizing the Shuttle’s cargo bay, but had little recent experience in
long-term space habitation or system operation. NASA and its contractors did have designs
for new equipment/facilities and some older technology, but significant development and
production remained before the US and its original partners would have been operational on
orbit.



Russia was in financial straits following the breakup of the Soviet Union and the space
program was not high as a priority for funding. A key driver was the US initiative to retain
Soviet aerospace engineers and scientists for work on aerospace projects (particularly ISS). A
concern at the time was that unemployed scientists and engineers from this sector could be
easily attracted to work for interests not in keeping with long term US security needs if not
gainfully employed on ISS. A large infusion of cash was needed. This was the primary
reason the US (via NASA) was driven to pay for Russian contributions to the ISS, rather than
in kind trades as with all other ISS partners. The inclusion of key Russian station elements
offered the chance for NASA to reduce cost and schedule overall. NASA was under pressure
to deliver a space station at a reasonable cost, and the Russian modules were already started
and most of the systems were flight proven.



In the initial assessment, the Russian participation should allow the ISS to accelerate or at
least meet a shorter schedule that would put elements into orbit by 2000. The Russian
modules/systems were flight proven and appeared to offer less cost, schedule, and technical
risk in comparison to the challenges of NASA designing and building some critical elements.

While the Russian systems were considered off the shelf, they still presented some risk
compared to the NASA SE protocols and system requirements. 67 As off-the-shelf modules (and
thus high TRLs), they had been initially designed for the MIR or its replacement. More
important, the Russians had different engineering and system design requirements that did not
67

“Russian Compliance with Safety Requirements,” GAO/T-NSIAD-00-128, 16 March 2000

53

always meet the newer ISS requirements. NASA engineers had to issue waivers for the early
modules that acknowledged the additional risks and provided future fixes where necessary—
such as for MMOD shielding or noise. Russian MMOD vulnerability and acoustic level
exceeding requirements were respectively the number 1 and 2 program risks in 2000. Currently,
the acoustic levels are no longer on the top list of concerns for ISS.
3.3.4

Spiral Construction Approach and Multi-configuration issues

A major task for the ISS program dated back to the Space Station Freedom effort. The
build-up sequence of the Space Station Freedom was problematic and considered high risk by
several of the systems engineers of the day. While the total system design was acceptable, the
SE process at the time was only beginning to recognize the implications of spiral construction
on-orbit. For ISS, spiral construction was the integrated design, configuration and assembly of
up to forty elements that had to operate as a fully functioning ISS at each sub-assembly stage.
This meant that full operating procedures, software builds, center-of-gravity and station moments
of inertia all had to be developed for each configuration. This spiral construction and its multiple
interim configurations drove the requirements for detailed Multi-element Integrated Testing
(MEIT)—though it was not actually implemented until a few years into the program.
One of the senior systems engineers commented that:
“Systems engineering involved communications, so as you go between divisions,
NASA centers and international partners, this makes things more difficult to
engineer. Communication bandwidth in these cases is essential. A key is to make
interfaces as simple as possible, then simplify further. This is more critical when
crossing organizational boundaries. If its crossing government (or country)
boundaries and its anything other than structure, it too complicated!”
3.3.5

Computer Hardware and Software

The ISS onboard computing architecture is a mixture of radiation-hardened Intel 386 chip
based ISS mission computers for station housekeeping, environmental, and station-keeping
duties combined with scores of standardized commercial, off-the-shelf (COTS) notebook
computers that the crews can use as interface devices to the more controlled software
environment of the systems and payloads, or use “off net” for email, internet protocol telephone,
training, and a host of other non-system uses. A conscious effort was made to use COTS
products where possible with minimal modifications while complying with safety to reduce cost
and risk to the program. The major critical computers provided significant capacity to
accommodate future requirements. The entire ISS system was designed as a distributed
processing system over major nodes (multiplexors) with each dependent on a major computer
system. The standard station-keeping functions were on the ISS computers. The non-critical and
experimental support software is configured on the laptops.
The use of laptop computers was not originally a major part of the program. In fact, a
local area network for support computers had to be retrofitted to the ISS after launch.
Originally, two entire racks of computer interface equipment known as Multi-Purpose
Application Consoles were to have been built as the main computing and training interface
aboard the ISS, built and programmed from scratch to Mil specs, using ADA and the XWindows software standard, similar to the systems used in mission control. Beginning in 2003,
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special studies were initiated to build upon the lessons of the Space Shuttle program’s experience
with the Portable General Support Computer (PGSC). The PGSC was used independently of the
Shuttle General Purpose Computers, but had rapidly enabled many new capabilities for the crew.
These studies led to a host of concepts, including onboard electronic training and procedures,
phone services, video uplink, and even command and control. A special safety position paper
was drawn up to define the functions in command and control that could be assigned to a
criticality-3 off-the-shelf hardware/software system, and those that must be assigned to
configuration-controlled software development processes and fault-tolerant hardware.
Generally this boiled down to the idea that the COTS system could display any data, and could
send individual crew commands under an arm/check/fire transmission concept. This prevented
the COTS notebook from taking any active role in the automated critical systems processes, but
enabled tremendous enhancements to situational awareness and to system debugging and control.
The custom-built shuttle Grid PGSC computer has been recently replaced by COTS IBM
Thinkpad computers, with vastly greater power and enough robustness to meet the demands of
spaceflight.
However, such COTS computers had to be qualified and modified to make them
fully safe for operation on the shuttle or ultimately the ISS. The major changes that had to be
made included:
1.

The laptops had to be modified with fans to handle cooling. In microgravity the warm air
generated around the computer circuit board does not move; it tends to stay in place
unless forced air ventilation is provided. Once the heat is removed, NASA then has to
determine if the ISS or its modules can handle the heat that is rejected. For instance, the
Shuttle had a restriction against devices that produced heat greater than 113 degrees
Fahrenheit.

2.

All internal circuit boards and printed connection areas had to be conformally-coated
with dielectric film, to avoid the possibility of small conducting debris floating against
the circuits and shorting them out in the 3-phase flows that are typical of zero-G cabin
atmospheres.

3.

Power adaptors were needed to allow the computers to be plugged in to either module
with 28 VDC.

4.

The laptop had to function normally in low pressure (10 psia) compared to normal earth
pressure of 14.7 psia. (This is more of a constraint onboard the Shuttle than aboard the
ISS, whose atmosphere is regulated to sea level pressure at all times: However, for
commonality and the many advantages it brings, all notebook computers are certified for
either vehicle.)

5.

The laptop had to be attached to a stable surface to allow the astronaut to use it without
both floating away; Velcro was the common solution.

Obsolescence was mainly a problem with laptop computers with a resulting major
configuration question of how to upgrade and how often. Obviously, NASA and its partners
could buy new laptops every month to capture the latest technology. The major expense was
maintaining back compatibility with data and software along with modifications to make them
flight-safe. NASA currently has a replacement cycle that is roughly every four years.
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Despite the NASA policy of using COTS hardware and software if possible, there is a
cost in making them space-ready. At a minimum, the cost to qualify includes ground testing and
safety checks to make sure there are no surprises in orbit.
Even with a multi-billion dollar ISS, the computers are not immune to such mundane
threats as computer viruses or hackers. 68 In August of 2008, the message traffic between ground
controllers and the astronauts revealed that some of the computers on board had been infected
with a common gaming virus worm that is used to gather information from the infected computer
and then transmit it to the remote attacker. In the end, this problem was minor and apparently
caused no damage, but ensured virus protection on the ISS computers.
The ISS, its subsystems, and many space-related experiments employ a wide variety of
software.
When possible, COTS software was used, especially for management or
administrative tasks. The laptops are all Windows-based and use the standard Microsoft
products along with other more technical off-the-shelf packages. There are specific programs
written to control experiments and non-critical equipment that the astronauts use on each flight.
An example of a more sophisticated software application is within the Mobile Servicing
System (MSS), which is the system composed of the Canadarm 2 robotic arm that has been
critical in the construction and maintenance of the ISS. 69 The operation of this equipment is
safety-critical, so a software approach for “life-critical” operations was chosen. In this case
ADA was the language of choice. Some system engineers believe ADA is a “dead language”
which was used in the Department of Defense in the late 1970s. However, it is still the language
of choice for many system developers for applications requiring safety, low cost maintenance,
and near perfect reliability. At the time of Space Station Freedom, ADA was the US space
systems required standard, and so was used. ISS system developers stated that:
“The most important safety features that make ADA ideal for development of failsafe software include its information-hiding capability, its ability to provide reuseable code and its “strong typing”, which helps detect and solve many types of
coding errors at compile time, very early in the development cycle.”
While very robust languages like ADA prevent most errors from ever making it to orbit, long
term maintenance and changes present significant challenges, especially when considering the
integration of the module, control systems and experimental packages. Here the software must
be routinely torn down and rebuilt. According to Lehman's laws 70 of software evolution:
“The functionality of a system must increase continually in order to maintain user
satisfaction over its lifecycle. At the same time the software complexity increases unless
something is done to reduce it.”
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Particularly in the preliminary design phases of the complex ISS data management
system, a strong typing language like ADA was a huge hindrance to the much-needed rapid
prototyping of an enormously complex system. Rapid prototyping’s “sloppy”, instant-iteration
capability might allow cooperating engineers to discover and to work out major architecture and
interface problems in an environment that quickly grows progressively more “flight like.” The
ISS program adopted a formal requirements definition process that led from system architecture
requirements to Interface Requirements to Interface Control specifications before a single line of
software could be written and explored. Such a plan, while useful up to a manageable
complexity level, put a burden on the software and command and control systems engineers to
imagine all the intricacies of this multiple-interfaced system, and to capture all necessary
interfaces, without a fully-functional test-bed.
Further, particularly in the earliest days of the development, the agency did not have a
strong enough background in the advantages and techniques of object-level programming, so
most software planning was more reflective of (and appropriate to) the monolithic code that was
typical of the Space Shuttle General Purpose Computers or the Mission Control Complex, and
not to a system of over two dozen cooperating parallel processors.
A manifestation of the lack of use of true object programming was the persistence of
what can be termed “push rod” command and control. Although the grand vision of the software
architecture had multiple tiers of higher and higher automation overseeing the low-level sensors
and effectors working within an automated process or series of cooperating processes, the natural
desire of the ground operators and astronauts was to have ultimate override capability at the
effector and sensor level. Thus for every automated application “object”, the architects were
challenged to provide individual command paths to bypass virtually every function in the object.
Sensor and effector objects were originally replicated at every level of the architecture, adding
more and more resource requirement to the higher level tiers, instead of less. Thus, all tiers of
automation hierarchy reverted to massive “pass through” relays of low-level commands for the
operators down to the individual effectors. Automation would come later, and the complex
system was thus architected from the bottom up, rather than the top down.
One study 71 considered the challenges to ISS software system engineers of how to
respond to design problems discovered during testing and how to incorporate new features into
the software design after launch and initial implementation. The study focused on the ISS
Operations Control Software (OCS), since it was a good example of a complex software system
with extensive testing early on, and then a long maintenance period once the system was
deployed. The study considered both cases: constructive fixes early on and adaptive fixes during
operations. The study concluded:
1. Lehman’s thesis was confirmed: In both maintenance scenarios, the altered
designs increased the complexity of the system compared to the original
architecture.
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2. During maintenance, re-factoring operations helped alleviate the increased
complexity introduced by new architectural elements such as hardware and
software.
3. Additions as opposed to changes are often more desirable to developers, because
they do not risk “breaking” already developed code.
4. Engineers tend to consider implementation cost more than maintenance cost—not
necessarily best for long term operation or ISS life cycle cost. This tendency is
also a by-product of the U.S. government’s year-to-year funding process which
forces decisions early in the system life cycle thus impacting the operational
costs.
3.3.6

Power Systems

The power system for the ISS is the largest space based electrical power system (EPS)
ever developed and successfully operated. 72 The EPS was designed as a hybrid 120-volt DC US
segment and a 28/120 volt Russian segment. The two systems are independent, but can be
interconnected via dc converters. The split system derives from the early decision to use the
Russian modules that were essentially off-the-shelf and space proven (low risk). The power flow
diagram is shown in Figure 30.
The US segment of the EPS is a channelized, load following (i.e., points at the sun)
network of extensive solar photovoltaic arrays, batteries, voltage converters, remote controlled
switchgear, and power routing cables.
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Figure 30. Single Channel Power Flow Diagram
The ISS has eight solar array wings that when fully extended are each 35 meters long by
12 meters wide. The wings are constantly adjusted to maintain an optimal tracking of the sun,
simultaneously achieving orbital power balance, minimum depth of battery discharge, and
minimized frontal area projected to the ram direction (thus minimizing ISS drag, and saving
propellant), while constantly avoiding differential heating of the slender mast longerons, that
could lead to very dangerous structural fatigue. Because the station is in and out of the sun
approximately every ninety minutes, the ISS contains a large battery set to store the energy
during eclipse. The US system uses actively-cooled nickel-hydrogen batteries specifically
designed for high (40,000) charge/discharge cycles.
A critical requirement is to constantly track the sun with the arrays and the station to
maximize photovoltaic solar cell output. A key part of the system is the solar array rotating joint
(SARJ), which rotates the large solar panels. In fall 2007, the ground team noticed unusual
vibrations when the starboard SARJ rotated, along with higher than normal current usage.
During a scheduled EVA in October 2007, astronauts did a visual inspection and found the
exterior to be free of damage—but once they removed covers over the motor and gears, they
found metal shavings, indicating either debris left during assembly, or more likely, the gears
were chewing themselves up. The initial fix was to lock down the unit and not adjust those solar
panels; but long term, this would seriously diminish electrical output—at a time when NASA
was hoping to increase electrical production for the upcoming six-person crews. Fortunately,
during several 2008 EVAs, the astronauts were able to replace the bearings and other joint parts
and thoroughly lubricated the system to make the joint operational.
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3.3.7

Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) Protection

For an aircraft program, engineers typically worry about bird-strikes while in flight or
foreign object damage (FOD) that is picked up on the ramps, taxiways and runways. In the case
of FOD, prevention is the major emphasis area with some degree of damage tolerance built in to
the system. Bird strikes are normally defended against with material strength and engines that
can tolerate bird ingestion and allow the aircraft to land safely. For space vehicles, there is a
major difference: each piece of micrometeoroid or space debris contains large amounts of kinetic
energy as they travel at extremely high velocities:
Ek=1/2mV2 where V is speed and m = ρ 43 π ( d2 )3 is the particle mass with density ρ
Even small micrometeoroid particles can have densities that range from 7-8 g/cm3 while smaller
ones (mainly ice) are 1-2 g/cm3. Typical space debris velocities range from 6-16 km/sec while
meteorites can be up to 70 km/sec—thus the high velocity-squared allows even tiny particles to
have hazardous energy levels.

Figure 31. Average Micrometeoroid Environment for ISS
The threat has been characterized in several studies 73 and metrics used to measure flux,
or the number of micrometeoroid hits per square meter per year on an exposed surface.
Obviously with a large station and thousands of meters of exposed surface, this is not a trivial
risk. A recent study looked at various models to predict the number of hits and size of the
projectiles with some results shown in Figure 31. The models clearly indicate that thousands of
small hits probably occur every year and this distribution is a function of orbital path, altitude,
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and speed of the satellite or ISS. At the time of this study (December 2007) the authors
speculated that:
“The calculations do not include the as yet unknown change in OD particle
number and distribution due to the recent Chinese ASAT experiment. Such events
are certain to increase the number of orbiting particles. Some people have
suggested that a relative small number of explosions in LEO can eventually
render LEO space uninhabitable for satellites because one large particle can
cause an explosion that leads to further particles that hit more spacecraft until a
runaway situation is reached.”
Since that study came out, there has been a major collision in orbit between a dead Russian
satellite and US communications satellite. 74 Both were over 680 kg (1500 lbs) in mass and
created a debris field many times larger than the Chinese ASAT experiment, with thousands of
new smaller objects going in a multitude of directions. While the collision occurred at an
altitude of 790 KM (about 490 miles), which is well above the ISS (normally around 200-240
miles), the debris will all eventually sink to lower orbits and threaten the ISS orbit as the debris
speed decays. Large debris from that event was seen re-entering the atmosphere over Texas as
early as a week after the collision.
The ISS has several means of protecting itself and crew against impacts with
micrometeoroids and orbital debris. First, the ISS can be moved to a different orbit if the ground
controllers (with radar) can discover and track a potential threat. The ISS has been moved on
occasion to avoid any possibility of collision. NASA and the DOD (plus other countries) already
track over 13,000 objects larger than about two inches known to be in orbit.
The ISS has an outer skin and additional protective “curtains” to increase its protective
shields. These shields and outer skins are meant to absorb the initial energy of a small strike and
have the energy spread out through the protective layer much like a bullet hitting a bullet-proof
vest (see 2.3.7.2). An interesting highlight of the high importance of MMOD protection to the
ISS program is the fact that the US government allowed the technical export of the “BUMPER”
hypersonic ballistic penetration software code to all foreign ISS partners as the de-facto analysis
standard to allow technical development of better and better protective strategies. This export
was quickly granted, despite the fact that such a code has obvious military benefits.
3.3.8

Test and Integration

3.3.8.1 ISS Multi Element Integrated Testing (MEIT) Program
Testing complex space systems represented a major challenge to NASA and its partners.
Many of the modules were developed in different countries and delivered “just in time” for the
launch. Each module had to be tested for its own internal operation; then it had to interface with
the launch vehicle, and finally it had to work in space while integrated with multiple modules
and systems. An early strategy at NASA to save cost was coined as “Ship and Shoot” which
implied the modules or systems were delivered as late as possible to the launch site preventing
extensive testing, checked for internal operation (but with little or no testing when coupled with
other systems or simulators) and then “shot” into orbit where they would be installed. The
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factory-level and subsystem checkouts were all that might have been planned or possible. Given
this approach, the modules were not originally scheduled to be delivered in time to perform
additional testing at the Kennedy Space Center.
By the late 1990s and with the benefit of MIR and Shuttle mission experience, NASA
adopted a more integrated approach for testing. 75 It became apparent that most of the modules
and major subsystems would be available prior to launch for some version of integrated testing
and limited ground assembly to imitate the final “on-orbit” assembly and operation. This
approach allowed for element-to-element interface capability to be tested and verified as well as
systems end-to-end operability with hardware and software. To the degree that hardware could
be physically connected in its final orbit configuration, it was tested as such. Otherwise, the
segments were connected with simulation hardware. Four major test configurations are detailed
on the following page and were [Note the truss segment designations: Z for zenith, P for port,
and S for starboard. The truss numbers indicate the order from the center.]:
MEIT 1 – US Lab Module, Z1, P6, SSRMS, Node 1 (simulated since it was in orbit)
MEIT 2 – S0/MT/MBS, S1, P1, P3/4, US Lab (simulated since it was now in orbit)
MEIT 3 – JEM, Node 2, US Lab (simulated since it was in orbit)
Node 2 System Test – Node 2, US lab & Node 1 (simulated)
The MEIT 2 set-up is shown in Figures 32 and 33.
The results of this MEIT approach were significant and prevented major problems that
would have been discovered only after attempting to assemble and then test the major elements
while in orbit.76 The MEIT approach for functional verification was a major SE contribution
from Boeing based on their lessons learned on their 777 aircraft development program. In
particular, Boeing brought the Digital Pre-Assembly (DPA) and Cable Assessment/Fluid
Assessment (CA/FA) technologies to bear, which enabled the success of MEIT. DPA ensured
verification of element-to-element structural interfaces without interference, while CA/FA
ensured that on-orbit assembled fluid and electrical lines would mate properly once installed.
Major discoveries on the ground were:


P6 Truss failed to power up due to Auxiliary Power Converter Unit under voltage
trip condition.



US Lab activation took over 36 hours during on ground first MEIT power up due
to significant computer/procedure problems.



Multiple Command and Control (C&C) computer failures due to task overrun
problems. C&C computers failed to perform synchronization with GPS time.



Incorrect video cable harnesses which would have required difficult EVA in orbit
to replace
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Space to ground communication audio was unacceptable and would have required
a major on-orbit upgrade and fix.

The net result of these and other discoveries was a chance to fix them while on the
ground at significant cost and schedule saving as well as a major risk reduction to the crew and
to the future missions.
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Figure 32. Multi Element Integrated Test Configurations for the ISS
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Figure 33. Multi Element Integrated Test 2 Set Up for the ISS
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3.3.8.2 Software
The modules, experiments and ISS housekeeping systems all had different base
programming languages and were written independent of each other during development with
only specified moderately-detailed interface specification. The issues tended to be handled
relatively well by the IPT process and the integrations protocols, despite the lack of a full rapidprototyping simulation area for the integrated software. The bigger issue was the practical
requirement for a different and distinct software configuration for each flight configuration. This
required a major systems engineering effort to coordinate the exchange of information, followed
by the process for testing and assuring that changes were producing the expected results for the
new configuration. Such multiple-configuration integration was one of the more important
aspects of the program and the system engineering process.
Initially, there were over 4 million lines of code in the ISS command and control system.
This code had to accommodate multi-configurations to include active modules for those elements
already on orbit and “inactive” software modules for elements that had not yet been delivered.
As the new ISS elements arrived, the new code was turned on. The software test and evaluation
took place on the ground using a duplicate of the entire ISS system architecture. This large
software build has been re-written numerous times in the ISS’s lifespan.
Execution Issues

3.4.1

Unrealistic Estimates for Cost and Schedule

The ISS has one major area in
common with all current NASA
development programs—significant
schedule
and
cost
overruns.
Multiple GAO reports have targeted
NASA for these problems (See
Figures 34 and 35) 77. A recent
Aerospace
Corporation
study78
looked at a variety of NASA
programs and found results typical to
those shown below for forty NASA
mission projects. The vast majority
all overran their budgets. The NASA
experience has been to create
optimistic schedules with the
majority suffering schedule slippage.
Starting with the Space
Station Freedom in the 1990s, cost
overruns on the space station were a
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Figure 34. NASA Cost and Schedule Overruns
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common problem and led to its eventual redesign. Despite excellent progress in technical areas
and in integrating its IPs, the program
suffered schedule and cost overruns
from the very start. By 2001, the
problem was getting worse, so a blueribbon ISS Management and Cost
Evaluation Task Force was created to
look at the ISS program and make
recommendations. 79 This panel of
senior and very experienced former
NASA, government and corporate
experts delivered the following
findings:
1.

The ISS program plans and
budget were not credible.
Figure 35. NASA Schedule Outcomes
NASA had not and did not
have the capability to develop
and implement a rigorous ISS cost estimate. It also did not have the capability to track
and audit costs in a timely fashion. NASA lacked the basic tools and financial staff to
create and track a detailed life cycle cost estimate.

2.

The existing estimate at the time (2001) had doubled since program inception and much
of the cost and schedule growth was due to poor original estimates, requirements
definition, capability creep, and program changes—all traditional reasons for cost growth
in large programs. [These issues were exacerbated during the Freedom station design. In
particular, the meandering mission scope which included stakeholders for micro-gravity
science, Earth observation, satellite servicing, and spacecraft assembly for deep space
missions. Such diverse interests drive the system design as well as cost and schedule
performance.]

3.

The program was being managed as an “institution” rather than a program with specific
purpose, focused goals and objectives, and defined milestones. The program budget was
paying for a large number of NASA staff and support contractors—a “standing army.”
This flat-funding concept by Congress did not match the system’s engineering life cycle
and prevented NASA from optimizing the development and construction.

4.

The budget from Congress and NASA’s focus on fiscal year management provided no
strategic management or focus. The Congress provided level funding, but without multiyear authority to make optimal economic decisions.

5.

Lack of a defined program created confusion and inefficiencies. The budget and
execution did not match reality and major changes to the program had been made
(reductions) without the approval of the IPs.
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The result of the budget growth and schedule slips has been the construction of a station
with less capability than planned and with a completion date that complicates needed support
from all partners. After this report was presented, the ISS suffered additional delays as a result
of the Columbia accident.
3.4.2

Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act

The United States uses trade incentives (or bans) as a part of its foreign policy to
encourage nations to achieve its national strategies and those of its partners. 80 One of the issues
that the United States has been concerned about is the proliferation of nuclear weapons and of
technologies for their development. In the late 1980s, the United States and its partners began
an effort to stop the sales of ballistic missile technology under the Missile Technology Control
In 1993, Russia joined the ISS partnership and agreed to abide by the
Regime (MTCR). 81
MTCR (1995). During this same period, it was perceived that entities under the control of the
Russian space Agency began to sell sensitive technology to Iran. In response, Congress passed
the Iran Nonproliferation Act (INA) 82 which banned the US from doing business with entities
that support Iran—in this case, it specifically targeted the Russia Space industry and the NASA
human spaceflight program. Prior to this, it was estimated that the US had spent $800M in
direct buys of goods and services to support the ISS programs. However, the Iran NonProliferation Act (INA) would put a severe limitation to this unless Russia could demonstrate
cooperation.
The INA and its actual implementation in terms of ISS had many restrictions, but NASA
was still able to move ahead with the ISS program. It did not forbid the completion of any
ongoing contracts or agreements. It also allowed for the US (NASA) to purchase service if the
crew of the ISS was in “imminent” danger services to maintain the existing Russian service
module, and $14M for Russian docking hardware already under development and production.
The Russian partnership agreement requires them to maintain a “lifeboat” at the station at all
times with the capability to return three astronauts. Because it carries three, and the Soyuz
normally can stay aloft only six months, this implies two launches per year. The US must
provide the capability for three more crew once the station is complete (for a total of six). There
was also a 1996 “Balance Agreement” to provide 11 Soyuz missions for Russian and American
(or other) crew. At this point, the NASA strategy was to have either a US crew rescue vehicle in
place or a new space plane. Neither of these happened in the post Columbia environment.
With the new vision of space exploration announced by the administration in 2004, the
Space Shuttle is scheduled for retirement in 2010. NASA plans to contract for Soyuz flights
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through 2012 and for limited Progress flights—which should be replaced by European, Japanese
or American automated supply vehicles. There remains an issue about what happens after 2012
and until the new US crew vehicle is ready in the 2015-2016 timeframe. Studies are underway
for human-rating both commercial and IP launch vehicles that may provide services to ISS;
although no decisions have been made to enable US crew access to ISS between 2012 and the
availability of the Orion/Ares 1 vehicle.
3.4.3

ISS Logistical Support

Traditional crewed space vehicles have been designed for short term missions with
maintenance and logistics a distant second to performance. The ISS challenge is more like
designing a naval ship that operates in a hostile environment, but must have periodic
maintenance with no chance of visiting a dry dock. The ISS has been in orbit as of this writing
over 4000 days with over nine full years of crew habitation. With an expected lifetime of over
15 years (2015 and beyond), space logistics is a major portion of the ISS program and a learning
laboratory for future space exploration and engineering.
As discussed previously, the transportation issues alone are complex and made more so
by budget constraints and limitations on what can be brought into space.
The system
engineering challenge for each system and subsystem had to consider initial deployment,
assembly and then possible repairs of all or part of a major component. To complicate this, the
designers also had to consider spare parts, tools, diagnostic equipment and sensors (both ground
and on-orbit) and how to do maintenance without disrupting the ISS operation.
An early discovery on the MIR by the Soviets was the large amount of time spent on
station maintenance compared to research. The ISS has been no different. In the five-year
time period since initial occupation (2000-2005), astronauts spent over 4000+ hours on ISS
preventive and corrective maintenance—not counting how long it took to assemble the station.83
This works out to almost two hours of maintenance per day per astronaut.
One of the challenges to system engineers when designing equipment and systems is
determining the mean-time-between-failures (MTBF), which determines maintenance plans and
spares inventory. Using traditional “earth” values has resulted in some ISS items far exceeding
their MTBFs—which means some of the ISS stored spares are not needed and waste critical
space. If the delivered MTBF is too short, then critical systems or services may suffer—such as
crew lighting when the bulbs burn out too soon. In most cases, the Orbital Replacement Units
(ORUs) were planned for removal and replacement on-orbit, swapped out with spares, and the
failed equipment being shipped back to Earth for repair. Given the expected retirement of the
Space Shuttle, this strategy for large ORU maintenance has shifted to storage of ORUs on-orbit.
A major problem has been how to deal with subsystems that fail in orbit, but which were
not optimized for on-orbit repair or replacement. This can be as simple as lacking the right tool
for disassembly or the problem of physically removing an item without cutting a hole in the side
of the ISS. The problem manifests itself when items on the exterior break or fail and the only
access is through a space walk with limited tools or ability to address the system. The tools
83
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themselves are an issue if they have to be calibrated or the modules require different tools—such
as metric or standard. While there were attempts to standardize equipment, there are still
hundreds of different fasteners, washers, etc. that all require their own tools.
Another major issue is the engineering tradeoff between designing in automated health
monitoring systems--and sensors that might pinpoint failures to key parts--and how to fix
malfunctioning equipment or major components.
While useful, this option increases
complexity, cost, and weight. One major advantage that the ISS has over other space systems is
the human in the loop. On-site astronauts tied in with thousands of ground support engineers
have the ability to modify the systems already in place plus innovate as needed with materials on
hand.
Mundane issues have often had major impacts in ISS operations. The use of consumable
parts limits ISS functionality. A lack of disposable batteries and duct tape can limit repairs or
research progress. Items such as filters, carbon dioxide scrubbers, water, cleaners and many
other items we take for granted have to be rationed. The design challenge is how to design a
system where these are not needed or else minimized.
A last major issue mentioned by several of the past ISS systems engineers is
obsolescence and shortened equipment life-spans. Some of the major equipment is not lasting as
long as NASA had hoped and the failure of these parts and subsystems is forcing revised
decisions about upgrades, replacement and long term repair strategies. The rotating joints that
turn the large solar panels have exhibited failures. With the root cause of the joint failure
unidentified, the problem has disappeared with the maintenance steps of cleaning up the filings,
regreasing the joint, and installing the new array (note: EVAs performed in 2008). Some of the
ISS systems continue having problems—such as oxygen generators, the new urine recycling
system, and the toilets.
3.4.4

Handling a Major Computer Failure

The importance of the systems engineering process came to light during a major
computer disruption that occurred on 14 June, 2007, during the STS-117 mission. In this case, it
shed light on the requirements, design, integration and test and evaluation process that had been
used during the ISS’s early period that resulted in the existing configuration of June 2007.
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Figure 36. STS-117 Extra-Vehicular Activity at ISS
The major goal of the STS-117 mission to the ISS was to deliver and deploy the last major set of
large solar arrays (See Figure 36). Each ISS solar wing contains two 115 foot long panels that
attach to a central truss for a total width of almost 240 feet and a weight of 17.5 tons. Unfurling
the panels is a slow, tedious procedure that has not always gone as planned. On a previous
assembly mission (STS-97), a similar panel failed to deploy properly and had to be repaired
during a subsequent space walk. This deployment went smoothly—considering the 120-foot
panel had been in storage for several years, compressed into a block only 20-inches deep (see
Figure 37). In order to provide a clear field of view for the new panels, an older solar array had
to be furled and stowed. Both the new and old
panels generate several KWs of power, create
large static charges and can generate radio and
static noise. 84
The first hint of trouble came during
the deployment when the Russian navigation
computer developed some anomalies forcing
the ISS crew to switch to the Space Shuttle
Atlantis’s thrusters along with the ISS US
gyroscopes to maintain attitude control. This
delayed the initial power up of the solar wings
(since the ISS was not initially in optimal
position to charge the panels).
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Figure 37. Stowed Solar Panel Being Unfolded for Deployment

“Engineers Close in on Cause of ISS Computer Glitch,” Tariq Mailik, Space News. 23 July 2007.
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A short time later on 14 July, all six of the command and control computers in the
Russian module failed. 85 The computers controlled the Russian module attitude control thrusters
as well as the Elektron oxygen generators and other atmosphere control system equipment. The
station did have sufficient oxygen on board for the short run (estimated at 56 days for the basic
ISS crew), but this would have long-term impacts if unresolved. To control the station, the ISS
used the four US control moment gyroscopes to maintain orientation along with the Space
Shuttle Atlantis thrusters. The computers also controlled power to the Soyuz return vehicle
(lifeboat) and the external service module cooling loops. The atmospheric control system and
carbon dioxide scrubbers were also off line. As a result, the station internal temperature began to
rise. After two of the computers were rebooted, this triggered a false alarm for the crew in the
middle of a sleep cycle.
The computers were eventually brought back on line by running jumper cables to bypass
the computers power monitoring devices. After running tests of all critical systems, the Shuttle
Atlantis departed with replacement computers to be delivered on board an unmanned Russian
supply ship (Progress). While the fix seemed to work, it was not immediately clear why it
worked.
This was not the first command and control computer system failure—in 2001 the mass
storage drives on the US side had suffered a failure and had to be replaced. 86 Again in February
2002, the main computer shut down for several hours before the crew and ground controllers
were able to reboot it. 87 It was however, the first major failure of all three, redundant computer
systems. The Russian computers were developed and manufactured by Daimler Benz (German
company) almost a decade before. The initial starting point for a solution was to determine what
might have triggered the event (root cause analysis). The astronauts had just connected the new
truss elements a few minutes before the failure sequence began. Both the Russians and NASA
were aware that the ISS electrical properties can change with each new configuration. It was
known that the Russian computer system design was sensitive to static noise and voltage spikes –
thus the need for a sophisticated power monitoring system. With the addition of a major solar
array and the movement of an existing one, it appeared that this was an obvious source of a static
or electrical spike that might cause a computer failure. The US modules used a structural ground
system while the Russians used a floating ground approach. Adding a major new module or
element could cause a potential difference between the Russian ground and the ISS structure. 88
The basic theory at the time was that the electrically charged plasma field shifted when the ISS’s
shape changed with the addition of the new truss and solar panels. 89 Both NASA and the
Russian space companies alluded to this as a probable cause—and both proved to be premature
and wrong. 90
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After the Atlantis left, the ISS crew (Russians Fyodor Yurchikhin and Oleg Kotov and
American Clayton Anderson) disassembled the individual systems to troubleshoot possible
causes. They suspected the power monitoring system since the bypass around it allowed the
computers to work (though it did present a risk to possible voltage spikes). While disassembling
the power monitoring systems they discovered connection pins that were corroded and wet.
Performing continuity checks, they discovered that one of the main lines had shorted out. More
surprising, when they and ground personnel simulated the failure of the lines, they discovered
that this created a power off command to all three of the “redundant” processing units—they had
a single point failure designed into the system.
A Russian Progress 26P re-supply ship was launched on 2 Aug 2007 to bring supplies
and replacement computers (new models built by ESA). On August 8, the Endeavor launched
with STS-118 crew to install another major truss segment and to continue work on the computer
system. Further investigation by the crew found the source of the corrosion—water
condensation. They determined that the units were close to dehumidifiers that mal-functioned,
ejecting water vapor on the unit. When the boxes were removed for replacement, their bases
were wet and mold was discovered.
The good news for the ISS was that the computers did not have a fatal flaw. The same
computer system was built into the European Columbus Laboratory Module that was scheduled
to fly later in 2008. They also were on the Automated Transport Vehicle scheduled for 2008
launch. Replacing and or redesigning that system would have been a major problem for both
systems.
In retrospect, this incident focused questions on key areas of the systems engineering
process:
1. Did the requirements and integration process encompass all needed areas?
a. Grounding issues and electrical impacts of configurations changes
b. Impacts of humidity on electronics and the adequacy of the environmental
control system
c. Systems integration between international systems
2. Was the test and evaluation process sufficient?
a. How did the German/Russian system contain a single point failure node?
b. How are configuration changes modeled, studied and tested?
c. Were the computers/electronics properly tested for the ISS environment?
3.4.5

Transportation

Transportation to the ISS is a major part of the system that is equal in importance to the
safety and reliability of the ISS itself. The US Skylab experience is a painful reminder that a
failure to integrate the schedule, budget and planning of a new system with all critical elements
can lead to unwanted outcomes. In the case of Skylab, the system was totally dependent on the
old Apollo systems for initial launch and servicing, and then the promised availability of the
shuttle for continued operation and support. In hindsight, it appeared questionable why the US
would launch a system that could be used for only one year (1973-74), cancel the existing
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transportation system (Apollo), and then expect to park it in orbit for at least five years (until late
1978) on the hope that the Space Shuttle would be on schedule and capable of immediately
performing maintenance missions. This obviously demonstrates the challenge inherent in US
plans to retire the Shuttle in the 2010 timeframe with a known gap in US crew transport to
service the ISS. 91 This is a basic systems engineering requirements discussion coupled with
budget and politics. However, the benefits of international partnership highlights the fact that
even if the US is unable to sustain the ISS, the robust partnership is in place to sustain it.
3.4.5.1 Impacts of launch delays (Columbia failure)
From the beginning of the ISS program, the
space shuttle fleet was considered an essential part of
the ISS program and critical to its completion. The
Space Shuttle (Figure 38) is the only vehicle capable of
carrying large payloads of up to 36,000 lbs into low
earth orbit. The remaining ISS major modules were
designed to be carried on the shuttle. The shuttle also
transports the multi-purpose logistics module to the ISS
which is loaded with cargo, supplies, experiments and
other key life support items. It is removed from the
cargo bay and docked with the ISS for unloading. At
the end of the mission, it is loaded with trash, waste
material and experiments and placed in the shuttle bay
for return to earth.

Figure 38. Space Shuttle

Throughout the program, the schedule has always been optimistic and included little
slack to accommodate risk. At a very top level, much of the program cost is for the “standing
army” of scientists, engineers and technicians that work for NASA, its partners, and its
contractors. For the Shuttle this is the large team required to process the vehicle for flight. For
the ISS the significant problem is the extended development time that requires maintaining the
team at a higher staffing level. As the program slips for a variety of reasons, this “fixed yearly
cost” continues and raises the total program cost. Several major government and NASA panels 92
have studied these issues and recommended major program changes to reduce cost—most of
which also reduced the final size or capability of the ISS and the number of shuttle flights.
When the shuttle Columbia was lost in February 2003, NASA grounded all remaining
shuttles indefinitely pending the outcome of the accident investigation. This meant a day for day
slip in the ISS construction schedule, plus a serious problem on how to logistically support the
station and transport astronauts. The Russians already were providing Soyuz and Progress
flights carrying six astronauts per year plus cargo. Initially, many options were contemplated,
including bringing the Americans home from the ISS. The inventories of food and supplies were
carefully updated and tracked closely on orbit and on the ground to determine the feasibility of
continuing ISS operations relying solely on Russian capability. A strategy eventually developed
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that reduced the crew aboard ISS from three to two—one Russian and one American—and
officially lengthened the Increment duration from approximately 4 months to a standard 6
months to fit the Soyuz rotation schedule. Upon completion of Increment 6, the ISS complement
was reduced to two people. This situation was managed as a temporary situation, although it
eventually lasted two and a half years.
The grounding of the Shuttle fleet lasted until July of 2005 (almost 30 months) with the
launch of the shuttle Discovery. It was then another year (July 2006), before the next shuttle
visited the ISS. This caused a number of impacts to the ISS program: 93


The number of Progress vehicles was increased to 3-4 per year to provide
logistics support. This required a modification to the exemption of the Iran, North
Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act.



Shuttle payloads already packed and certified had to be unpacked and the contents
safely stored. Some of the contents and equipment had to be serviced, and in
some cases replaced due to their time sensitive natures (such as batteries and
fluids)



A solar array awaiting launch had to be unpacked and unfurled and then
recertified. Another solar array wing had to be returned to the factory and
replaced since it was only allowed to be in storage (tightly packed in its container)
for a fixed period of time.



The single most significant impact was the reduction of crew size for several
expeditions from 3 to 2. This was done largely to improve margins on critical
logistics.



Obviously, only limited repairs could be made on the ISS without spare parts or
new equipment. Without new research and or maintenance equipment, the ISS
crew used the existing resources more—which contributed to higher failure rates.
Very limited equipment was flown on Progress and Soyuz.



A normal part of every shuttle mission was the return of science experiments,
especially time sensitive experiments. The Soyuz vehicle had very little space to
return payloads; so much of this research was not completed.

While the total cost of the delay may never be known, it was significant.
estimated that the following were the major issues they faced that drove cost:
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The 30-month delay before resuming normal flight schedules extended the cost of
maintaining the ISS support staff and contractors to finish development



Numerous requirements to recertify equipment



Disassembly, reassembly and in some case repair of component parts



Cost of additional storage



Cost of maintaining and replacing consumables (especially batteries)



Storage effects on the solar arrays

“Impact of the Grounding of the Shuttle Fleet,: GAO Report GAO-03-1107, September 2003.
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Additional cost of Russia support flights and the cost of travel and working with
Russians



Continued cost of maintaining critical engineering skills on the program for an
additional 30-40 months.

3.4.5.2 Russian Soyuz and Progress vehicles
From the start of the ISS program, it was assumed that there would be service and
transportation missions consisting of the US Space Shuttle, Soviet expendable vehicles (Soyuz
and Progress) along with future systems to be developed. The Russians had extensive
experience with their early space stations through the more recent Mir program with launching
cargo and cosmonauts. They developed very reliable automated docking capability that allowed
them to routinely use unmanned Progress resupply vehicles.
For crewed transportation, the Russians have used their Soyuz systems successfully 16
times carrying 47 astronauts up to the ISS and returning 48 astronauts to Russia. However,
recent return missions in the Soyuz have raised some fears about the safety of the Russian
system. On 21 October 2007, Soyuz TMA-10 undocked from the ISS for an expected, normal
return carrying two cosmonauts and a space flight participant (paying passenger). Normally, the
utility module is detached and sent in a safe direction to de-orbit and burn up. The propulsion or
instrument assembly module is bolted to the bottom and provides the required de-orbit burn to
slow the spacecraft and align it for reentry (See Figure 39). Once on course, the propulsion
module’s explosive attachment bolts fire and the two are separated. The capsule then begins its
reentry in a heat shield down mode where it “skims” along the atmosphere from the lift
generated which limits the heat buildup and limits the G-force on the astronauts to a 4.5 G
maximum.

Figure 39. Soyuz Manned Vehicle
In this case, the capsule failed to properly separate from the propulsion module
(apparently due to a control cable issue) and was not able to fly the normal trajectory. Instead,
after the propulsion module separated, the capsule went into a fail-safe mode and took a steep,
ballistic trajectory. This subjected the crew to almost 9 Gs plus generated significant burn
damage to the capsule’s exterior.
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Figure 40. Fire at Scene of Soyuz Capsule Landing
The capsule landed hard, several hundred kilometers off course, and was so hot it started
a grass fire around the capsule (see Figure 40). One of the cosmonauts reported later that the
grass fire burned quite heavily causing smoke to enter the ventilation system of the capsule
(normally opens upon landing) causing the three cosmonauts to switch back to their spacesuit
breathing modes.
Six months later (April 2008), a similar incident occurred. 94 This time Soyuz TMA-11
was returning one American (ISS Commander Peggy Whitson), a Korean and a Russian
astronaut when the capsule failed to properly separate. This time the culprit was thought to be
faulty explosive separation bolt. Once again, when the normal systems failed, the capsule
defaulted to the fail-safe mode and performed a ballistic trajectory subjecting the astronauts to a
high G reentry. The Korean astronaut suffered back injuries as a result of the hard landing.
As a result of these two incidents, two Russian cosmonauts on the ISS made a spacewalk
in July 2008 to remove one of the explosive bolts from the Soyuz TMA-12 that was docked and
planned for an upcoming descent. That Soyuz did successfully return with a near perfect landing
in October 2008 with two cosmonauts and an American tourist.
The Progress supply ship has an excellent record with over thirty-seven missions to the
ISS. Compared to the Soyuz, it does not have to safely reenter the atmosphere and land—instead
it is normally filled with waste and sent on a trajectory to burn up in the atmosphere. NASA has
decided to stop using Progress after 2011 in favor of promised US-based commercial launch
providers. Several firms are competing for contracts to provide logistics support to the ISS in the
post 2010 time frame. (See section 3.2.6)
This policy decision to not spend money on Russian vehicles and instead invest the
money in American technology made good domestic public policy sense. However, from a
systems engineering risk viewpoint, it must take into account the TRL levels of the replacement
systems, the cost, the schedule, the risk and the relevant MTBF of the new systems. As an
example, one of the US competitors is Space Exploration Technologies Falcon 1 rocket (See
94

“Space Crews Hard Landing Raises Hard Questions,” James Oberg, MSNBC News.
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Figure 41). It completed its first successful
launch on 28 September 2008 after three
previous failures and plans on delivering 1000
kg payloads to low earth orbit for about $10M.
3.4.5.3 Retirement of the Shuttle
Two key parts of any well-engineered
system of systems are that all parts work well
with each other (integration and performance)
Figure 41. Space Exploration Falcon 1
and that the various systems are available when
Rocket
needed. In the case of the ISS and the Shuttle,
the Shuttle was always destined to be a key
element of the successful construction and station operation.
In later testimony to Congress, 95 the Administrator explained that the decision to retire
the Space Shuttle is basically one of trading off the ISS (and its completion) against future
manned spaceflight capability if it requires extending the Shuttle beyond 2010:
“Retirement of the Space Shuttle is on schedule for 2010 and critical to future
Exploration plans. As we approach this date, we are hopeful that we can complete
the ten remaining Space Station assembly flights, the servicing mission to the
Hubble Space Telescope, and the two contingency Shuttle missions to the ISS
within this timeframe. If it becomes clear that we will not complete the flight
manifest by 2010, NASA will evaluate options and make adjustments consistent
with not flying any flights beyond 2010. Continuing to fly the Shuttle beyond 2010
does not enhance U.S. human spaceflight capability, but rather delays the time
until a new capability exists and increases the total life cycle cost to bring the new
capability on line. . . . Flying the Space Shuttle past 2010 would carry significant
risks, particularly to our efforts to build and purchase new transportation systems
that are less complex, less expensive to operate, and better suited to serving both
ISS utilization and exploration missions to the Moon, Mars, and beyond.”
The decision to retire the shuttle has been controversial. From a systems engineering
viewpoint, the decision should consider risk, cost, safety and performance to decide what the
best overall approach should be. Further, with a significant downward trend in the economy
NASA programs are not at the top of Congressional priorities, and are thus vulnerable, especially
when already winding down. Such a budgetary position tends to lead to “status quo” in
congressional direction: the sense that NASA should plod on with the existing year’s mode of
business until directed otherwise. In this backdrop of political and financial reality, George W.
Bush’s vision for NASA in February 2004 required the shutting-down of two existing programs
with expensive but functioning infrastructure, with ongoing missions that had been actively
cultured as priorities with the American public and with many international partners. Once the
“keep on operating” status quo was replaced with a “keep on shutting down, and waiting for the
next big thing” status quo, NASA was deeply limited and constrained in its ISS systems
95

Statement of Administrator Michael Griffin to the Subcommittee on Space, Aeronautics and Related Sciences, 15
November 2007
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engineering options. While the shuttle program’s realities were of course more dire than ISS’s
with their more immediate shut-down, the ISS also faced a highly uncertain and less desirable
future than the one for which it had been designed. The entire ISS maintenance strategy had to
be re-engineered for a slow obsolescence with no chance of major Shuttle repair flights or
ground refurbishment of critical large system components. The logistics and crew rotations
would be severely cut back from original plans. Meanwhile, the inevitable delays in the Orion
spacecraft have led to a long forecast period of no US launch capability, significantly dulling the
accustomed luster of the US Space program on the world stage.
The Shuttle has been the primary transportation for long duration US crew members and
for short term US research, construction and visits by US astronauts. If the Shuttle is terminated
after 2010, the US will be dependent on the Russians for crew transportation until a domestic
capability is ready. Initial analysis done by NASA indicates a gross requirement for sustainment
supplies of 80 metric tonnes (MT) between 2010 and 2015. Additionally, the plan is to occupy
the ISS with a full time crew of six, with each crew doing six month rotations. Of the six person
crew, three would be Russian and three would be from the US, Canada, Europe or Japan. The
US has current arrangements with the Russians for crew launches (Soyuz) through 2011 only and
for limited Progress flights. 96
Sustaining the International Partnership
A major question for the US and its partners is how well the international partnership has
worked and what may be useful on future cooperative ventures. There is little doubt that the
participation by the IPs allowed the program to succeed much more quickly and more
successfully than if the US had shouldered the entire program. In fact, the dissimilar redundancy
in launch capability ensured the continuation of the program through the Columbia accident
down time.


Despite the different systems engineering environments, the IPs were able to work
with the joint SE structure and integrate modules and systems that came from
very different development processes.



It is quite possible that Congress and/or a US President would have cancelled the
program had not an IP arrangement occurred to execute the new ISS design. 97

From our partner’s viewpoints, there were some major challenges: 98


The Japanese invested heavily in the program early on and met their original
schedules only to face months and years of wait times prior to launch and/or on
orbit participation.
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As a reference point, in 2005, NASA paid Russia $43.8M for one seat up to the ISS and one seat down using the
Soyuz vehicle.
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3.4.6



The Russians were essentially on schedule to deliver the first module (Functional
Cargo Block—FGB) as it was funded by the US. Their next major module,
Zvezda, was almost two years late, primarily due to Russian funding issues.



ESA and CSA have all remained in the program, but like all IPs, their level of
financial support has varied and is often a function of domestic politics.

Anomaly Resolution and the Columbia Accident

A major issue that has challenged NASA and other managers of major programs is how
to handle technical and or performance anomalies that occur. This has been at the heart of the
two Shuttle accidents and at incidents related to the ISS and other NASA programs. This
involves the proper identification, reporting, investigation, resolution and documentation for all
ISS crew, hardware and software issues. At issue is how to have the full resources of NASA
(and the international team) quickly focus on and solve a problem before the ISS and its crew are
placed in peril—while at the same time not declaring an emergency with every possible incident
and making the operation of the ISS impossible. Following the Columbia accident, NASA
reviewed its policies to include anomaly resolution for the ISS. 99 The main recommendations
(October 2003) that affected the ISS were as follows:


The ISS will provide capability to do external surveys of visiting spacecraft as
well as itself. ISS external surveys of itself (to discover damage or maintenance
issues) are limited in certain areas without Shuttle support. The ISS and crew
since that time have completed surveys and developed procedures for regular
inspections.



The board directed the ISS team to review all of its analytical models that are
used to support on-orbit operations, anomaly resolution and decision making
processes.



Evaluate and improve ISS shielding and planning to avoid damage from
micrometeoroid or orbital debris damage. This has taken the form of additional
shielding, movement of the station and new procedures and equipment to handle
possible impact damage.



The report directed the ISS team to address major nonconformance report issues.
The most serious was that the Space Shuttle reaction jet drive system did not have
adequate failure tolerance to control against an inadvertent firing when attached to
the ISS. This was fixed.



While not a hardware issue, one of the most important recommendations was a
major review and validation of the ISS anomaly resolution process and its work
instructions, to assure that proper resources were assigned and processes were
begun in a timely manner to deal with anomalies early.
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“NASA’s Implementation Plan for International Space Station Continuing Flight,”October 28, 2003.
the ISS Program’s response to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board’s Report.
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This was

3.4.7

Major Risks to the ISS

As part of the SE process, NASA and its international partners have had to carefully
consider all design elements and requirements. A key consideration is the remoteness of the ISS
relative to traditional systems and the inability to rapidly provide additional support (i.e., quickly
supply spare parts or personnel onsite). The most likely operational safety risks are briefly
discussed below along with their demonstrated or planned solutions.


Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) Damage: 100 There are millions of
particles in orbit that range from micro-millimeter sized particles to large pieces
of decaying spacecraft. While most large pieces are tracked, there is always a
probability of impact. For the larger tracked items, the ISS can be moved given
enough warning. The ISS is designed with a level of protection in its outer skin
for most modules. MMOD debris panels have been added to protect the Russian
modules and the living quarters. There is also the danger of impact during
extravehicular activities, as the space suits have a lesser level of protection. The
probabilities of MMOD impacts have been studied to show how safety is
improved with service module augmentations in place and additional Russian
Progress and Soyuz enhancements:
Table 3. Probability of Penetration Damage to the ISS

Existing ISS Design

With Service Module
Augmentations in
Place

With Service Module
Augmentations plus
Progress and Soyuz
Enhancements

No Penetration

45%

54%

71%

Isolate the
Penetrated
Element

19%

16%

11%

Penetration
Leading to ISS
Abandonment

18%

14%

8%

Repairable
Penetration

9%

8%

5%

Penetration
Leading to Loss
of ISS and/or
crew

9%

8%

5%

As the table indicates, 101 there is a very good chance that the ISS will sustain some level
of appreciable damage during its lifetime.
100

A further discussion on micrometeorite and orbital debris protection is at 3.3.7.

101

SM stands for service module
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Collision with vehicles or remote manipulator systems: The MIR program
demonstrated that collisions between the various vehicles and the ISS are a real
possibility. 102 A major engineering challenge of the ISS was how to unload cargo
and personnel from arriving space vehicles and how to move the new or old
module around for installation. Arriving vehicles all have a combination of
automated and manual docking interfaces and procedures. These vehicles use a
three-tiered approach to ensure safety:
1. The vehicles must have at least a two-failure tolerant approach against
catastrophic outcomes. The system must have onboard fault detection,
isolation and reconfiguration capability plus the ability to self monitor all
critical functions. It must have an independent collision avoidance maneuver
function. There must be a manual ground and crew monitoring capability to
follow progress and react to out of tolerance situations. It must have
robustness against failed capture capabilities.
2. The second level of protection requires that the ground station be able to
monitor all aspects of the activity with the ability to abort while the ISS crew
must be able to monitor and take evasive actions.
3. The third level of protection requires the new systems to demonstrate key
capabilities during their first flight while maintaining a safe distance from the
ISS prior to an actual attempted docking.



There is also a risk of damage from any of the space station’s robotic arms. In
some case, there are definite limits to their movement that prevent damage.
However, most have to have the ability to reach most areas of the ISS to be
useful. The key approaches to safety for these operations center on two-fault
tolerant designs, extensive crew training, monitoring by the crew and the ground
support and careful mission design and simulation.



Fire: This is a major hazard and the primary safety approach is prevention. In the
early design phase, the engineers carefully selected fire-safe materials and
mechanical/electrical designs with low probability of fire creation. There is also
extensive fire detection (smoke and heat alarms) throughout the ISS to provide
quick warning of any dangerous situations. The ISS system was designed to
identify the fire site, isolate the area (remove power, ventilation and oxygen), and
extinguish the source without damaging the station or endangering the crew. The
physics of a fire in space make this a very unlikely but still dangerous possibility.
A chronic problem early in the program was that the very sensitive smoke
detectors (particularly those in the FGB) would too often alarm ground operators
and crew at nuisance levels. Although there have been dozens of alarms, not a
single actual fire has occurred onboard. The ISS is also equipped with hand-held
fire extinguishers and the crew is trained in their use.

102

The MIR was hit on at least two separate occasions, once with a Progress transfer vehicle and another with a
Soyuz. The Progress accident caused a module to depressurize.
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Toxic Spills: The main means of preventing toxic spills is by not bringing toxic
materials on board or containing them in spill-proof devices. When toxic items
are allowed, the crew follows strict procedures for using the items and conducting
the experiments or procedures. The crew has well-practiced procedures for
cleaning spills in microgravity and has access to full protective gear if needed. 103



Catastrophic system failure: This type of failure and its prevention permeate the
SE approach to the ISS. At each stage of review, methods for reducing this risk
are considered—redundancy, sound design specification, rigorous testing, and
risk assessment. After the Columbia accident, the ISS management team took the
opportunity to focus on the ISS to see if any significant risk remained. If found,
these are documented in noncompliance reports (NCR). The only significant
NCR remaining at this time dealt with the shuttle reaction jet driver (RJD) and
primary jet thrusters. The danger was that they might inadvertently fire and
damage the ISS. NASA quickly studied the issue and dictated no fire zones
during certain key operations, performing avionics checks prior to system
activation, and performing each flight’s first-time Shuttle equipment power-up
before Shuttle docking to the ISS.



Extravehicular Activity (EVA): This is primarily the safety of the astronauts, their
equipment and the contamination of their equipment and danger of damaging the
exterior of the ISS. The most important preventative measure has been the
extensive planning and practice of the EVAs. Each EVA has been rehearsed
underwater (when possible) for hundreds of hours prior to the missions to ensure
the astronauts understand the repair, have the right tools, and have the EVAs
orchestrated properly using the robotic arms if needed. There is also an intravehicular crew member always coordinating with the EVA crew. The biggest
danger to date has been a concern about damaging the suits. This can happen due
to a rip or tear, chemical exposure or contamination or puncture by a meteorite or
orbital debris.
The suits are a compromise between flexibility and impact
protection. The current EVA requirement for MMOD is to meet a probability of
no penetration of 91% against two member performing 2700 hours of EVAs.
Current analysis puts the actual probability at 94%. So far, there has been no
evidence of a MMOD impact to any of the EVA suits.



There is a danger of contamination from ISS materials and lubricants. On a
recent mission (18 November 2008) an astronaut was preparing to repair and
lubricate one of the solar array joints. 104 In a pre-packed tool kit, the astronaut
opened the bag and discovered one of the grease cartridges for the grease gun had
“exploded,” contaminating everything in the bag—along with the astronaut’s
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On 19 Sept 2006, the first ever “emergency” was declared on the ISS when a Russian oxygen generator
(Elekton) malfunctioned and began to overheat. It caused an o-ring to overheat and smoke, which allowed some
potassium hydroxide to leak. The three astronauts quickly donned protective gas masks and implemented their
emergency procedures to isolate the module and the spill. They cleaned up the spill with towels and used special
carbon filters to scrub the air. Within a few hours, the station air was clean again and the situation was over.
(Associated Press Report, Seth Borenstein, 19 Sept 2006)
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“Engineers Study Options for Replacing Lost Grease guns,” William Harwood, CBS News, 18 Nov 2008
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gloves and sleeves. The cleanup method was to basically wipe up the grease with
towels and store the dirty towel and most of the grease in plastic pouches. In this
case, the problem is more than just a minor mess; the remaining grease on the
space suit can contaminate the airlock, the space station interior and exterior—to
include sensors and exterior experiment payloads.


3.5

Errant Commands or Security Compromises: The ISS by design shares a great
deal of control with the ground stations. There is always a danger of an outside
source compromising the security and sending false commands. The ISS design
and operation meet all NASA and National Security Agency (NSA) requirements.
The systems are tested and challenged regularly to maintain system security.
There is also a risk of an inadvertent critical command from NASA. Commands
that could cause catastrophic damage are required to be two-stage commands—a
separate “arm” and then “fire.” Additionally, these types of commands are
automatically safed and require approval by Mission Control Center personnel at
Houston and must also be approved by the mission flight director. There is also
software protection on other critical commands that query the crew with “are you
sure” messages that must be acknowledged. NASA reports that each year, over
100,000 commands are sent to the station with a command accuracy exceeding
99.95%.

Long Term Outlook

The long-term challenges for the ISS are more financial and political in nature than
systems engineering problems. The United States, like its IPs, is facing economic pressures
during a down economy while trying to develop a new crewed launch system (see Figure 42) and
a new exploration program to the moon and beyond (dubbed the Constellation Program). As
discussed earlier, the US decision to retire the shuttle has had major impacts on the ISS
completion and operation. The US has also discussed possible retirement dates for the ISS and
what that would mean to its partners. Many of the partners invested and developed their
modules with the plan of a long station life on orbit. Many, including the Russians, are even
considering possible new additions to the ISS for research. 105 The possibility of an early shut
down of the ISS would have negative impacts on future cooperative efforts.
In May 2009 the station's crew was expanded from three to six astronauts, A record 39
Russian space launches were planned for 2009, as opposed to 27 in 2008 (not all to ISS, but an
indicator of the robustness of the Russian program, even in light of the world’s financial crisis).
While the Constellation Program competes for budget with the legacy ISS program, it
also may become the biggest supporter and benefactor of the ISS. 106 During the development
phase of the new program, it will have to do a capabilities-based assessment of planned
technologies. Many of these new or modified technologies will be needed for long duration
space missions and will require extensive validation. While some tests are quite feasible on the
105

“The Role of Space Stations in Russia’s Long Term Exploration Strategy,” Valery Borisov and Andrey
Golovinken, IBC Workshop, Berlin, November 17, 2006.
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Michael Clifford, and Joy Bryant, The Boeing Company, AIAA conference paper.
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ground, the best method is to test them in the environment in which they will operate—outer
space. The ISS as a test bed for space exploration is the best tool to evaluate the acceptable
tradeoff between new technology, manufacturing maturity and applicability for long duration
spaceflights.
Despite political and financial challenges, there are some indications that the ISS may
already be suffering premature aging issues that could shorten its lifespan. In January 2009, 107
ISS rockets were commanded to fire to move the station into a higher orbit as part of routine
station-keeping. An incorrect delay filter was loaded for the “off pulsing” delta-V burn, allowing
the jet pulses to hit a resonance with fundamental ISS structural modes. The jet firing filter is
designed to prevent just such an occurrence, and the resonant excitation had the potential to
severely limit the fatigue life of the ISS, which diminishes roughly as the fourth power of the
magnitude of the applied load. This load reached previously unexpected levels during the
incident. Onboard video confirmed that the station shook severely—much like a ship in a violent
storm. The vibration episode was severe enough that the three astronauts notified mission
control and ground engineers did a full check of the station’s systems. While nothing was found
to be wrong, ground controllers delayed additional thruster burns for two months to give them
time to recheck the systems. NASA Space Station program manager Mike Suffredini noted that
while this event appears not to have harmed the station, its total lifetime has been shortened due
to extra stress on its components over the years.
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Figure 42. Orion Visiting the ISS
4.0
4.1

SUMMARY
Summary

The International Space Station definitely has been the most complex NASA systems
engineering program to date. Despite the enormous challenge of dealing with International
Partners, multiple configurations and a dynamic political environment, the ISS is close to
completing its final configuration and becoming fully operational. A major element of its
success has been the program management and effective systems engineering process that NASA
has developed and executed over the last three decades.
The success of the ISS traces back to the original decisions to use much of the
demonstrated technologies from the Skylab, Space Station Freedom, Shuttle missions and
eventually, the Russian contributions that were proven onboard MIR and it predecessors. While
many of the systems were updated, it was done in an evolutionary manner that reduced system
86

risk, reduced cost and minimized schedule risk. Another major part of the success was the team
effort to develop advanced element-to-element physical and functional verification methods for
interfaces assembled on-orbit. While this was also applied at the sub-system level, this helped to
discover and quickly fix many system problems that would have been very difficult, if not
impossible to fix once on orbit. Finally, NASA and its partners developed an excellent systems
engineering approach to handle the 40+ on-orbit configurations that placed demanding
requirements on unique software, hardware and operational requirements every time the ISS was
upgraded with the next component or modules. Such evolutionary performance is atypical of
almost every other complex electromechanical system, and its complexity is compounded by the
additional strict requirements of human-rated space hardware.
NASA and its partners also had problems that the system engineering approach had to
either deal with or work around. The biggest issue was program uncertainty from all the
countries as budgets were adjusted or eliminated during the life of the program. The current plan
for the Shuttle retirement and the uncertain lifespan of the ISS (prior to decommissioning)
remains a major issue for the ISS partners.
4.2

Lessons Learned

We interviewed experts and asked what they felt were the most important lessons learned
for NASA systems engineers. While there were a variety of responses, those responses tended to
repeat the same core topics discussed below:


Sometimes difficult topics need to be finessed with the use of less-than-precise language.
While open to interpretation or requiring future interpretation, such constructive ambiguity
allows negotiators to move beyond an impasse. 108



Don’t be so ready to chase revolutionary designs over evolutionary designs. A key lesson
from Russian experience (such as the Soyuz) is that it is often less risky to stay with a known
design and provide minor improvements.



Multi-Element Integrated Testing with actual hardware, high fidelity simulators and
connectors is critical and must be in the program from day one.



Systems engineering involves communications, critical to international partnerships, so
before worrying about technical interfaces, make sure the integrated product teams and
communication bandwidth between partners are optimal. This fundamentally includes faceto-face meetings, so regular international travel is a large and essential part of the systems
engineering cost.



In an ISS like project where so many different countries and companies contribute hardware
and software, the interfaces must be extremely simple.



Maintaining a high level of competent and experienced personnel over a two decade long
program requires strategic level planning and execution of workforce planning. Despite
budget realities, cyclical hiring and layoffs due to budget minimized workforce competence.



Don’t be too quick to allow partners (or NASA) to start building modules or expensive
experiments too far in advance of locking in schedule and program baseline. 109
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Conversely, physically simple models are important, especially in the early systems
engineering phase. These should be budgeted for and provided on a continuing basis. A
simple turned-wood model can be produced overnight to illustrate most of the complex
geometries of a typical spacecraft, and such a model definitely beats using lay-around objects
such as pencils and salt shakers to imitate construction or rendezvous details. Generally,
appropriate crude models were scarce, with the Program waiting for the next design iteration
before commissioning an official one-of-a-kind public relations model. Such lower-fidelity
models were most needed by the engineers during the process to get to that next iteration.
Some of the most rapid gains in the US integration with Russian partners occurred with crude
models cut from cardboard and wood during breaks between meetings. (One team even built
a full-scale cardboard mockup of a key US-Russian interface along their meeting table during
a week-long meeting, and filled in many interface control details using a tape measure
against the model).
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This is not unique to the ISS. NASA previously built a back-up Skylab that was not used and today hangs in the
Smithsonian as one of the most expensive exhibits. The Russian Multi-Purpose Logistic Module is another
example of major hardware that was started, then stopped, then started again and finally launched into space.
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APPENDIX 2. ACRONYMS

1P Progress flight 110

CMS Countermeasures System

1S Soyuz flight
AC Assembly Complete

CNES Centre National D’Études Spatiales
[French space agency]

ACU Arm Control Unit

COF Columbus Orbital Facility

ARC Ames Research Center

COL-CC Columbus Control Centre

ARIS Active Rack Isolation System

COTS Commercial Orbital

ATCS Active Thermal Control System

Transportation Services

atm Atmospheres

CPDS Charged Particle Directional
Spectrometer

ATV Automated Transfer Vehicle, launched
by Ariane [ESA]

CRPCM Canadian Remote Power

ATV-CC Automated Transfer
VehicleControl Centre

Controller Module

BCA Battery Charging Assembly

CTB Cargo Transfer Bag

BCDU Battery Charge Discharge Unit

CWC Contingency Water Container

BSA Battery Stowage Assembly

DC Docking Compartment; Direct Current

CBM Common Berthing Mechanism

DCSU Direct Current Switching Unit

CC Control Center

DDCU DC-to-DC Converter Unit

CCAA Common Cabin Air Assembly
CCC Contaminant Control Cartridge

DDT&E Design, Development, Test, and
Evaluation

CDRA Carbon Dioxide Removal Assembly

DLR German Aerospace Center

CETA Crew and Equipment
TranslationAid/Assembly

DMS Data Management System

CSA Canadian Space Agency

CEV Crew Exploration Vehicle

DOS Long-Duration Orbital Station
[Russian]

CEVIS Cycle Ergometer with Vibration
Isolation System

EADS European Aeronautic Defence and
Space Company

CHeCS Crew Health Care System

ECLSS Environmental Control and Life
Support System

CMG Control Moment Gyroscope

ECS Exercise Countermeasures System

CMRS Crew Medical Restraint System

ECU Electronics Control Unit
EDR European Drawer Rack
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EDV Water Storage Container [Russian]
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EF Exposed Facility

HMS Health Maintenance System

EHS Environmental Health System

HRF Human Research Facility

ELC Expres Logistics Carrier

HTV H-II Transfer Vehicle [JAXA]

ELM Experiment Logistics Module

IBMP Institute for Biomedical Problems

EMU Extravehicular Mobility Unit

ICC Integrated Cargo Carrier

EPM European Physiology Module

ICS Internal Communications System

EPS Electrical Power System

IEA Integrated Equipment Assembly

ERA European Robotic Arm

IRU In-flight Refill Unit

ESA European Space Agency

ISPR International Standard Payload Rack

ESTEC European Space Research and
Technology Centre

ISS International Space Station

ETC European Transport Carrier

ITS Integrated Truss Structure

EVA Extravehicular Activity

IV-CPDS Intravehicular Charged Particle
Directional Spectrometer

ITA Integrated Truss Assembly

ExPCA EXPRESS Carrier Avionics

JAXA Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency

EXPRESS Expedite the Processing of
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JEM Japanese Experiment Module
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JEM-ELM Japanese Experiment ModuleExperiment Logistics Module

FRAM Flight Releasable Attachment
Mechanism

JEM-ELM-EF Japanese Experiment
Module-Experiment Logistics ModuleExposed Facility

FRGF Flight Releasable Grapple Fixture
FSA Roscosmos, Russian Federal Space
Agency

JEM-ELM-ES Japanese Experiment
Module-Experiment Logistics ModuleExposed Section

FSL Fluid Science Laboratory
GASMAP Gas Analyzer System for
Metabolic Analysis Physiology

JEM-ELM-PS Japanese Experiment
Module-Experiment Logistics ModulePressurized Section

GB Gigabyte
GCM Gas Calibration Module

JEM-PM Japanese Experiment ModulePressurized Module

GCTC Gagarin Cosmonaut Training Center

JEM-RMS Japanese Experiment ModuleRemote Manipulator System

GN&C Guidance, Navigation, and Control
GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite
System [Russian]

JSC Johnson Space Center

GPS Global Positioning System

kgf Kilogram Force

GRC Glenn Research Center

kN Kilonewton

GSC Guiana Space Center

KSC Kennedy Space Center
lbf Pound Force
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LF Logistics Flight

PDA Payload Disconnect Assembly

LiOH Lithium Hydroxide

PDGF Payload Data Grapple Fixture

LSS Life Support Subsystem

PLSS Primary Life Support System

Mb Megabit

PM Pressurized Module

MBS Mobile Base System

PMA Pressurized Mating Adapter

MBSU Main Bus Switching Unit

POC Payload Operations Center; Primary
Oxygen Circuit

MCC Mission Control Center

PROX OPS Proximity Operations

MDM Multiplexer-Demultiplexer

PSA Power Supply Assembly

MELFI Minus Eighty-Degree Laboratory
Freezer for ISS

PSC Physiological Signal Conditioner

MGBX Microgravity Science Glovebox

PTCS Passive Thermal Control System

MLE Middeck Locker Equivalent

PVGF Power Video Grapple Fixture

MLM Multipurpose Laboratory Module

PVR Photovoltaic Radiator

MMOD Micrometeoroid/Orbital Debris

RED Resistive Exercise Device

MMU Mass Memory Unit

RGA Rate Gyro Assembly

MOC MSS Operations Complex

RM Research Module

MPLM Multi-Purpose Logistics Module

RMS Remote Manipulation, Manipulator
System

MSFC Marshall Space Flight Center

RPC Remote Power Controller

MSS Mobile Servicing System

rpm Revolutions Per Minute

MT Mobile Transporter

ROEU-PDA Remotely Operated Electrical
Umbilical-Power Distribution Assembly

NASA National Aeronautics and Space
Administration

RPCM Remote Power Controller Module

NAVSTAR Navigation Signal Timing and
Ranging [U.S. satellite]

RSC Rocket and Space Corporation

NPO Production Enterprise [Russian]

RV Reentry Vehicle

NTO Nitrogen Tetroxide

S&M Structures and Mechanisms

NTSC National Television Standards
Committee

S0 or S Zero, Starboard trusses

OMS Orbital Maneuvering System

SARJ Solar (Array) Alpha Rotation Joint

OGS Oxygen Generation System

SAFER Simplified Aid for EVA Rescue

ORU Orbital Replacement Unit

SASA S-Band Antenna Structural Assembly

OVC Oxygen Ventilation Circuit

SAW Solar Array Wing

P1, P6, etc. Port trusses

SFOG Solid Fuel Oxygen Generator

S1, etc.

PCAS Passive Common Attach System
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SFP Space Flight Participant

TMG Thermal Micrometeoroid Garment

SGANT Space-to-Ground Antenna

TNSC Tanegashima Space Center

SM Service Module

TORU Progress Remote Control Unit
[Russian]

SPDM Special Purpose Dexterous
Manipulator

TSC Telescience Support Center

SS Space Shuttle

TSS Temporary Sleep Station

SSA Space Suit Assembly

TSUP Moscow Mission Control

SSIPC Space Station Integration and
Promotion Center

TVIS Treadmill Vibration Isolation System

SSRMS Space Station Remote Manipulator
System

UF Utilization Flight

UDMH Unsymmetrical Dimethylhydrazine
UHF Ultra-High Frequency

SSU Sequential Shunt Unit

ULF Utilization and Logistics Flight

STS Space Transportation System

UMA Umbilical Mating Assembly

TCS Thermal Control System

USOC User Support and Operations Centre

TDRS Tracking and Data Relay Satellite

VDC Voltage, Direct Current

TEPC Tissue Equivalent Proportional
Counter

VDU Video Distribution Unit

TKS Orbital Transfer System

VOA Volatile Organic Analyzer

TKSC Tsukuba Space Center

WRS Water Recovery System

TMA Transportation Modified
Anthropometric

Z1 Zenith 1, a truss segment
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APPENDIX 3. SPACELAB MISSIONS
•
•
•
•

STS-9, Spacelab 1, November 1983, Module LM1 and Pallet (Columbia)
STS-51-B, Spacelab 3, April 1985, Module LM1 (Challenger)
STS-51-F, Spacelab 2, July 1985, triple Pallet configuration (Challenger)
STS-61-A, Spacelab D1, October 1985, Module LM2 (Challenger)

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

STS-35, ASTRO-1, December 1990, Pallet (Columbia)
STS-40, SLS-1, June 1991, Module LM1 (Columbia)
STS-42, IML-1, January 1992, Module LM2 (Discovery)
STS-45, ATLAS-1, March 1992, double Pallet configuration (Atlantis)
STS-50, USML-1, June 1992, Module LM1 (Columbia)
STS-47, Spacelab-J, September 1992, Module LM2 (Endeavour)
STS-56, ATLAS-2, April 1993, Pallet (Discovery)
STS-55, Spacelab D2, April 1993, Module LM1 (Columbia)
STS-58, SLS-2, October 1993, Module LM2 (Columbia)
STS-59, SRL-1, April 1994, Pallet (Endeavour)

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

STS-65, IML-2, July 1994, Module LM1 (Columbia)
STS-68, SRL-2, October 1994, Pallet (Endeavour)
STS-66, ATLAS-3, November 1994, Pallet (Atlantis)
STS-67, ASTRO-2, March 1995, Pallet (Endeavour)
STS-71, Spacelab-Mir, June 1995, Module LM2 (Atlantis)
STS-73, USML-2, October 1995, Module LM1 (Columbia)
STS-78, LMS, June 1996, Module LM2 (Columbia)
STS-83, MSL-1, April 1997, Module LM1 (Columbia)
STS-94, MSL-1R, July 1997, Module LM1 (Columbia)
STS-90, Neurolab, April 1998, Module LM2 (Columbia)
STS-99, SRTM, February 2000, Pallet (Endeavour)
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APPENDIX 4. PHASE ONE—SHUTTLE-MIR MISSIONS

1994
STS-60: First Cosmonaut on the Shuttle
Sergei K. Krikalev was the first Cosmonaut to fly aboard the Shuttle.

Feb
3 - 11

1995
Feb
3 - 11

STS-63: First Rendezvous with Mir
With Cosmonaut VladiMir Titov aboard, Discovery rendezvoused with Mir,
closed to within 37 feet, and performed a fly-around, but did not dock.

Mar 14
- Jul 7

Thagard Increment: First Astronaut on Mir
Astronaut Norman Thagard launched with Cosmonauts VladiMir Dezhurov and
Gennady Strekalov aboard a Russian Soyuz to spend 115 days on Mir.

Jun 27
- Jul 7

STS-71: First Docking
Atlantis performed the first shuttle docking with Mir; delivered a replacement
crew -- cosmonauts Anatoly Solovyev and Nikolai Budarin -- and returned
Dezhurov, Strekalov, and Thagard to Earth.

Nov
12 - 20

STS-74: A New Docking Module
The first shuttle assembly flight to Mir, it carried a Russian-built, U.S.-funded
docking module with two attached solar arrays.
1996

Mar
22 - 31

STS-76: Starting a Continuous U.S. Presence
This mission carried Shannon Lucid to Mir, demonstrated logistics capabilities
with a Spacehab module, and placed experiment packages on Mir's docking
module during a spacewalk.

Mar 22
- Aug 26

Lucid Increment: One for the Records
Shannon Lucid began the continuous U.S. presence on Mir and set a U.S. single
spaceflight record of 188 days. The Priroda module, with about 2,200 pounds of
U.S. science hardware, was docked to Mir.

Aug
16 - 26

STS-79: Blaha Succeeds Lucid
This mission included a double Spacehab module. It brought Lucid home and
replaced her with John Blaha.

Aug 16 Jan 22,
1997

Blaha Increment: Keeping it Going
Blaha spent four months with the Mir-22 Cosmonaut crew conducting material
science, fluid science, and life science research.
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1997
Jan
12 - 22

STS-81: Linenger Succeeds Blaha
On this mission, Jerry Linenger replaced Blaha.

Jan 12
- May 24

Linenger Increment: A Spacewalk and a Fire
Linenger conducted the first spacewalk by a U.S. astronaut wearing a Russian
spacesuit and experienced the onboard fire in February.

May
15 - 24

STS-84: Foale Succeeds Linenger
This mission carried up Linenger's replacement Mike Foale, along with Russian
mission specialist Elena V. Kondakova.

May 15
- Sep 25

Foale Increment: Collision and Recovery
Foale experienced the collision with the Progress, which damaged the Spektr
module and caused the loss of some science experiments. A remarkable salvage
and replanning effort by Foale and the science community maximized the
scientific return. Foale conducted a spacewalk with Anatoly Solovyev to survey
damage to the Spektr module.

Sep 25
- Oct 6

STS-86: Wolf Succeeds Foale
David Wolf boarded Mir with this mission, replacing Foale. Astronaut Scott
Parazynski and cosmonaut VladiMir Titov conducted a joint spacewalk, the first
in which a Russian wore a U.S. spacesuit.

Sep 25 Jan 31,
1998

Wolf Increment: Back Toward Normal
Wolf conducted a spacewalk in January with cosmonaut Solovyev to conduct
scientific experiments.

1998
Jan
22 - 31

STS-89: Thomas Succeeds Wolf
This mission replaced Wolf with Andy Thomas. The flight also carried cosmonaut
Salizhan Sharipov to Mir.

Jan 22
- Jun 12

Thomas Increment: Smoothest Sailing
Thomas studied meteorology, ocean biochemistry, and human adaptation to
microgravity.

Jun
2 - 12

STS-91: Closing Out Shuttle-Mir
This mission picked up Thomas and conducted scientific investigations. Phase 1
came to a close.
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APPENDIX 5. INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION MISSION SUMMARIES
Spacecraft Launch

Landing/
Mission
Deorbit

Crew**

Mission
1998

Zarya FGB
STS-88

1998
Nov. 20

In
progress

1A

Control Module

1998
Dec. 4

1998 Dec.
15

2A

Unity (Node 1) delivery

Robert D. Cabana, Frederick W.
Sturckow, Jerry Ross, Nancy J. Currie,
James H. Newman, Sergei Krikalev

1999
STS-96

1999
May 27

1999 June
6

2A.1

Strela/logistics delivery

Kent V. Rominger, Rick D. Husband,
Tamara E. Jernigan, Ellen Ochoa, Daniel
T. Barry, Julie Payette, Valeri Tokarev

2000
James D.. Halsell, Scott J. Horowits, Mary
Ellen Weber, Jeffrey N. Williams, James
S. Voss, Susan Helms, Yuri Usachev

STS-101

2000
May 19

2000 May
29

2A.2a

Logistics delivery

Zvezda

2000
July 12

In
progress

1R

Service Module

-

Progress
M1-3

2000
Aug. 6

2000 Nov.
1

1P

Cargo supply

-

STS-106

2000
Sept. 8

2000
Sept. 19

2A.2b

Logistics delivery

Terrence W. Wilcutt, Scott D. Altman,
Daniel C. Burbank, Edward Tsang Lu,
Richard Mastracchio, Yuri Malenchenko,
Boris Morukov

STS-92

2000
Oct. 11

2000 Oct.
24

3A

Z-1 truss, PMA-3
docking port delivery

Brian K. Duffy, Pamela A. Melroy, Koichi
Wakata, Leroy Chiao, Peter J.K. Wisoff,
Michael E. Lopez-Alegria, William S.
McArthur
Bill Shepherd, Yuri Gidzenko, Sergei
Krikalev (up) Talgat Musabaev, Yuri
Baturin, Dennis Tito (down) **

Permanent presence of the crew of three
Soyuz TM31

2000.
Oct. 31

2001 May
6

2R

1st resident crew
delivery

Progress
M1-4

2000
Nov. 16

2001 Feb.
8

2P

Cargo supply

2000
Dec. 1

2000 Dec.
11

4A

Endeavour
STS-97

-

Brendt Jett, Michael J. Bloomfield, Joseph
Delivery of the P6
R. Tanner, Marc Garneau, Carlos I.
section with solar arrays
Noriega
2001

Atlantis
STS-98

2001
Feb. 7

Progress M- 2001
Feb. 26
44

Kenneth D. Cockrell, Mark L. Polansky,
Destiny (US lab) delivery Robert L. Curbeam, Marsha S. Ivins,
Thomas D. Jones

2001 Feb.
20

5A

2001 April
13

3P

Cargo supply

James Wetherbee, James Kelly, Andrew
Thomas, Paul Richards; Yuri Usachev,
James Voss, Susan Helms (ISS-2: up),
Bill Shepherd, Yuri Gidzenko, Sergei
Krikalev (ISS-1: down)**

-

Discovery
STS-102

2001
March 8

2001
March 21

5A.1

1st and 2nd resident
crew exchange,
Leonardo cargo module
delivery and return

Atlantis
STS-100

2001
April 19

2001 May
1

6A

Remote manipulator
delivery, Raffaello cargo
module delivery and
return

Kent V. Rominger, Jeffrey S. Ashby, Chris
A. Hadfield, John L. Phillips, Scott E.
Parazynski, Umberto Guidoni, Yuri V.
Lonchakov

Soyuz TM32

2001
April 28

2001 Oct.
31

2S

Soyuz rescue vehicle
replacement

Talgat Musabaev, Yuri Baturin, Dennis
Tito (up)** (This crew returned onboard
Soyuz TM-31)
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Progress
M1-6

2001
2001
May 21 Aug. 22

4P

Cargo supply

Atlantis
STS-104

2001
2001 July
July 12 24

7A

US airlock delivery and
installation (four tanks on
two Spacelab pallets)

Steven W. Lindsey, Charles O. Hobaugh,
Michael L. Gernhardt, Janet L. Kavandi,
James F. Reilly

Discovery
STS-105

2001
Aug.
10

2001
Aug. 21

7A.1

2nd and 3rd resident crew
exchange; Cargo module
delivery and return

Scott "Doc" Horowitz, Frederick Sturckow,
Patrick Forrester, Daniel Barry; Frank
Culbertson, Vladimir Dezhurov, Mikhail
Tyurin (ISS-3: up); Yuri Usachev, James
Voss, Susan Helms (ISS-2: down)

2001
Progress MAug.
45
21

2001
Nov. 22

5P

Cargo supply

-

In
progress

3R

Docking Compartment 1
delivery

-

3S

Soyuz rescue vehicle
replacement

2002
March 20

6P

Cargo supply

2001
Dec. 17

UF1

3rd and 4th resident crew
exchange; The Rafaello
cargo module delivery and
return; Starshine-2
deployment

Progress /
DC-1

2001
Sept.
15

Soyuz TM- 2001
2002
33
Oct. 21 May 5
Progress
M1-7

2001
Nov.
26

Endeavour 2001
STS-108 Dec. 5

-

Viktor Afanasiev, Konstantin Kazeev, Claudie
Haigneré (ESA) (This crew returned onboard
Soyuz TM-32)
Dom Gorie, Mark Kelly, Linda Godwin, Daniel
Tani; Yuri Onufrienko, Daniel Bursch,
Carl Walz (ISS-4: up); Frank Culbertson,
Vladimir Dezhurov, Mikhail Tyurin (ISS3: down)

2002
Progress
M1-8

2002
March
21

2002
June 25

7P

Cargo supply

Atlantis
STS-110

2002
April 8

2002
April 19

8A

S0 truss delivery

2002
Nov. 10

4S

Soyuz rescue vehicle
replacement

Endeavour 2002
2002
STS-111 June 5 June 19

UF2

4th and 5th resident crew
exchange; Leonardo
Multipurpose Logistics
Module, Mobile Base System
delivery

2002
Progress MJune
46
26

2002
Oct. 14

8P

Cargo supply

-

-

2002
Soyuz TMApril
34
25

Progress
M1-9

2002
Sept.
25

2003
Feb. 1

9P

Cargo supply

Atlantis
STS-112

2002
Oct. 7

2002
Oct. 18

9A

S1 truss delivery

5S

Soyuz rescue vehicle
replacement; ISS-6 return

Soyuz TMA- 2002
2003
1
Oct. 30 May 4

2002
Endeavour
Nov.
STS-113
23

2002
Dec. 7

Michael J. Bloomfield, Stephen N. Frick, Rex
J. Walheim. Ellen Ochoa, Lee M. E. Morin,
Jerry L. Ross, Steven L. Smith
Yuri Gidzenko, Roberto Vittori, Mark
Shuttleworth. (This crew returned onboard
Soyuz TM-33)
Ken Cockrell, Paul Lockhart, Franklin ChangDíaz, Philippe Perrin; Yuri Onufrienko,
Daniel Bursch, Carl Walz (ISS-4: down);
Valery Korzun, Peggy Whitson, Sergei
Treshev (ISS-5: up)

Jeffrey S. Ashby, Pamela A. Melroy, David A.
Wolf, Piers J. Sellers, Sandra H. Magnus,
Fyodor N. Yurchikhin.
Sergei Zalyotin, Yuri Lonchakov, Frank De
Winne (Belgium/ESA: up). (This crew
returned onboard Soyuz TM-34) Ken
Bowersox, Don Petit, Nikolai Budarin
(ISS-6: down)

Jim Wetherbee, Paul Lockhart, Michael
P1 truss, Expedition 6 and 5 Lopez-Alegria, John Herrington, Ken
11A
exchange
Bowersox, Don Petit, Nikolai
Budarin.(ISS-6: up); Valery Korzun,
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Progress
M1-6

2001
2001
May 21 Aug. 22

4P

Cargo supply

Atlantis
STS-104

2001 July
2001
July 12 24

7A

US airlock delivery and
installation (four tanks on
two Spacelab pallets)

Steven W. Lindsey, Charles O. Hobaugh,
Michael L. Gernhardt, Janet L. Kavandi,
James F. Reilly

Discovery
STS-105

2001
Aug.
10

2001
Aug. 21

7A.1

2nd and 3rd resident crew
exchange; Cargo module
delivery and return

Scott "Doc" Horowitz, Frederick Sturckow,
Patrick Forrester, Daniel Barry; Frank
Culbertson, Vladimir Dezhurov, Mikhail
Tyurin (ISS-3: up); Yuri Usachev, James
Voss, Susan Helms (ISS-2: down)

2001
Progress MAug.
45
21

2001
Nov. 22

5P

Cargo supply

-

In
progress

3R

Docking Compartment 1
delivery

-

3S

Soyuz rescue vehicle
replacement

2002
March 20

6P

Cargo supply

2001
Dec. 17

UF1

3rd and 4th resident crew
exchange; The Rafaello
cargo module delivery and
return; Starshine-2
deployment

Progress /
DC-1

2001
Sept.
15

2002
Soyuz TM- 2001
Oct. 21 May 5
33
Progress
M1-7

2001
Nov.
26

Endeavour 2001
STS-108 Dec. 5

-

Viktor Afanasiev, Konstantin Kazeev, Claudie
Haigneré (ESA) (This crew returned onboard
Soyuz TM-32)
Dom Gorie, Mark Kelly, Linda Godwin, Daniel
Tani; Yuri Onufrienko, Daniel Bursch,
Carl Walz (ISS-4: up); Frank Culbertson,
Vladimir Dezhurov, Mikhail Tyurin (ISS3: down)

2002
Progress
M1-8

2002
March
21

2002
June 25

7P

Cargo supply

Atlantis
STS-110

2002
April 8

2002
April 19

8A

S0 truss delivery

2002
Nov. 10

4S

Soyuz rescue vehicle
replacement

2002
Endeavour 2002
STS-111 June 5 June 19

UF2

4th and 5th resident crew
exchange; Leonardo
Multipurpose Logistics
Module, Mobile Base System
delivery

2002
Progress MJune
46
26

2002
Oct. 14

8P

Cargo supply

-

-

2002
Soyuz TMApril
34
25

Progress
M1-9

2002
Sept.
25

2003
Feb. 1

9P

Cargo supply

Atlantis
STS-112

2002
Oct. 7

2002
Oct. 18

9A

S1 truss delivery

5S

Soyuz rescue vehicle
replacement; ISS-6 return

2003
Soyuz TMA- 2002
Oct. 30 May 4
1

2002
Endeavour
Nov.
STS-113
23

2002
Dec. 7

Michael J. Bloomfield, Stephen N. Frick, Rex
J. Walheim. Ellen Ochoa, Lee M. E. Morin,
Jerry L. Ross, Steven L. Smith
Yuri Gidzenko, Roberto Vittori, Mark
Shuttleworth. (This crew returned onboard
Soyuz TM-33)
Ken Cockrell, Paul Lockhart, Franklin ChangDíaz, Philippe Perrin; Yuri Onufrienko,
Daniel Bursch, Carl Walz (ISS-4: down);
Valery Korzun, Peggy Whitson, Sergei
Treshev (ISS-5: up)

Jeffrey S. Ashby, Pamela A. Melroy, David A.
Wolf, Piers J. Sellers, Sandra H. Magnus,
Fyodor N. Yurchikhin.
Sergei Zalyotin, Yuri Lonchakov, Frank De
Winne (Belgium/ESA: up). (This crew
returned onboard Soyuz TM-34) Ken
Bowersox, Don Petit, Nikolai Budarin
(ISS-6: down)

Jim Wetherbee, Paul Lockhart, Michael
Lopez-Alegria, John Herrington, Ken
P1 truss, Expedition 6 and 5 Bowersox, Don Petit, Nikolai
11A
exchange
Budarin.(ISS-6: up); Valery Korzun,
Peggy Whitson, Sergei Treshev (ISS-5:
down)
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Columbia accident grounds the Shuttle fleet, forces the reduction of the ISS crew to two
Progress M- 2003
Feb. 2
47

2003
10P
Aug. 28

Cargo supply

-

6S

Soyuz rescue vehicle
replacement; ISS-7 crew
delivery

11P

Cargo supply

-

2004
Progress M- 2003
12P
Aug. 29 Jan. 28
48

Cargo supply

-

Soyuz TMA-2

2003
2003
April 26 Oct. 28

Progress M1- 2003
10 No. 259 June 8

Soyuz TMA-3

2003
Oct. 3

2004
2003
7S
Oct. 18 April 30

Soyuz rescue vehicle
replacement; ISS-8 crew
delivery

Yuri Malenchenko, Ed Lu (ISS-7)

Alexander Kaleri, Michael Foale (ISS-8),
Pedro Duque (ESA/Spain) (Duque returned
onboard Soyuz TMA-2)

2004
2004
Progress M1- 2004
11 No. 260 Jan. 29 June 3

-

13P

Cargo supply

2004
2004
April 19 Oct. 24

8S

Soyuz rescue vehicle
replacement; ISS-9 crew
delivery

2004
July 30

14P

Cargo supply

-

2004
Progress M- 2004
15P
50 No. 350 Aug. 11 Dec. 23

Cargo supply

-

Soyuz TMA-4

Progress M- 2004
49 No. 249 May 25

Soyuz TMA-5

2005
2004
9S
Oct. 14 April 24

2005
Progress M- 2004
16P
51 No. 351 Dec. 24 March 9

Gennady Padalka, Michael Fincke (ISS-9),
André Kuipers (ESA) (Kuipers returned
onboard Soyuz TMA-3)

Leroy Chiao, Salizhan Sharipov (ISS-10),
Soyuz rescue vehicle
replacement; ISS-10 crew Yuri Shargin (Shargin returned onboard Soyuz
TMA-4)
delivery
Cargo supply

-

2005
2005
Progress M- 2005
17P
52 No. 352 Feb. 28 June 16

Cargo supply

-

Sergei Krikalev, John Phillips (ISS-11),
Soyuz rescue vehicle
Roberto Vittori (Italy) (Vittori returned
2005
2005
10S replacement; ISS-11 crew
Soyuz TMA-6
onboard Soyuz TMA-5) (Gregory Olsen: down
April 15 Oct. 11
delivery
only)
2005
Progress M- 2005
18P
53 No. 353 June 17 Sept. 7
Discovery
STS-114

2005
July 26

Progress M- 2005
54 No. 354 Sept. 8
Soyuz TMA-7

2005
Oct. 1

2005
Aug. 9

LF1

2006
19P
March 3
2006
April 9

Cargo supply
Raffaello Multi-Purpose
Logistics Module delivery
and return, cargo supply
Cargo supply

Eileen Collins, James Kelly, Charles Camarda,
Wendy Lawrence, Soichi Noguchi (Japan),
Steve Robinson, Andy Thomas
-

William McArthur, Valery Tokarev, Gregory
Soyuz rescue vehicle
Olsen (up only) (Gregory Olsen returned
11S replacement; ISS-12 crew
onboard Soyuz TMA-6) Marcos Pontes (Brazil)
delivery
down only

2006
Progress M- 2005
20P
55 No. 355 Dec. 24 June 19

Cargo supply

-

2006
2006
Soyuz TMA-8 March
30

2006
Sept.
29

Pavel Vinogradov, Jeffrey Williams,
Soyuz rescue vehicle
Marcos Pontes (Brazil) (up only) (Pontes
12S replacement; ISS-13 crew
returned onboard Soyuz TMA-7); Anousheh
delivery
Ansari (down only)
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2006
Progress MApril
56 No. 356
24

2006
Sept.
19

21P

Cargo supply

-

2006
Progress MJune
57 No. 357
24

2007
Jan. 17

22P

Cargo supply

-

Discovery
STS-121

2006
July 4

Multi-Purpose Logistics
Module (MPLM);
Integrated Cargo Carrier
Steven Lindsey, Mark Kelly, Lisa Nowak,
2006
(ICC);
Michael Fossum, Stephanie Wilson, Piers
ULF1.1
July 17
Lightweight Multi-Purpose
Sellers, Thomas Reiter (up only)(ESA).
Experiment Support
Structure Carrier (LMC);
ESA astronaut delivery

Atlantis
STS-115

2006
Sept.
9

2006
Sept.
21

12A

Second port truss
segment (ITS P3/P4)
Second set of solar arrays
and batteries

2006
Soyuz TMASept.
9
18

2007
April
21

13S

Michael E. Lopez-Alegria, Mikhail Tyurin,
Soyuz rescue vehicle
replacement; ISS-14 crew Anousheh Ansari (up only) (returned onboard
Soyuz TMA-8) Charles Simonyi (down only)
delivery

2006
Progress MOct.
58 No. 358
23

2007
March
28

23P

Cargo supply

12A.1

Third port truss segment
(ITS P5) delivery;
SPACEHAB single cargo
module and Integrated
Cargo Carrier (ICC)
remain in the cargo bay

Discovery
STS-116

2006
2006
Dec.
Dec. 9
22

Brent W. Jett Jr., Christopher J. Ferguson,
Heidemarie M. Stefanyshyn-Piper, Joseph R.
Tanner, Daniel C. Burbank and Steven G.
MacLean, CSA.

Mark Polansky, William Oefelein, Robert
Curbeam, Joan Higginbotham, Nicholas
Patrick, Christer Fuglesang (ESA); Sunita
Williams (up only; returns onboard STS-117);
Thomas Reiter (ESA) (down only);

2007
2007
Progress MJan.
59 No. 359
18

2007
Aug. 1

Soyuz TMA- 2007 2007
April 7 Oct. 21
10
2007
Progress MMay
60 No. 360
12

Atlantis
STS-117

2007
Sept.
25

2007
2007
June
June 8
22

Progress M- 2007 2008
61 No. 361 Aug. 2 Jan. 22

Endeavour
STS-118

2007
2007
Aug.
Aug. 8
21

2007
Soyuz TMAOct.
11
10

2008
April
19

24P

Cargo supply

14S

Expedition 15 delivery

25P

Cargo supply

13A

Second starboard truss
segment (ITS S3/S4) with
Photovoltaic Radiator
(PVR)
Third set of solar arrays
and batteries

26P

Cargo supply

Fyodor Yurchikhin, Oleg Kotov, Charles
Simonyi (up only; returned onboard Soyuz
TMA-9); Muszaphar Shukor (Malaysia); (down
only, launched onboard Soyuz TMA-11)
Frederick W. Sturckow, Lee Joseph
Archambault, James F. Reilly II, Steven R.
Swanson, Patrick G. Forrester, John D. Olivas,
Clayton C. Anderson (up only), Sunita L.
Williams (down only)
-

SPACEHAB Single Cargo
Module
Scott Kelly, Charlie Hobaugh, Tracy Caldwell,
Third starboard truss
Rick Mastracchio, Dave Williams, Barbara
13A.1
segment (ITS S5)
Morgan, Al Drew
External Stowage Platform
3 (ESP3)

15S
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Peggy A. Whitson, Yuri Malenchenko,
Sheikh Muszaphar Shukor (Malaysia) (up only;
returns onboard Soyuz TMA-10); So-yeon Yi,
(South Korea) (down only; launched onboard
Soyuz TMA-12)

Discovery
STS-120
Progress
M-62 No.
362

2007 Oct.
23

2007 Nov.
7

Pamela A. Melroy, George D.
Node 2 (Harmony) Zamka; Douglas H. Wheelock, Scott
E. Parazynski, Stephanie D. Wilson,
Sidewall - Power Paolo Nespoli (ESA); Daniel M.
and Data Grapple Tani; (up only) Clayton C.
Fixture (PDGF) Anderson (down only)
10A

2007 Dec.
23

2008 Feb.
15

27P

Progress
M-63

2008 Feb.
5

2008 April
7

Cargo supply

-

2008
28P

Cargo supply

-

Columbus
European
Laboratory Module

Atlantis
STS-122
ATV-1

2008 Feb.
7
2008 March
9

2008 Feb.
20
1E
2008
Sept. 29
ATV1

Multi-Purpose
Experiment
Support Structure
Non-Deployable
(MPESS-ND)
Cargo supply

Stephen Frick, Alan Poindexter,
Leland Melvin, Rex Walheim,
-Stanley Love, Leopold Eyharts
(ESA) (up only), Hans Schlegel
(ESA)
-

Kibo Japanese
Experiment
Logistics Module Pressurized
Section (ELM-PS)

Endeavou 2008 March 2008
r STS-123 11
March 26

Soyuz
TMA-12

2008 April
8

2008 Oct.
24

Spacelab Pallet - Dominic Gorie, Gregory H. Johnson,
Deployable 1 (SLP- Robert L. Behnken, Mike Foreman,
D1) with Canadian Rick Linnehan, Garrett Reisman,
Special Purpose (up only; returns with STS-124)
Dexterous
Takao Doi (JAXA); Leopold
Manipulator,
Eyharts (ESA) (down only; arrived
Dextre
with STS-122)
1J/A

16S
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Sergei Volkov, Oleg Kononenko, Soyeon Yi, (South Korea) (up only;
returns onboard Soyuz TMA-11);
Richard Garriott (down only; arrived
onboard Soyuz TMA-13)

Progress
M-64

2008 May
15

2008
Sept. 9

29P

Cargo supply

-

Kibo Japanese
Experiment
Module
Pressurized
Module (JEM-PM)

Discovery
STS-124
Progress
M-65

2008 May
31
2008 Sept.
10

2008 June
14
2008 Dec.
7

Soyuz
TMA-13

2008 Oct.
12

In
progress

Endeavou
r STS-126
Progress
M-01M
Progress
M-66

2008 Nov.
14
2008 Nov.
26
2009 Feb.
10

1J
30P

Cargo supply

-

17S

Expedition 18
delivery

E. Michael Fincke, Yury Lonchakov,
Richard Garriott, (USA) (up only;
returns onboard Soyuz TMA-12)

2008 Nov.
30
ULF2
2009 Feb.
8
31P
In
progress

Mark Kelly, Ken Ham, Karen
Nyberg, Ron Garan, Mike Fossum,
Japanese Remote Akihiko Hoshide, Greg Chamitoff
Manipulator
(up only); Garrett Reisman (down
System (JEM RMS) only; arrived with STS-123)

Christopher J. Ferguson, Eric A.
Boe, Stephen G. Bowen, Donald R.
Pettit, Robert S. (Shane) Kimbrough
and Heidemarie M. StefanyshynPiper; Sandra H. Magnus, (up
Leonardo Multi- only, returns with STS-119), Greg
Purpose Logistics Chamitoff (down only; arrived with
Module (MPLM) STS-124)
Cargo supply

-

2009
32P

Cargo supply
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-
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